From the point of view of Robert A. Pape, the main assumption that needs to be blown up is that Islamic fundamentalism is the common denominator of suicide attacks by non-state political actors, since "76 of the 315 incidents" from 1980 through 2003 were committed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and, "[e]ven among Muslims, secular groups like the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades account for more than a third of suicide attacks" (Robert A. Pape, "Blowing Up an Assumption," New York Times/International Herald Tribune, <http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/05/18/opinion/edpape.php> and <http://www.occupationwatch.org/analysis/archives/2005/05/blowing_up_an_a.html>, 19 May 2005). What do they have in common, then? "[A] specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland" (Pape, 19 May 2005).
I had heard the same explanation from Palestinian activists (except that they, unlike Pape, usually don't consider Israel to be a democracy), but I thought it noteworthy that it was presented by a scholar who can be justly characterized as a prudential liberal imperialist and has an experience of having taught "air power strategy for the USAF's School of Advanced Airpower Studies for three years" (at <http://political-science.uchicago.edu/faculty/pape.html>).
In an article on the same subject that he published in a scholarly journal before his op-ed in the New York Times, Pape blows up another assumption that suicide attacks are irrational because they do not "pay."
<blockquote>[D]uring the past 20 years, suicide terrorism has been steadily rising because terrorists have learned that it pays. Suicide terrorists sought to compel American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995, the Sri Lankan government to create an independent Tamil state from 1990 on, and the Turkish government to grant autonomy to the Kurds in the late 1990s. Terrorist groups did not achieve their full objectives in all these cases. However, in all but the case of Turkey, the terrorist political cause made more gains after the resort to suicide operations than it had before. Leaders of terrorist groups have consistently credited suicide operations with contributing to these gains.These assessments are hardly unreasonable given the timing and circumstances of many of the concessions and given that other observers within the terrorists' national community, neutral analysts, and target government leaders themselves often agreed that suicide operations accelerated or caused the concession.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . As Table 1 shows, of the 11 suicide terrorist campaigns that were completed during 1980-2001, six closely correlate with significant policy changes by the target state toward the terrorists' major political goals. In one case, the terrorists' territorial goals were fully achieved (Hezbollah v. US/F, 1983); in three cases, the terrorists territorial aims were partly achieved (Hezbollah v. Israel, 1983-85; Hamas v. Israel, 1994; and Hamas v. Israel, 1994-95); in one case, the target government to entered into sovereignty negotiations with the terrorists (LTTE v. Sri Lanka, 1993-94); and in one case, the terrorist organization's top leader was released from prison (Hamas v. Israel, 1997). Five campaigns did not lead to noticeable concessions (Hezbollah's second effort against Israel in Lebanon, 1985-86; a Hamas campaign in 1996 retaliating for an Israeli assassination; the LTTE v. Sri Lanka, 1995-2002; and both PKK campaigns). Coercive success is so rare that even a 50% success rate is significant, because international military and economic coercion, using the same standards as above, generally works less than a third of the time (Art and Cronin 2003). ("The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American Political Science Review 97.3, <http://danieldrezner.com/research/guest/Pape1.pdf>, August 2003, pp. 2, 9)</blockquote>
The most successful example of a politico-military organization that has employed suicide attacks, Hezbollah, just won 80% of votes in south Lebanon: Erich Marquardt, "More Power to Hezbollah" (<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GF10Ak02.html>, 10 Jun. 2005). Hamas is also expected to make further political conquests, having won "77 out of 118 council seats in municipal elections in the Gaza Strip in January": "Mahmoud Abbas on Saturday postponed parliamentary elections that had been scheduled for July 17, a move widely interpreted as a concession that Hamas would have trounced his Fatah faction" (Warren P. Strobel/Knight Ridder, "Bush's Dilemma: Arab Militants Win Elections," 9 <http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/world/11851489.htm>, Jun. 2005). -- Yoshie
* Critical Montages: <http://montages.blogspot.com/> * Monthly Review: <http://monthlyreview.org/> * Greens for Nader: <http://greensfornader.net/> * Bring Them Home Now! <http://www.bringthemhomenow.org/> * Calendars of Events in Columbus: <http://sif.org.ohio-state.edu/calendar.html>, <http://www.freepress.org/calendar.php>, & <http://www.cpanews.org/> * Student International Forum: <http://sif.org.ohio-state.edu/> * Committee for Justice in Palestine: <http://www.osudivest.org/> * Al-Awda-Ohio: <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Al-Awda-Ohio> * Solidarity: <http://www.solidarity-us.org/>