[lbo-talk] Fred Halliday on the Three Dustbins

Chris Doss lookoverhere1 at yahoo.com
Mon Jan 31 08:16:26 PST 2005


--- Michael Pugliese <michael098762001 at earthlink.net> wrote:


> >
> It's time to bin the past
>
> Fred Halliday, a leading expert on international
> affairs, says we are
> still infected by Cold War ills: an arrogant West,
> shabby dictators, naive
> protests

Fred Halliway is himself emblematic of the arrogant West, as visible in the following paragraph:


> Most significant of all of these is the political
> character of the two
> most important states to have undergone the
> communist experiment: the
> neo-authoritarian dictatorship of Vladimir Putin in
> Russia, and the
> politically immobile dictatorship of the communist
> leaders in China. No
> transition to democracy here and none likely, not
> least because these two
> groups of rulers play the coquette to Washington in
> the matter of their
> 'wars' against Chechen and Sinkiang opponents.

Thank you Mr. Halliway for your wisdom. I didn't know that I live in a dictatorship. The "coquette" crap is to stupid even to address. Earth to Mr. Halliway: almost nobody in Russia (and probably in China as well) is interested in a "transition to democracy."

On this subject by the list's occasionsl poster Peter Lavelle:

Commentary: Putin’s “authoritarianism” vs. the “commentariat” By Peter Lavelle Published on January 27, 2005

Calling Russia’s regime under Vladimir Putin “authoritarian” is a hasty and dangerous exaggeration. Such an appellation undermines, dismisses, and misrepresents an important stage of development Russia is undergoing to becoming a strong and modern state. Western and Russian media specializing in Russia-bashing have been unconscionably irresponsible.

The “commentariat” simply refuses to think or is unable to think; it appears only to wants to profit off of fear and old prejudices from the threatening idea called Russia.

Making a case against the “commentariat” is very easy – applying some logic and knowing some facts is all that is needed. What follows is a deconstruction of the case against Putin’s “authoritarianism.”

1. Restricting independent media. Media is very alive and well in Russia. Print media is expanding at a healthy pace. Everyday one can easily read articles that severely criticize Putin and the Kremlin. The diversity of political opinions found in Russian print media cannot be compared the United States, for example. Russia media includes far more differing opinions. Many of the popular print news outlets remain in the hands of oligarchs (two of whom – Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky – live in exile.) They use their considerable wealth to influence Russia’s domestic political scene (they also agitate against Putin in foreign media). If Putin is such an “authoritarian,” why doesn’t he simply shut down these news outlets?

Electronic media is different. Television is, for the most part, either controlled or heavily influenced by the Kremlin. However, control or influence of television is not the product of an “authoritarian” mindset. Rather, state influence has been the response to individuals who owned television networks for personal and political ambitions – the oligarchs again. The Kremlin would have been guilty of irresponsibility if it had allowed the super wealth to use airwaves to promote personal agendas (as they did during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin).

What of the charge that the Kremlin has shut down political debate on television? This simply is not true. What is true is that there are fewer political talk shows that focus on media specific personalities. Political figures continue to appear on political talk shows and continue to criticize Putin and his government. The Kremlin is also implementing some very controversial social reforms; television programs that used to pump their ratings through crude political debate only increased social tensions. The fact the Kremlin is mindful of uncontrolled, and at times grossly irresponsible, political debate on television certainly does not make it libertarian – but at the same time it does not make it “authoritarian.”

Lastly, the “commentariat” is simply unwilling to ask itself a very simple question: “Are Russian television audiences informed enough to made rational decisions about their lives and the world around them?” Anyone who has watched Russian television programming would find the answer to this question as self-evident.

2. Pressuring opposition parties. Russia’s political opposition is in disarray, but this is not the Kremlin’s fault. The “commentariat” can’t bring itself to admit that most Russian voters have little interest in the policy platforms of liberal-conservative Yabloko or Union of Right Forces (SPS). This applies to the Communist as well. The “commentariat” can’t admit that Russian political culture traditionally supports the state interests over society. United Russia, as boring as it is, does represent the state in the eyes of the electorate (for now). The “commentariat” will never admit that the more it criticizes Putin and the Kremlin, the greater chance that more Russian voters will join the ranks of nationalist Rodina (Motherland).

The woes of Russia’s opposition are completely self-inflicted. The fact that the Kremlin has taken advantage of this should not be surprising. Politic is about attaining and using power – this game is played out in every Western democracy, why the Kremlin is not allowed to play the same game is truly mystifying. The Kremlin presented a platform to Russian voters, through its vehicles United Russia and Rodina, and the Liberal Democrat Party. Platforms supporting economic growth, down with oligarchy and an independent Russian foreign policy have a strong appeal among voters.

The opposition, on the other hand, offers little to the average Russian. In fact, the opposition simply represents failure. Yabloko and SPS continue to represent the failures of Russia’s economic and political transformation since 1991. Their performance during the 2003 parliamentary elections was an embarrassment – de facto supporting oligarchic capitalism that destroyed any sense of normality for the average Russian was political suicide. That death wish continues with the recent Moscow conference denouncing Putin as a dictator – still the most popular political figure in Russia. If the platform of the opposition is simply “anti-Putin,” then liberalism in Russia is doomed for another generation. However, such a prognosis could quite possibly be too optimistic. Russian liberals have much more in common with Putin and his agenda than with the Communists or Rodina. The continuation of their “anti-Putin” agenda only promotes that Putin’s successor will be far less liberal than Putin.

The Communists are hardly worth commenting on. They have missed their historical moment to transform the party into a European-style democratic party like their former Eastern European Communist counterparts. That important niche is still up for grabs in Russia, with forces close to Kremlin most likely to fill that void.

Why Putin is called “authoritarian” when the opposition can’t get its own house in order is beyond comprehension.

http://www.untimely-thoughts.com/index.html?cat=3&type=3&art=1330

===== Nu, zayats, pogodi!

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