[lbo-talk] The realist argument for a w/drawal schedule

Yoshie Furuhashi furuhashi.1 at osu.edu
Sun Feb 27 10:46:06 PST 2005


Michael Pollak mpollak at panix.com, Sat Feb 26 20:52:29 PST 2005:
>[What's interesting about this is that it argues that setting a
>clear timetable for withdrawal -- specifically over an 18-month
>period -- would be the best course of action even from a
>counter-insurgency perspective. It does a good job of meeting the
>standard objections. And needless to say, if such a withdrawal
>makes sense in war fighting terms, it holds out even more promise in
>terms of political benefits. For example, such a schedule would
>plausibly meet the condition set by the (Sunni) Association of
>Muslim Scholars, allowing them to initiate official cooperation with
>the government, as well as allowing the (Shia) Alliance to say they
>have delivered on one of their central campaign promises, thus
>giving their government more legitimatcy. Etc. A timetable like
>this would have built-in flexibility for delay if things turned out
>differently. But it could still be agreed to in good faith. From
>that perspective, 18 months seems like the perfect time period.]
>
>http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/steinberg/20050223.htm
>
>February 22 2005
>Financial Times
>
>Departure does not mean defeat
>By James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon
<snip>
>Critics of the exit strategy concept, starting with George W. Bush
>himself, argue it would embolden the resistance and discourage
>Iraqis who are trying to rebuild their country.
<snip>
>Over the period, Iraq would complete its political transition
>process after the drafting and ratification of a constitution this
>year and elections for a regular government in early winter. There
>would also be time to complete at least basic training of most of
>Iraq's main police and army formations.
>
>Even after the 18 months, the US should not abandon Iraq. A new
>mandate for a foreign military presence could be created, assuming
>the Iraqi government wanted it. US forces might still participate
>in the new mission, but would make up a much smaller percentage
>than the 85 per cent today. Such a force could be established under
>a Nato command, which would reduce the perception that the forces
>were designed to serve US political interests unrelated to the
>success of democracy in Iraq. (Non-Nato troops could also
>participate, and should be welcomed, as was the case in the Balkans.)
<snip>
>As the leading nation in Nato, the US would continue to have a
>dominant voice in the activities of such a force -- which might
>number 30,000-50,000 troops (in contrast to today's 175,000), and
>would continue to train Iraqi forces as well as provide emergency
>counter-insurgency backup.
<snip>
>James Steinberg, former deputy national security adviser in the
>Clinton administration, is vice-president and director of the
>foreign policy studies programme at the Brookings Institution;
>Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at Brookings

The linchpin of the plan of the realpolitik wing of the Democratic Party (whose voice is represented here by Michael O'Hanlon and James Steinberg), as well as the Republican Party, is "Iraq's main police and army formations." The best and brightest of that wing have nothing to say about whether and how Washington can create Iraqi police and army capable of and (at great personal costs to themselves) willing to fight for the Shia notables and clerics of the United Iraqi Alliance, Washington's current preferred choice for reshaping Iraq in Washington's image. The Shiite notables and clerics themselves, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, know very well that, considerable as the influence of some of them may be, they do not command the level of allegiance among Iraqis necessary for them to create (on their own or with American financial assistance alone) the Iraqi army and police loyal to them and large enough to defeat Iraqi resistance fighters, hold Moktada al-Sadr's forces at bay, and keep aspirations of Kurds (who have their own militias) in check. Therefore, it is essentially up to Washington to fund, train, equip, and supervise the Iraqi army and police, which cannot but undercut the authority of the institutions as well as the government they are ostensibly serving in the eyes of not only the Iraqi populace but also Iraqi army soldiers and police men themselves (a real blow to their morale and discipline).

The question of legitimacy aside, how is Washington doing in its struggle to establish the Iraqi version of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam?

