Social Security reformers who make much of declining fertility rates fail to take women's wage labor and productivity into account. That a smaller proportion of the total population are working-age than before won't have any negative economic impact if a larger proportion of women are employed and/or productivity rates go higher than before..
Why is the proportion of older people in the total population higher today than in the past? That's in part because people are living longer on the average than before, but also because women are on the average having fewer children than before.
Total fertility rate (per woman) The number of children that would be born to each woman if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and bear children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates.
Total fertility rate
(per woman)
1970-75 2000-05
Developing countries 5.4 2.9 Least developed countries 6.6 5.1 Arab States 6.7 3.8 East Asia and the Pacific 5.0 2.0 Latin America and 5.1 2.5
the Caribbean South Asia 5.6 3.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 6.8 5.4 Central & Eastern Europe 2.5 1.4
& CIS OECD 2.5 1.8 High-income OECD 2.2 1.7 High human development 2.5 1.8 Medium human development 4.9 2.4 Low human development 6.8 5.6 High income 2.2 1.7 Middle income 4.6 2.1 Low income 5.7 3.7 World 4.5 2.7
<http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_47_1_1.html>
The more power women have, the fewer children they have -- see the differences among countries that enjoy "high human development," "medium human development," and "low human development" according to the United Nations.
The trend of declining fertility began in France in the eighteenth century:
<blockquote>In Europe and Japan, mortality decline did not occur precipitously as it has been occurring in IDT countries [countries "in demographic transition"]. Many developments in the fields of epidemiology, immunology and other health and medical advancements came slowly and as a result mortality rates too dropped slowly. Except for Japan, fertility rate decline also took a long time to occur in Europe.
The fertility rate in Europe fell before 1880 though infant mortality rates were high and population mostly lived in rural areas. France and French cultural regions such as Switzerland, and Belgium were probably the first where fertility rate began to decline. In France, though giving advice on birth control was forbidden by law and religion fertility decline started in the 18th century. According to Aflred Sauvy, "the reduction in the number of children arose out of the parents' worry about their children's prospects of climbing up and their own fears of sliding down" (as quoted by Samuel, 1965: 147). In Ireland, before the Potato Famine of the 1840s, economic difficulties and the law prohibiting subdivision of land motivated the Irish to limit family size by postponement of marriage. In 1871, half the Irish women in the age group 25-39 remained single compared to 36% of English women (Coulsen, 1984:58).
In Europe and Japan, it was the motivation for birth control that was more important than birth control techniques, their sophistication and availability when the fertility started to fall. For instance, _coitus interruptus_ was the mainstay of many couples when fertility declined within marriage. It was a common method used in all European countries during the early decades of the century. "Indeed in some European countries it was still in common use when fertility reached the level of replacement" (Santow, 1995:19) According to a study from Zaire, this is the "most widely practised method" in that country (Bertrand, et al., 1983: 3).
In most countries, fertility rate decline was preceded by a mortality rate decline. In others, fertility decline took place _pari passu_ with mortality decline. Contrary to what Malthus had feared, fertility responded to mortality declines because of improving living standards and rapid strides in health and medical fields. Often there was a time lag. Eventually though, a slower rate of population growth was attained as suggested in the Theory of Demographic Transition.
By the late 18th century, when the industrial age started in Europe, fertility rate was falling because of lower marriage rates and higher age at marriages. Some studies show that as many as 14 to 20 percent of women in Northwestern Europe never married (Coulsen, 1984: 58). The mean age at marriage was about twenty-five in Belgium, England, France, Germany, and Scandinavia.
Though some mortality rate decline was taking place in Europe, that decline was nowhere near what the IDT countries of today are experiencing. As a result, the annual population growth rate never exceeded 1.6 percent in Europe compared with four to five percent taking place in several Afro-Asian and Latin American/Caribbean countries. In addition, emigration from Europe was acting as a safety valve, reducing population pressures to a significant extent. During the period 1881-1910, emigration of about 50 million people is believed to have siphoned off a fifth of the natural increase in Europe to Australia, Canada, the U. S. and New Zealand. Between 1846 and 1932, 30 to 40% of the population increase in Italy, Portugal and Spain had emigrated 13 (Ibid:60).
Japan achieved a demographic transition in the postwar period. The fall in Japanese fertility rate is attributed to strong motivation to limit families brought about by socioeconomic factors (such as industrialization, urbanization, employment of women in non-agricultural occupations, increased literacy levels, the psychological impact of the defeat of Japan in the Second World War), the tradition of family limitation that allowed a couple to use any available technique including abortions aided by a permissive attitude in such matters by the government (Samuel, 1966: 15).
There are a number of conclusions one can draw from the experience of above-mentioned countries. First, fertility rate decline is possible in a rural population if there is a strong motivation to make this happen as exemplified in countries such as France, Hungary, Japan and Sweden. Irrespective of the availability of birth control methods, families will be limited if there is strong motivation to do so as seen in France where one of the main methods used was _coitus interruptus_. In Japan, it was abortion (Samuel, 1965). Second, making couples aware of the economic and social opportunities they may have access to, if they do not have the "excess baggage" of too many children because of education, is a strong motivation for family limitation. In England, for instance, fertility rate decline became more widespread when educational opportunities became available for all social classes. Third, the legitimacy of family limitation does not immediately result in the limitation of fertility. As seen from the French example, fertility rate decline occurs within cultural and linguistic boundaries promoted by better communication facilities. Fourth, international migration acted as a significant safety valve to relieve population pressure in Europe and bring down population growth rates.
(T. John Samuel, "World Population and Development: Retrospect and Prospects," <http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/decentralization/library2/worldpop.pdf>, March 1997)</blockquote> -- Yoshie
* Critical Montages: <http://montages.blogspot.com/> * "Proud of Britain": <http://www.proudofbritain.net/ > and <http://www.proud-of-britain.org.uk/>