by Salam Max, AIC
Palestinians elected Mahmoud Abbas as President of the Palestinian Authority on Sunday 9th January, 2004, despite not having a state, not even having agreed borders or even access to their capital city, Jerusalem. The main question behind the elections was whether or not they could be “free and fair” under occupation.
The mainstream press went overboard in their support of the US/Israel favourite, Abu Mazen, and foreign states treated him like a president in the two months before the first vote was even cast. In addition, there were many reports of corruption and forged votes in the West Bank, which did not help foster any Palestinian illusions in the democratic process—people complained about Fatah members voting more than once in neighbouring areas, voting on behalf of others, and effectively campaigning on Polling day (which was banned by the elections committee) by mobilising dozens of “neutral” buses to transport voters to polling stations which just happened to have Fatah posters plastered all over them.
But the real problem was not the fairness of the elections or democracy as such, but the Israeli occupation itself. “What point is there in an election when I can’t even feed my children?” asked one woman in De Heisha refugee camp. Ultimately, it was widely held that elections will solve nothing in themselves, and in any case the decision had been made in advance. Israel had made it clear they would only deal with president Abbas.
The most potent reminder of the occupation disrupting the Presidential elections was in annexed Jerusalem, where only 5,700 Palestinians were to be allowed to vote by the State of Israel, out of 125,000 Palestinians residents. At 2.30pm this was changed after an 11th hour intervention by ex-US President Carter, by which time, most of the damage had already been done. Barghouti was arrested twice campaigning in Jerusalem; other candidates also complained they were refused entry; public display of election posters were outlawed in the city; and meetings were only permitted in private houses. Settlers demonstrated outside polling stations and had threatened to disrupt voting at the post offices. In the event, a few settlers wandering into East Jerusalem stood little chance against very large groups of “shebab” (Palestinian youth).
Palestine is not Iraq, where elections look less and less likely to be anything remotely close to democratic or even feasible under the increasingly bloody US/UK occupation. Palestinians have a 56-year-old occupation to cope with—and the roadblocks, invasions, assassinations and poverty inherent to it—meaning that there were in fact elections, but without the democracy. Nevertheless, casting a vote provided an opportunity to somehow express or reject the various political forces at work in Palestinian society.
The first thing to note was that the left failed to unite for the presidential campaign. The early chances of holding a united campaign by the democratic, secular left in the presidential elections were lost when the various factions could not agree on a candidate. This meant voters had three Independents, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP; initially a split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the PFLP), the Palestine Popular Party (PPP) (ex-Communists) and the PFLP-backed Mustafa Barghouti, who leads the NGO-based Palestine Initiative.
Marwan Barghouti, currently serving many life sentences as a political prisoner, pulled out of the race (twice, once as Fatah and once as an independent), reminding the PA leadership that this was not an election for a newly born state-let, but rather an expression of the state of the Intifada: with around 7,500 political prisoners—in many ways the vanguard of the Palestinian resistance—the main question is not of (not free and unfair) elections, but of Political resistance to occupation. In the end the militants of Fatah—from Gaza to Jenin, and throughout the Prisons across Israel—provided Abu Mazen with an easy ride by supporting his bid for Presidency.
Mustafa Barghouti, on the other hand, stood as head of the Palestinian Initiative, and gained PFLP support very late in the day. Until then, the PFLP had said that they would not stand in an election based on the Oslo accords. Gaining just below 20 percent of the vote (153,516), against Mazen’s 62 percent (483,039), he became the alternative to Fatah’s corruption and compromise. The DFLP gained just 3.5 percent, against the PPP’s 2.68, (which was barely a fraction above independent Abdel Halim Al-Ashqar’s share). Some on the left, however, saw PFLP support for Barghouti as opportunism—either on behalf of the PFLP (backing the second favourite at the last minute), or from Barghouti himself (an ex-communist searching for a home). The PFLP emphasized that Barghouti endorsed their support and programme for democratic reform of the PA, continuation of the Intifada, etc. Further, they said that the framework of the elections were now around the declaration of Palestinian independence, rather than the Oslo accords.
