I think the last bit is very pertinent. A lot of this has to do with rallying supporters, as much as it might be to achieve political change. I said long ago, after 9.11, that if you look at what we know about terrorism, they're kind of like a highly bureaucratized mafia. and once that process sets in, the important thing is to reproduce the organizational structure. Propaganda of the deed becomes a way to recruit people, not unlike Bill's argument about the goals of black bloc actions. Create a specatable to gain notoreity for the organization and attract those who were leaning in that direction anyway. This is what I've written before:
"From what I've read of Al-q, they're basically a criminal organization that does, indeed, cynically pedal a version of Islam. (It's easy, perhaps too easy, to see them as a lot like mafia organizations--stressing that I'm talking about the _organizational_ aspect of the mafia, not The Godfather/Mario Puzo version)
It may have started out with strongly held religious world-view but, like any other organization, as it becomes larger, it grows more complex and, thus, more bureaucratic. It develops new goals, mainly geared to organizational survival and that means making money. And that means trading in drugs, arms, and so forth."
anyway, Jordan, something's screwy with the archives. Been that way for a day or so I think. To view the articles, you have to go to Google's cache. And boy, clicking those Google ads is great fun, especially to see what keywords people must buy!
here's a general search on Stern's material posted at LBO
Uhlas also posted this article by Stern:
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=jf01stern
Tragic cycle
Terrorism thrives in much of the world--not only in lingering conflicts, but in areas where the state fails to provide basic services, especially education. Solving this problem will therefore require a lot more than resolving the conflict in Kashmir. It will require curbing the jihadi culture that took root in Afghanistan in the 1980s and is now spreading to Pakistan. That culture is fueled by money from all over the world.
There are winners and losers in this jihad. For the winners--the gun-runners, the leaders of militant groups, and the managers of the training camps--jihad is, at least in part, a profit-making business.
The mujahideen "believe their bosses are motivated by pure religious principles," a disillusioned mujahed explained to me. "They expect their followers to live by strict moral standards, but they have a different set of standards for their own behavior."
The countries--particularly the United States--that planted the seeds of the jihadi culture in the 1980s ought to be thinking seriously about how to promote its end. Helping to educate Pakistani youth might turn out to be among the wisest investments the United States could make.
Meanwhile, the Pakistani conflict with India continues, deepening an already tragic cycle. Pakistan feels it must spend more than a quarter of its budget on defense, leaving little money for educating the poor. The poor, in turn, send their children to the free madrisas, where they learn a dangerously virulent version of jihad.
"The rich donate money," a disenchanted mujahed told me, "and the poor donate their sons."
Financial Times - June 12/13, 2004
Holy avengers By Jessica Stern
<....> A totalitarian Islamic revivalism has become the dystopic ideology of the new world order. In an earlier era, its converts might have described their grievances through other ideological lenses, perhaps communism, perhaps Nazism. In Europe a radical transnational Islam, divorced from its countries of origin, is appealing to youth in depressed or high unemployment areas, says Olivier Roy, research director at the French National Centre for Scientific Research. Leaders of the radical groups are often from the middle classes, many of them trained in technical fields, while followers are more likely to be working-class dropouts, he says.
Members of the London-based al-Muhajiroun openly support al-Qaeda. Several men arrested on suspicion of organising a terrorist attack in London in March had been followers of this movement, according to Omar Bakri Muhammad, the group's leader. Al-Qaeda used to be a group but has become a phenomenon, Muhammad told the Lisbon Publico newspaper. "The September 11 attacks made Muslims realise they have power, that the rebirth of Islam is inevitable and we are entering a new chapter in history. That is why we started a new calendar then. We are now in year three of the age of al-Qaeda." It makes no difference whether bin Laden is dead or alive, he said, the movement has taken off.
We must not romanticise al-Qaeda and its networks of nihilist minions by assuming that they have clear objectives that they could ultimately achieve, or that we could, if we chose, appease them. The groups that subscribe to al-Qaeda's ideology have a grandiose vision but no set goals. The purpose of lethal attacks is to rally the followers at least as much as it is to horrify and frighten the victims.
The goals continue to shift - from forcing US troops out of Saudi Arabia or coalition troops out of Iraq to sowing discord in the west to setting Iraq aflame with sectarian tensions. To achieve these shifting goals, the movement aims to create a clash not only among civilisations but also within civilisations. The ultimate objective is to "purify" the world - replacing the new world order with a caliphate of terror based on a fantasised simpler, purer, past.
In thinking about how to respond to terrorism, it is important to realise that we are unlikely to persuade terrorists to change their approach. Terrorists, I have found, become professionals and, after some time on the job, it can be hard for them to imagine another life. But terrorists and guerrillas rely on the broader population for support. Mao Zedong described insurgents as fish swimming in a sea of ordinary people, whose occasional support they require. We are competing with the terrorists for the hearts and minds of the ordinary people who make up that sea.
Jessica Stern is lecturer in public policy at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government and author of "Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill" (HarperCollins 2003).
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"Finish your beer. There are sober kids in India."
-- rwmartin