>And the per capita global growth rates of output of the 50s were higher
>than of the 60s, the 60s were higher than of the 70s, the 70s were
>higher than the 80s, the 80s were higher than the 90s and the 90s were
>higher than the 00s so far. Vibrant dynamism?
In places yes, in places no. I've appended below a bunch of stats that address this point. Some highlights: US growth rates were higher in the 1960s than the 1950s - even the 70s were higher than the 50s. Describing a trend in US growth rates isn't so easy - and a lot depends on your choice of a starting year for comparison. The trend is essentially flat over the very long term, slightly downward over the merely long term, and slightly upward over the last few decades - but none of these trends have much statistical significance. Globally, according to the World Bank, growth rates were stronger in the early 2000s than the 1990s, and higher in the 1990s than the 1980s. But Africa's done miserably and Asia's done very well. Longer-term comparisons are mixed. Using Angus Maddison's numbers and periodization, growth in most rich regions has been higher since 1973 than it was during the first golden age, 1870-1913. Recent growth in Asia has been stronger than Western Europe's was in the second golden age, 1950-1973. Almost everyone's growing faster now than in the crisis years, 1913-1950 - even Latin America. The story that crisis was good for the South doesn't get much support here.
>Baran and Sweezy were not saying that monopoly capitalism would not
>change, indeed they were arguing that faced with its central
>contradictions it would more and more rely on militarism and imperialism
>and "sales effort" and all the features that have come to dominate its
>present existence.
So? I'm not sure I want to concede the increased reliance on militarism & imperialism - is the present more martial & imperialistic than the late 19th century, or the early 20th, with its two world wars? But leaving that aside, I don't see any sign that capitalism is suffering from its reliance on the "sales effort," which for the most part is successful not just at promoting sales, but also transforming consciousness: we're all consumers now, and not workers. Interpellation is powerful stuff, as that famous MR author demonstrated.
>As for "intensified competition" let's not go round the bush again with
>the one nonsense paper from the Harvard BS without sources. "Intensified
>competition" does not describe the world i'm living in - the media?
The big TV networks are losing eyeballs to cable. Newspapers are losing circ to websites.
>Microsoft?
One of the great monopolies of all time - but it will fall someday.
> Wall-Mart?
Wal-Mart orchestrates intense competition among its suppliers, and has greatly intensified competition among retailers - just ask any retailer or analyst about the "Wal-Mart effect." The retail sector had its own private deflation going until late last year, when prices finally turned up.
> retail or investment banking and brokerage?
I don't know. Commercial banking is more concentrated - but in some ways national markets can be more competitive than purely local ones. Brokerage is another story. Discount brokerage certainly transformed the industry, then web brokerage transformed it further - margins on that sort of thing are very low now. How much money can you make with a $7 commission? Compare that to pre-Mayday commissions.
> energy
>companies?
Has that changed much? The price mechanism is much more competitive now than it was when the Texas RR commish was setting the level, and OPEC has lost lots of power to spot & futures markets.
You forgot airlines, which are on the verge of wreckage becuase of 26 years of price dereg.
> , in fact all the biggest and most important sectors are more
>concentrated and with less competition, in the US and globally.
GM would love it if this were the case.
>But as i see it things are not as dark as you picture them to be. As for
>their ability to use their power to offset their problems - yes, in the
>class war in the core countries & the ex-bloc the working class has as
>you say been "crushed" - but the story is far from over, and broad
>resistance has emerged (note in particular Latin America) that is
>challenging big time "the neoliberal restructuring of the so-called
>Third World".
Of course the story is far from over. If I thought it was over, I'd have given up on this on this long ago. But capital has had a splendid run of it since the late 1970s, and I don't see the point of minimizing that. If the US overthrew or killed Chavez and/or Castro died, the whole LA dynamic could change. We're having dinner with Christian Parenti tonight - he's just back from a month in Venez. Very eager to hear his news.
Doug
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TRENDS IN PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH
U.S. per capita GDP, average growth rate by decade 1890-1900 1.9% 1900-10 2.5% 1910-20 0.0% 1920-30 1.4% 1930-40 2.0% 1940-50 4.1% 1950-60 1.7% 1960-70 2.9% 1970-80 2.1% 1980-90 2.3% 1990-2000 2.0% 2000-2004 1.5%
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yearly growth rates, trend by base year 1890 flat, r2=0 1920 flat, r2=0 1930 slight downtrend, insig r2 1940 downtrend, r2=.04 1950 downtrend, r2 = .01 1960 slight downtrend, r2=.01 1970 slight uptrend, r2=.002 1980 slight uptrend, r2=.02
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per capita GDP growth, 1990 international $ (Maddison)
western western eastern Latin
Europe offshoots* Europe America 0-1000 -0.0% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% 1000-1500 +0.1% +0.0% +0.0% +0.0% 1500-1600 +0.1% +0.0% +0.1% +0.0% 1600-1700 +0.1% +0.2% +0.1% +0.2% 1700-1820 +0.2% +0.8% +0.1% +0.2% 1820-1870 +0.9% +1.4% +0.6% +0.1% 1870-1913 +1.3% +1.8% +1.3% +1.8% 1913-1950 +0.8% +1.6% +0.9% +1.4% 1950-1973 +4.1% +2.4% +3.8% +2.5% 1973-1990 +1.9% +1.9% +0.5% +0.6% 1990-1998 +1.4% +2.0% +0.1% +1.7%
Asia ex-
Asia Japan Africa 0-1000 +0.0% -0.0% 1000-1500 +0.0% -0.0% 1500-1600 +0.0% +0.0% 1600-1700 -0.0% +0.0% 1700-1820 +0.0% +0.0% 1820-1870 -0.1% -0.1% +0.1% 1870-1913 +0.5% +0.4% +0.6% 1913-1950 +0.1% -0.0% +1.0% 1950-1973 +3.9% +2.9% +2.1% 1973-1990 +2.8% +3.2% +0.1% 1990-1998 +3.2% +4.2% -0.2%
*Western offshoots = Australia, Canada, New Zealand, US
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per capita GDP growth, 1995 international $ (World Bank)
1980s 1990s 2000s World 1.5% 1.6% 1.8% Low income 2.4% 2.4% 3.4% Middle income 1.8% 2.5% 3.7% Lower middle income 2.7% 2.6% 4.5% Upper middle income -0.6% 2.0% 0.0% Low & middle income 1.8% 2.3% 3.4% East Asia & Pacific 6.0% 7.1% 5.7% Europe & Central Asia -2.0% 5.2% Latin America & Caribbean -0.6% 1.6% -0.7% Middle East & North Africa -0.8% 1.4% South Asia 3.5% 3.2% 3.6% Sub-Saharan Africa -1.0% -0.4% 1.3% High income 2.3% 1.8% 1.2% European Monetary Union 2.2% 1.8% 0.9% High income: OECD 2.4% 1.8% 1.2% Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) 0.8% 2.1% Least developed countries: UN classification 0.7% 2.5%
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