Because Hamas and Islamic Jihad boycotted these elections, it was left to the secular parties to fight amongst themselves, with the final result already decided in advance. This US/Israel backing of the Fatah reformist Abu Mazen meant a lack of enthusiasm at the outset. “Why bother voting?” asked Yasser Ibrahim, a taxi driver: “The Americans have already chosen who they want, so what difference will my vote make?” Around half of the eligible population, for one reason or another, also declined the chance to vote. Another common expression was: “In my heart I will vote for [Mustafa] Barghouti, but with my head, I will vote for Mazen.”
Hamas immediately declared they would work with Abu Mazen when he gained just over 60 percent. One dejected looking youth from Hebron (where turn out was very low in the city) described the new situation: “Now we have a new layer of the occupation. The US rules Israel, Israel occupies Palestine, and now Abu Mazen rules us on behalf of them both.”
But as soon as Gaza-based militants carried out an attack on the border crossing (killing three Palestinians as well as six Israelis) Sharon wasted no time in breaking off talks with Mazen, giving him “limited time” to “combat terrorism”, and further threatening: “If he does not change the rules of the game, then the Palestinians will pay an enormous price.”
Indeed, Palestinians have paid a heavy price already. Settlements are expanding, prisoners detained indefinitely and without charge, the roadblocks continue to suffocate society, and refugees persistently maintain their right to return with little sign of hope yet. Just three days after the election results were announced, Alaa Hassuna, 23-years-old, paid the ultimate price: shot dead by Israeli soldiers as he drove his pregnant wife towards a checkpoint in Gaza on his way to a hospital. Events like these confirm the dire prediction of the 16-year-old student from Hebron: “Nothing will change, except for the name of our president.”
What exactly will Mazen be able to achieve? J.D. Salah, of Jericho, aptly described the situation for Palestinians with Mazen as leader: “Israel is scared of Peace. They have a siege-mentality and need it to maintain a militarised, authoritarian society. Things might get a little better for us; maybe a truce and then a deal on the table, which will be even worse than Oslo. Effectively, Mazen will be able to do very little for us. It’ll be like administering morphine to a cancer patient: things might be less harsh for a few years, but that’s it.”
Mazen faces contradictory pressure from Israel and the US on the one hand, and from the militants, prisoners and supporters (inside and out of Fatah) on the other. He is supposed to represent not only those in Gaza and the West Bank as President of the PA, but also the millions of refugees world-wide, as leader of the PLO. One ex-prisoner from Jerusalem explained it bluntly: “If he sells us out cheaply, he’ll become a target. He’ll be gone in no time.”
Meanwhile, Hamas and the other Islamists have been gaining strength on the Palestinian street. They won around half of the 26 municipal elections in December, and are looking to take many more in March. They know that the US had chosen the president in advance: but they are set to begin taking over elsewhere. Hamas stole control from Fatah and from the PFLP in certain municipalities, where the secular parties had presumed they would win (and thus stood against each other as well as against the Islamists), sending a brief shockwave through the old leaders of the Intifada.
Unless the democratic and secular forces unite in a political struggle against the Islamists in both the next set of municipals and then the legislative council elections in July, they will pave the way for even greater Hamas gains. The Palestinian left needs to re-group and face up to the challenge of Islamism in the Middle East; to provide a strong alternative for Palestine to both the concessions and corruption of the PA, and to the growing religious fundamentalists of Hamas and Jihad. In any case, Mazen will find it difficult to play the role of Palestinian policeman, as he is expected to by Israel and the US. If he does cling to power and plays the role of American puppet, then he will be playing a very dangerous game indeed. The tightrope that Abu Mazen must now walk has no safety net below it, and it’s a long way to the other side.
For more on elections in Palestine:
http://www.palestinianelections.tk/ http://alternativenews.org/