[lbo-talk] Re-engineering Balochistan 1

uvj at vsnl.com uvj at vsnl.com
Sun Jan 2 04:40:27 PST 2005


OutLookIndia.com

Web | Dec 22, 2004

PAKISTAN

Re-engineering Balochistan

With the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) relatively secured, it is now Balochistan's turn -- the military crackdown is clearly slated for intensification.

KANCHAN LAKSHMAN

The stage for escalated, and possibly extraordinary, violence has been set in Balochistan. Addressing the media at Turbat in the province on December 16, 2004, President Pervez Musharraf declared that his government would crush all anti-Pakistan movements: "We are gathering information through intelligence and other sources that who is doing what in the area and I warn them because when the government starts action against them, they will be crushed."

This declaration of intent only completes what has been on the cards, at least since 31st March 2004, when the General had declared on the Pakistan Television (PTV) "Newsnight" programme, that the problem with Balochistan was that only 5 per cent of the area was 'A area', while 95 per cent was 'B', where the police did not operate. Soon, he had stated, the entire 95 per cent 'B area' would be made into 'A area'. Already, he disclosed further, five districts in the 'B area' had been declared 'A area'.

[The British colonial administration divided Balochistan into A and B Areas: the former were under direct British control and administration; in the latter, the British exercised proxy control through the Sardars or tribal chiefs. The system was continued after Independence by the Pakistan Establishment.]

With its vast potential for a wide range of natural resources, including oil, uranium, copper and other minerals, its critical strategic location - it commands over 900 miles of the Arabian Sea coastline, and the development, particularly, of the Gwadar Port with massive Chinese financial and technical assistance, 'stabilizing' Balochistan and consolidating Islamabad's administrative hold over the province is emerging as an overarching objective of the present regime. These objectives militate directly both against the long-standing system of near autonomy most of the province has enjoyed since and even before the creation of Pakistan, and against a number of critical demands consistently held by the Baloch people and leadership. Specifically, the Baloch Ittihad (Baloch Unity) movement seeks, among a range of other objectives, to bring an end to the exploitation of Baloch resources by Islamabad, particularly by North Punjab; to secure fair royalties for Baloch gas; to secure employment for locals in projects being executed in Baloch areas; and to ensure that revenues from various projects in Balochistan are invested in the province itself.

More significantly, the Baloch have long and bitter memories of Islambad's repression and betrayal over the past, and there is great venom against the 'Punjabis' in the Baloch discourse. In the 1950s, after an unsuccessful insurrection, Pakistan offered a General Amnesty to the rebels, but when their leaders came out they were hanged. This betrayal weighs heavily in the consciousness of the Baloch, as does the brutality with which the rebellion of the 1970s was suppressed, with indiscriminate use of superior firepower - including air power - against Baloch camps and villages in which thousands were killed.

But the current sentiment goes well beyond the bitterness of historical memories to a fear of an existential threat, as Islamabad unfolds its plans to transform the very character of all of Balochistan. The military regime has reportedly decided to replace the Levies (the local enforcement apparatus) and to provide full powers to the police to control law and order. This would bring 25 districts of Balochistan into province-wide policing, and do away with the traditional institution of Levies, which are manned substantially by the locals. The Federal Interior Ministry is reported to have finalized a Rupees 9.6 billion security plan under which the 'B areas' would be converted into 'A areas' under this scheme, and for which 9,866 personnel would be recruited.

Changing the structure of policing in Balochistan is central to a deeper re-engineering of the entire power structure in Balochistan. Many of the tribes have already been bought over or neutralized and it is only among a few dominant tribes such as the Bugtis and the Maris that an independent power base survives. The Pakistan Establishment has systematically diluted the traditional system of working through the Sardars, because the local leadership is no longer trusted. The Sardars, in turn, jealously guard their socio-political and financial control in the regions, and seek to 'keep the destiny of Balochistan in their own hands'. Each of Islamabad's new experiments at social engineering is, consequently, deeply resented, as is the increasing dominance of the 'Punjabis' in Islamabad.

Clearly, the Sardars now realize that Musharraf has confronted them with a 'do-or-die' choice. If the General succeeds in transforming all of Balochistan into 'A areas', the power of the Sardars will have ended. The current struggle is, consequently, quite different from the insurrections of the 1950s and the 1970s. The Sardars, in the present instance, are completely united. Earlier movements had individual tribes rebelling, and these were individually targeted in concentrated areas in the mountains into which they escaped.

