>However, a suicide nuclear attack reverses that logic by placing the loss
>rates back to those for the conventional warfare. Thus, the suicide aspect
>looses its advantage of killing more enemies with fewer losses. It thus
>does not make sense. Jihadists & Co. proved to be rather skilled fighters
>and tacticians, so I do not think they'd fall for such a trap.
I don't think either US or Russia are ready to gamble on rational calculations by jihadis.See the news report "US to reconsider plans for securing Pakistan's nukes". I could post other reports on the same subject. States like the US would assume the worst case scenario in case of AQ takeover.
Moreover, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is anyway based on "first use" option, if Pakistan's very existence is threatened. If they don't use them first, how will they ever use them if they are obliterated? The danger of "first use" of nuclear weapons goes up in the event of AQ takeover.
Ulhas
HindustanTimes.com
Tuesday, December 30, 2003
US to reconsider plans for securing Pakistan's nukes
Vasantha Arora, Indo-Asian News Service Washington,
The US, worried by two assassination attempts on President Pervez Musharraf, is likely to reconsider its contingency plans to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal and prevent terrorists from gaining access to weapons and fissile materials.
Even though US officials declined to discuss the contingency plans, several spoke of the renewed concern in the administration of President George Bush over both the stability of a critical ally and the security of its nuclear weapons if Musharraf were killed or removed from office.
A New York Times report Tuesday said under both former president Bill Clinton and Bush, the Pentagon had analysed such contingency plans, including the use of American troops to seize or secure Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, if it appeared likely to fall into the hands of terrorists.
The paper quoted one Pentagon official as saying that any raid by US forces to secure Pakistan's nuclear arsenal during a period of chaos would be "an extremely difficult and highly risky venture".
Other administration officials termed it simply impossible. It was also impossible to be sure where all of Pakistan's nuclear materials and weapon components were stored, they said.
The contingency plans -- which cater for possibilities like the Al Qaida or extremists within the Pakistani military gaining access to weapons and fissile materials -- were part of a broad effort at planning for nuclear emergencies around the world.
"It's what we don't know that worries us, including the critical question of how much fissile material Pakistan now holds, and where it holds it," a senior administration official was quoted as saying.
Three years ago, it was estimated that Pakistan had enough highly enriched uranium to manufacture 40 nuclear weapons and it is assumed that the figure has grown.
"It's one of the things that we're concerned about -- nuclear materials or weapons-related information falling into the hands of terrorists or states who harbour them -- irrespective of what country we're talking about," a State Department official said Monday.
"We have discussed these concerns with Pakistan, and we continue to do so. Pakistan has taken those concerns very seriously."
The report, however, said the officials were relatively confident that even if Musharraf lost power or was killed, Pakistan has established some fairly reliable nuclear safeguards.
Nuclear warheads, triggering devices and the delivery systems for the weapons are all stored separately. Thus, it would be difficult to steal a complete weapon, according to administration officials and academic analysts.
To what extent the US might have helped Pakistan in the process is a secret, in part because the Bush administration does not want to worsen anti-American sentiment in Pakistan.
But there are other reasons too, administration and Pentagon officials said. Pakistan has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and so the US cannot share certain technology with it.
But two years ago, a senior American official said the Bush administration would waive these rules if it came to improving the safety of Pakistan's arsenal.
Included in America's most prized secrets are the computerised and encoded nuclear safeguards, and military officials fear they could pass through Pakistan's hands to adversaries.
Pakistan too might reject an offer of the safeguard technology because it would have to share its own nuclear design secrets with the US to create a compatible system.
What really worries the Bush administration officials is not that Musharraf would lose control over actual weapons but over highly enriched uranium. Terrorists in possession of bomb fuel, even without triggering devices needed to produce a nuclear explosion, could build a "dirty bomb" that spews radioactive material or could attempt to engineer a crude nuclear device. Another cause of concern is how the US uncovered from documents seized in Afghanistan that the Al Qaida sought to develop a nuclear weapon, even though it was not close to it.
But it is believed that Pakistan's scientific community has that ability, and much of the American concern centres on the issue of whether Musharraf has the loyalty of his nuclear scientists.
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, George Tenet, director of central intelligence, and Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state, visited Pakistan and raised the delicate issue.
On Monday, officials declined to describe the results of those discussions.
© Hindustan Times Ltd. 2003.