[lbo-talk] Writer Sees Iran Having Close Strategic Relations With Russia

Chris Doss lookoverhere1 at yahoo.com
Mon Mar 14 08:38:03 PST 2005


Formatting's not my fault -- it came like this.

Writer Sees Iran Having Close Strategic Relations With Russia Tehran Sharq (Internet Version-WWW) in Persian 28 Dec 04

[Article by Mehran Qasemi: "Iran and Russia, Strategic Partners"]

[Text] Iran and Russia as two neighboring countries have rapidly expanded their political relations in the recent decade. Perhaps it could be said that the mutual relations between these two countries constitute the most important aspect of their foreign policy today. With the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tehran elevated the level of its relations with Moscow. The mutual trust between the politicians of these two countries on the one hand and the increased political and economic cooperation between them on the other caused the relations between these two countries to reach the level of assuming strategic significance. Both Tehran and Moscow are fully aware of the fact that under the present special circumstances in our region and its open geography, maintaining the current desirable relations, and even further expanding these relations, not only would safeguard their mutual interests but would also guarantee national security and stability in this region. It is with this approach that the politicians on both sides see these mutual relations as the best vehicle that would allow them to achieve three basic objectives. These three basic objectives are:

1. Stopping the American hegemony and preventing the United States from dominating international relations.

2. Creating a multi-polar world and weakening America's hold.

3. Confronting attempts by the White House to isolate and marginalize both countries.

With the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow in practice regards its relations with Iran as the symbol of its independence from the West, particularly from the United States. The Russian politicians, regardless of their political views, ignoring America's accusations against Iran -- which the people in the White House would like to call "concerns" -— regard Iran as a strategic ally in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia also believes that given the present differences over the expansion of relations between Iran and the West, maintaining and developing its relations with Iran could secure its interests in the Middle East and even along the coastlines of the Caspian Sea -— which are closer to Iran than Russia and for reasons of culture and history are within Iran's sphere of influence. The Russian officials, contrary to their colleagues in the West, are not interested at all in accusing Iran of supporting international terrorism. Years of peaceful coexistence between these two neighbors on the one hand and Iran's lack of interest in interfering in Russia's internal affairs on the other have convinced the Russian officials that they have no reasons to worry about Iran's support for their radical Islamist opponents. Instead they have learned that they should keep a careful eye on radical groups that operate from inside the Arab countries or from inside the pro-Western countries in this region, countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.

Iran's official views regarding Chechnya also cause the Russians to attach greater importance to strengthening their ties with Iran. Iran's position, which regards Chechnya as an internal conflict, is a gift from heaven for the Russian officials who are worried about the anger of Muslims in this region and their possible support for the Chechen separatists. Under these conditions the Russian officials regard Turkey as a far greater threat than Iran. Iran also is seeking many interests in maintaining and expanding its relations with Russia. The victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and Iran's increased distance from the United States and the West, which symbolize political and moral corruption, brought Iran and Russia closer together. The eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, and the West's overt and covert support for Iraq, even further separated Iran from the then rivals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Nevertheless the leaders of Iran, through their wisdom, avoided falling into the arms of the Eastern superpower. Yet the fact that the two neighbors got closer to each other was the natural result of Western hostility toward Iran. The collapse of the former Soviet Union removed the big obstacle of Communism, which was preventing the expansion of relations between Iran and Russia. It was under such conditions that the Russians started to participate in the building of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and transfer nuclear technology to Iran. During the years of their participation in this project the Russians have shown that they, even under the intense pressure from the United States, were more willing to satisfy the needs of their influential neighbor rather than meeting the demands of the White House. During the 1990s, as the two countries were gradually growing closer to each other, they also started a serious competition over their interests in the Caspian Sea region. As a result of these two concurrent trends (participation and competition) the politicians on both sides decided to cooperate even more closely with each other. The competition between Tehran and Moscow in the 1990s more than anything was over the ownership of the huge oil resources of the Caspian Sea and the oil pipelines in this region. Both countries worked at the same time to limit America's increasing presence in the region.

They preferred to overlook their competition in certain cases and instead confront the serious rival that none of them wanted to see in this region. Besides their peaceful nuclear cooperation the two sides are also cooperating very seriously in the military industrial sector. During the last decade, Iran, having put eight years of an unequal war with Iraq behind, made strengthening the country's defensive capabilities a main priority. Iran is located in a region that is marked with crises and is surrounded by countries that do not enjoy much stability, countries that do not always act in a predictable fashion. This has caused the Iranian statesmen to consider developing Iran's defensive capabilities as an inescapable principle. During all this time the United States has worked tirelessly to prevent Russia from cooperating with Iran. These American efforts that have included both encouragements and threats; however, they have never produced any results. To the contrary, they in fact have led to a closer cooperation between Russia and Iran and have strengthened the relationship between these two countries. The Russian politicians consider America's insistence that they should cut ties with Iran as interference in their internal affairs and have become more steadfast in their opposition to Washington's demands. The strategic relationship between the two countries of Iran and Russia has now become a symbol of "national pride" and "Russian identity." This is a symbol that not only the statesmen but also the ordinary citizens in that country desperately need. Bush's election in the year 2000 took place at a time when Iran and Russia were seeing a considerable expansion in their mutual relations. Russian Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev's visit to Tehran in December 2000 and the subsequent historic trip by Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to Russia in March 2001 marked the high point of desire to expand cooperation by both countries. These two historic trips and Vladimir Putin's, the Russian president's, upcoming visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused the American officials who had worked very hard to stop the trend of expanding relations between Moscow and Tehran to practically admit defeat (even the President of the United States himself had traveled to Moscow to convince the Russians not to cooperate with Tehran). After the September 11 incidents the Bush administration once again increased the pressures on Russia. The pretext this time was that Iran was trying to develop nuclear weapons. Bush spent his first term as president to practically redefine the political geography in this region. Regarding Afghanistan he benefited from an international consensus based on the collective will to rid the people of Afghanistan of the medieval Taliban regime and the Al-Qa'ida network, but Bush's policy in Iraq was defeated in practice. The American President who thought that he could achieve victory by ignoring opposition from Russia, France, and other countries in the world and without reaching international consensus discovered over time that he had made a mistake. Therefore in his second term as president Bush prefers to achieve international consensus if he is to carry out his plans, yet the signs indicate that the United States will fail to achieve that consensus. Bush's extraordinary insistence on sending Iran's nuclear case to the UN Security Council indicates that new approach. A look at the depth and scope of the relations between Iran and Russia shows that the Russian officials would not be ready to sacrifice the long-term benefits of cooperating with Iran for some short-term gains or fear of condemnation by Washington. Such American actions as canceling the agreement to keep Russia's nuclear material safe or canceling some joint nuclear programs -— that in practice are not very important -— would not affect the Kremlin's insistence on continuing its cooperation with Iran. To survive the Russian economy has such winning cards as the military industry, the oil and oil industry, and the nuclear industry. Iran and Russia as two neighboring countries have the greatest degree of cooperation in these areas. Therefore it is only natural for the Russians to prefer their old neighbor to the politicians from the other side of the world.

Nu, zayats, pogodi!

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