<blockquote>Fewer than 30 percent of the 136,000 Iraqi security forces whom the Pentagon has said were trained and equipped are fully capable of conducting a broad range of independent missions in Iraq, and Iraqi Army units are suffering severe troop shortages, two top Pentagon officials told a Senate panel on Thursday.

General Richard Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that only about 40,000 of Iraq's security forces "can go anywhere and do anything," but he said that the remaining troops could also be useful.

He also said that American military commanders now suspected that the 79,000 Iraqi police officers and other Iraqi Ministry forces on official government rolls might not be as capable as Iraqi officials have asserted.

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told senators that Iraqi Army units had absentee rates of up to 40 percent at any given time because many new Iraqi soldiers had failed to return to duty after going home on leave.

At the hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Susan Collins, a Maine Republican, read an e-mail message from a Marine colonel who said Iraqi commanders in his area inflated their official troop levels and pocketed the extra budgeted monies. In one Iraq unit of 134 soldiers that the colonel noted, she said, 37 troops returned after being paid and going on leave.

"It's a different culture and it's difficult for us to understand," Myers said when asked to explain the problems, saying that the various Iraqi security units had different training standards and that Collins's example of corrupt Iraqi conduct was not widespread.

Taken together, however, the information at the hearing revealed new details of problems plaguing the fledgling Iraqi security forces and underscored the immense challenge the Bush administration faces in helping to whip the Iraqis into fighting form to secure their own country and allow the 150,000 U.S. forces there to leave eventually. (Eric Schmitt, "Iraq Security Forces Only 30% Trained," New York Times/International Herald Tribune, <http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/02/03/news/military.html>, February 4, 2005)</blockquote>

Fred Kaplan suspects worse.

<blockquote>Deeply buried in the Bush administration's 97-page supplemental budget request for $81.9 billion ($75 billion of it for the Pentagon), mainly to fund operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is one sentence that expresses-more succinctly and shockingly than any official statement to date-just how little progress we've made toward making Iraq a stable nation.

It's there in the section dealing with the $5.7 billion requested for the "Iraq Security Force Fund," which notes that the interim Iraqi government, with assistance from coalition nations, has already created a security force of 90 battalions, but then adds:

<blockquote>All but one of these 90 battalions, however, are lightly equipped and armed, and have very limited mobility and sustainment capabilities.</blockquote>

In other words, 89 of Iraq's 90 battalions essentially cannot fight. (Fred Kaplan, "Supplemental Insecurity," <http://www.slate.com/Default.aspx?id=2113575&fr=nl&>, February 15, 2005)</blockquote>

In any event, any plan that argues that Washington should first create the Iraqi army and police capable of propping up the government of Washington's choice and then leave is essentially a recipe for staying in Iraq indefinitely (until forced out by Iraqis themselves, that is).

Why does realpolitik become unhinged from reality? That is because the plan supposedly based on realpolitik is still "a strategy _for success_" (emphasis added, James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon, "Departure Does Not Mean Defeat," Financial Times, February 22 2005). Unless and until things get so bad that Washington is ready to withdraw troops, _knowing_ that its departure will be perceived as defeat by all thinking persons in the world (except perhaps to the right wing of the power elite and viewers addicted to Fox News fantasy), it won't quit Iraq. -- Yoshie

* Critical Montages: <http://montages.blogspot.com/> * Greens for Nader: <http://greensfornader.net/> * Bring Them Home Now! <http://www.bringthemhomenow.org/> * OSU-GESO: <http://www.osu-geso.org/> * Calendars of Events in Columbus: <http://sif.org.ohio-state.edu/calendar.html>, <http://www.freepress.org/calendar.php>, & <http://www.cpanews.org/> * Student International Forum: <http://sif.org.ohio-state.edu/> * Committee for Justice in Palestine: <http://www.osudivest.org/> * Al-Awda-Ohio: <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Al-Awda-Ohio> * Solidarity: <http://www.solidarity-us.org/>



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