The current and mounting insurgency is radically different. Presently, a majority of Balochistan is covered, and almost all tribes have been united in their opposition to Islamabad in the enveloping Baloch Ittihad. The political leadership of the Ittihad comprises Khair Buksh Murri, Akbar Bugti, Attaullah Mengal, Abdul Hayee Baloch and Hasil Bizenjo. Murri rejects the Parliamentary system, and is more prone to 'direct action'. Bugti leads a political party - the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), but also retains armed cadres. Mengel has adopted the path of political protest and mobilization, and is the Chairman of the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM). Hayee Baloch and Bizenjo are leaders of the National Party (NP). While Murri, Bugti and Mengel are Sardars, Baloch and Bizenjo come from ordinary middle class backgrounds. All have come together in a loosely cooperative structure under the banner of the Ittihad. This present movement, consequently, is an inclusive movement representing wide Balochi interests, not just the Sardars and there has been increasing popular consciousness of exploitation among the common Baloch, which now transcends elite interest groups.

This has translated into a calibrated and widely dispersed campaign of attacks virtually across the length and breadth of Balochistan. Total casualties have, however, remained relatively small - given the South Asia context - with some 94 dead and 303 wounded in the current year (till December 14). However, vital installations and state actors have been repeatedly targeted and the strife in Balochistan is emerging as a critical internal security problem for Islamabad. The most alarming aspect of this crisis, from Islamabad's perspective, is the sheer spatial and temporal distribution of attacks on the Army and security forces, vital installations and sporadic skirmishes. These have been reported throughout the year from north-central Balochistan (Kohlu and Dera Bugti), the capital Quetta (also the hub of sectarian terrorism) in the west, and Gwadar, Kech, and Khuzdar in the south. Encounters between the troops and 'Baloch nationalists' have been on the upswing since the middle of 2004 and furthermore, increased army presence ('protective deployment' according to military regime spokesperson Major General Shaukat Sultan) has led to high-profile targets like Chief Minister Jam Muhammad Yousaf falling under the compass of violence.

Nevertheless, the pattern of insurgent violence thus far suggests that the Balochis are essentially demonstrating their capabilities, rather than using them to the fullest. Hence, the low fatality levels, uncommon for violence-wrecked South Asia. Actions are being calibrated to a threshold that keeps the movement alive, while a fuller commitment is kept at abeyance till clearer assurance of support is secured from one or another external power. It is significant, in this context, to note that, though fatalities have been kept low, rocket attacks and improvised explosive device explosions have been an almost daily affair throughout 2004. In May 2004 alone, for instance, approximately 140 rocket attacks were recorded, targeting the gas pipelines in Sui, while some 120 rocket attacks were reported in June.

The insurgency has gradually spread across the whole of Balochistan, and is not concentrated in any one sector. Strikingly, there is no locus of command either, and the Balochis, wiser for their experience in the 1970s, appear to have ensured that their movement will not easily be 'decapitated'. A deeper scrutiny of the insurgency also reveals that no single leader is central to its survival, and there are indications derived from operational patterns that suggest that the movement has, in fact, been dispersed down to the level of cells comprising 2 to 10 persons.

Widening the strategic depth of the insurgency, the Baloch have sought to exploit the situation prevailing in Waziristan as well. Insurgents from the tribal belt have reportedly begun crossing into the mountain ranges of Balochistan. Tarique Niazi notes that, "they seamlessly melt into the latter's capital city, Quetta, which houses predominantly Pakhtun population, alongside the burgeoning demographic growth of Baluchs on its skirts."

However, the current insurgent activities are like warning shots fired over the bow, not an open insurgency as yet. While it is true that grievances which form necessary conditions for an insurgency are a reality in Balochistan, they have not been adequate enough, thus far, to trigger a major conflagration. Most violence is 'nationalist' and there is no co-operation between Islamists in the North and the Balochs, and there is little love lost between the Mullahs and the Sardars. Fortunately for Islamabad, though the Balochis are devout, they are not fundamentalist. Indeed, efforts by the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) to consolidate the influence of the Mullahs in Balochistan is seen as a direct threat to the power and influence of the Sardars.

The crisis has acquired additional urgency as a result of a multiplicity of 'externalities' linked to the strategic location and natural resources of the province. Chinese involvement is clearly growing in Balochistan, and as the region becomes increasingly important, its security dimensions cannot be neglected. Gwadar is, in fact, being projected as a major economic hub in the region, facilitating imports and exports between Pakistan and China. While negotiations are currently underway for investment and collaboration in coal-fired power generation, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz during his visit to China from December 14 to 18, 2004, signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the expansion of Gwadar seaport channel capacity for facilitating large vessels. Further, China is to continue work on the Rupees 16 billion Saindak Project as Pakistan has reportedly expressed its willingness to extend the lease of Saindak copper-gold mines in Balochistan for another 20 years. Crucially, the Gwadar Port is part of China's long-term strategy to consolidate its strategic presence in the region, and its maritime dominance in the Persian Gulf.



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