[lbo-talk] Does America Owe Us Something?-- Polish paper

Chris Doss lookoverhere1 at yahoo.com
Sat May 14 08:41:15 PDT 2005


Analyst: Poland is Key Ally, Yet Not 'Key Political Partner' for US in Europe Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza (Internet Version-WWW) in Polish 14 Apr 05

[Analysis by Antoni Podolski, program director of the International Relations Center and former deputy minister of internal affairs and administration: "Does America Owe Us Something?" -- first paragraph published in boldface]

We are deluding ourselves, thinking that Poland is an equal strategic partner for the United States. For Washington, such partners continue to be Russia on the one hand, and the large and strong EU countries on the other -- writes Antoni Podolski, program director of the International Relations Center.

The United States is increasingly facing the accusation that it insufficiently appreciates Poland, its strategic ally. This accusation forces us to again raise the question of the nature of this alliance, and our expectations and aspirations in this regard.

These expectations seem to be a mixture of historical stereotypes, fears, and excessive expectations, a peculiar conglomerate of a sense of inferiority and megalomania. We have a tendency to be submissive towards the United States, which we recover from quickly and aggressively, especially in verbal form.

An Ally, Not a Partner

It is true that Poland is the United States' most important ally among the post-Communist countries of Central Europe. Nevertheless, contrary to the delusions, this does not mean that Poland is the United States' greatest partner in strategic political action. This partner is Russia -- although it is not an ally -- especially in the context of fighting Islamic terrorism. The United States would also like Moscow to be such a partner in its policy towards Iran and China.

Things are similar in terms of the EU and NATO. Here too, Poland is one of the countries whose pro-American attitude Washington can be relatively certain of. More importantly, our attitude is independent of the general balance of political forces within the internal stage. Unlike in Spain and Italy, and recently in Germany, all the political forces that count prefer the Atlantic option (Washington) over the European option (Paris), which is presented in opposition to the former, although not rightfully so.

This does not mean, however, that being a key ally, we are the United States' key political partner in Western Europe. Countries larger and more powerful than us continue to be these partners, even if their current policy is confrontational with respect to US policy.

For this reason, in both cases -- the Eastern and European case -- it is in the United States' interest for its key ally not to be too distant, and definitely for it not to be greatly at odds with its chief partners. And it would be better if this ally had good enough relations with them to be able to bring pro-American views to circles that are averse to the United States -- both in Paris and Berlin, as well as in Moscow.

But if at some point United States had to choose between its own interests and the interests of its ally, we should have no delusions as to what option it will choose.

And here, we come to another issue: faith in the permanence and effectiveness of the US security umbrella over Poland. On the one hand, we believe that the United States should have not only a moral obligation, but also a national interest in defending Poland's security. We very attentively search for signals that the White House shares our point of view on Russia or Ukraine. On the other hand, we prefer not to perceive the profoundness of US-Russian cooperation in the fight against terrorism or the strategic significance of Moscow for Washington. A significance that causes the United States to pass over in silence successive "omissions" or "mistakes" -- to put it delicately -- on the part of the Russian authorities in terms of Ukraine, Chechnya, and Georgia, as well as Iran.

Strategy of Delusions

The intensification and strengthening of the Polish-US alliance took us to Iraq. When giving assistance to the isolated world power, we wanted to instill Americans with a sense of moral debt -- if the need arose, they would prepay us in kind. In order to intensify this sense of community, we even began to officially share the US perception of threats to global security. The classic threats to our security and independence began to be replaced, in the Polish security strategy, by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We also employed a similar mechanism of strategic "mimicry" with respect to the EU, since sections were drawn almost verbatim from the European Defense Strategy when the Polish strategy was being drafted.

This practice, however, is just as dangerous as it is ineffective. Dangerous, since the specifically Polish problems associated with state security are being edged out by schemas of threats that have been copied from abroad. Moreover, this strategy draws Poland into conflicts that are not connected to our national interests, and moreover it unnecessarily generates new areas of conflict with European partners. This practice is also ineffective, since it is not winning us greater favor with the United States, and is only giving rise to more delusions, which generate bitterness and a sense of disappointment when confronted with reality.

We are embittered by the alleged US ungratefulness for assistance in Iraq, as is supposed to be evidenced not only by the maintenance of the US visa regime for Poles, but also by Congress's recent scrapping of $100 million in aid for the Polish army. Besides, this hundred million, when juxtaposed with the amounts allocated for the United States' allies in Asia and in the Middle East, indicates well not so much Poland's proper place among the US allies, as much as US perception of current threats. US money simply goes where the superpower's key interests might be most threatened. Our part of the world's definitely not such an area nowadays.

The United States and its military potential are needed by Poland, and especially by Polish society, which still harbors a historically understandable fear about the permanence of our security. The alliance with United States gives Poland this sense of security and makes it possible to pursue relatively normal foreign policy. It would not be good for us to lie to ourselves, that this is an alliance on equal terms, and the United States owes us something. Even if this were the case, our ability to exert pressure is even so quite limited.

Nu, zayats, pogodi!

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