I agree with this (and Seth's points too), but again, this has been around a while - it's not an innovation that can explain the Bush turn in foreign policy. Especially since the neocons conceived that turn during the 1990s, when the US economy was widely seen as the eighth wonder of the world.
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Yes.
I think the neocons, if I'm remembering the theory-of-action described within the PNAC docs and other sources accurately, base their hyper-aggressive notions of foreign policy upon two pillars:
* a belief (not unjustified it seems) that the Soviet Union's collapse opened new vistas of possibility -- call it the 'nothing can stop us now' approach to foreign policy
* a fear of so-called, *peer competitors* which, described in other words, is a fear of decline. In fact, it seems that of all the commentators on the American scene who comfortably inhabit the world of acceptable discourse, the neocons are the most open (but in a strange way, hidden just below the surface level of relentless shouting about limitless strength) about the possibility of decline which they mean to halt -- like an ancient fly trapped in amber -- by using this closing window of opportunity to shore up the American situation for decades to come.
The Bush turn in foreign policy appears to my eyes to be a clumsy attempt to put flesh on these conceptual bones -- to seize the moment of (they believe) supreme strength/impending weakness to prevent the long defeat surely to come. But reality is unconcerned with our plans. There have been complications. The Iraq venture is a problem. There were many theorists and grand talkers but very few competent doers. They turned out to be better at boasting about restoring the lights and cleaning the streets than actually turning on the power and cleaning the streets. Things look to be going in strange and unimagined directions (the rise of the Shia as a political force, for example).
The very real lack of competency on display during the Iraq operation -- so shocking to those of us who believed that Americans excelled not only in bombing but also in building -- is a global object lesson with deep implications. But it's far too early to say now where it'll all lead.
.d.