[lbo-talk] Amnesia Express

knowknot at mindspring.com knowknot at mindspring.com
Wed Jul 13 12:19:39 PDT 2005


Having (understandably!) been chided about too often too quick indulgence in speculative conspiracy mongering, a poster to this List rejoins that "at the time [he] posted the article [in question]" -- when if he was not a direct participant he could not possibly have had any personal knowledge of the underlying facts "the neo-nazi angle was as plausible [sic] a scenario [sic] as anything else" and then goes on to "wonder [sic] why many 'leftists' (especially of the lbo-talk variety) seem eager to latch onto any official story rather than trying to figure things out for themselves."

This sort of exchange dances around a related question also too many too frequently avoid -- namely, how and under what circumstances we can (reasonably) say we "know" some politically/culturally related.

As letter from Mark Danner published in the July 14, 2005 issue of "New York Review of Books" also published on line (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18131) addresses these issues. In a piece worth reading in full, he says in part:

----------------- It is a source of some irony that one of the obstacles to gaining recognition for the Downing Street memo in the American press has been the largely unspoken notion among reporters and editors that the story the memo tells is "nothing new." I say irony because we see in this an odd and familiar narrative from our current world of "frozen scandal" — so-called scandals, that is, in which we have revelation but not a true investigation or punishment: scandals we are forced to live with. A story is told the first time but hardly acknowledged . . . largely because the broader story the government is telling drowns it out. When the story is later confirmed by official documents, in this case the Downing Street memorandum, the documents are largely dismissed because they contain "nothing new."

Part of this comes down to the question of what, in our current political and journalistic world, constitutes a "fact." How do we actually prove the truth of a story, such as the rather obvious one that, as the Knight Ridder headline had it, "Bush has decided to overthrow Hussein" many months before the war and the congressional resolution authorizing it, despite the President's protestations that "no decision had been made"? How would one prove the truth of the story that fully eight months before the invasion of Iraq, as the head of British intelligence reports to his prime minister and his cabinet colleagues upon his return from Washington in July 2002, "the facts and the intelligence were being fixed around the policy"? Michael Kinsley, in a recent article largely dismissing the Downing Street memo, remarks about this sentence:

"Of course, if 'intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy,' rather than vice versa, that is pretty good evidence of Bush's intentions, as well as a scandal in its own right. And we know now that was true and a half. Fixing intelligence and facts to fit a desired policy is the Bush II governing style, especially concerning the war in Iraq. But C offered no specifics, or none that made it into the memo. Nor does the memo assert that actual decision makers had told him they were fixing the facts."

Consider for a moment this paragraph, which strikes me as a perfect little poem on our current political and journalistic condition. Kinsley accepts as "true and a half" that "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" — that is, after all, "the Bush II governing style" — but rejects the notion that the Downing Street memo actually proves this, since, presumably, the head of British intelligence "does [not] assert that actual decision makers had told him they were fixing the facts." Kinsley does not say from whom he thinks the chief of British intelligence, in reporting to his prime minister "on his recent talks in Washington," might have derived that information, if not "actual decision makers." (In fact, as the London Sunday Times reported, among the people he saw was his American counterpart, director of central intelligence George Tenet.) Kinsley does say that if the point, which he accepts as true — indeed, almost blithely dismissing all who might doubt it — could in fact be proved, it would be "pretty good evidence of Bush's intentions, as well as a scandal in its own right."

One might ask what would convince this writer, and many others, of the truth of what, apparently, they already know, and accept, and acknowledge that they know and accept. What could be said to establish "truth" — to "prove it"? Perhaps a true congressional investigation of the way the administration used intelligence before the war — an investigation of the kind that . . . [had been] promised by the Senate Intelligence Committee, then thoughtfully postponed until after the election . . .then finally, and quietly, abandoned. Instead, the Senate committee produced a report that, while powerfully damning on its own terms, explicitly excluded the critical question of how administration officials made use of the intelligence that was supplied them.

Still, Kinsley's column, and the cynical and impotent attitude it represents, suggests that such an investigation, if it occurred, might still not be adequate to make a publicly acceptable fact out of what everyone now knows and accepts. The column bears the perfect headline "No Smoking Gun," which suggests that failing the discovery of a tape recording in which President Bush is quoted explicitly ordering then Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet that he should "fix the intelligence and facts around the policy," many will never regard the case as proved — though all the while accepting, of course, and admitting that they accept, that this is indeed what happened.



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