Russian Interests and Aims Without a doubt, Roy said, the Russians want to maintain a presence in Tajikistan, as it is their last foothold in Central Asia. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are drifting away from Moscow and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They are not necessarily opposed to Moscow--and there are many agreements between them--but they are taking charge of their own affairs. Both countries, for example, have refused to sign on to CIS military commitments. Roy asked, why should President Karimov of Uzbekistan support the American embargo against Iran? It is to show defiance of Moscow and signal a desire for closer links with Washington as a way to back up that defiance. Russian influence in these two countries is simply fading.
The Russians, according to Roy, need an unsettled, slightly chaotic situation in Tajikistan in order to maintain their foothold there, and they therefore are not pushing for a real settlement to the conflict. "They need to keep the fighting at an acceptable but low level," Roy stated. Without a doubt, Russia is the only country with real influence in Tajikistan; the OSCE, for example, has no means to apply any real pressure, as it is primarily a forum for discussion. Yet, thus far, Russia has not agreed to do the one thing that could change the situation: put pressure on the Kulyabis who are now running the government, not to give up power, but to make security guarantees to the opposition in the event that a real settlement is found. At each round of negotiations, Russia declines to be more than an observer, and to commit itself to implementing any security guarantees; it claims for itself a very neutral position, as if it were barely even an actor. But, Roy maintained, when a country (Russia) has 20,000 troops stationed in another nation (Tajikistan), making it that nation's largest military contingent, it cannot be considered just a neutral observer. "As long as Russia refuses to put real pressure on the Tajik government, or to offer security guarantees to the opposition, a settlement will be impossible," Roy said.
The Fight Against "Islamic Fundamentalism" Russia has claimed that it is fighting against Islamic fundamentalism in Tajikistan on behalf of Europe-- and the world. Yet, Roy asked, who and where are the fundamentalists? There are no revolution-exporting Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan, as no one in that country is interested in any spillover into Tajikistan. According to Roy, the factions fighting in Afghanistan have two main interests: (1) gaining power in Kabul for power over Afghanistan, not some "greater Tajikistan" (the case even for Afghan- Tajik leader Masud); and (2) securing access to communication with the outside world. The current government in Kabul is on bad terms with Pakistan, leaving Central Asia (including Tajikistan) the only direct route to the outside world. In the present situation, the ones who control that access are the Russian border guards, which provides the Afghans with incentives to negotiate with the Russians--which is, in fact, Masud's strategy. Furthermore, for the access to remain reliable, stability in Tajikistan is needed. Thus the Afghans have little interest in giving military support to the Tajik opposition if that would only prolong the hostilities. "Kabul is not pushing for an Islamic government in Tajikistan-- that is clear," Roy declared. "For Kabul, the priority is a deal with Moscow, not to support the Tajik opposition."
In any case, Roy asked, if Russia truly is concerned about an Islamic threat, why is it selling weapons to Iran? Far from worrying about Islamic fundamentalism, it appears that Russia has good relations with Iran. Furthermore, it is clear that Iran is not supporting Islamic fundamentalism in the Caucasus or Central Asia; in fact, Iran is supporting the (Christian) Armenians against the (Shiia Muslim) Azeris for its own reasons. Roy said if Moscow believes itself to be battling Islamic fundamentalism in Tajikistan, it is "fighting an elusive battle." Roy asserted that he did not believe an Islamic revolution is possible in Central Asia, but if it were, it would not come from over the border but would be generated from within, from the Ferghana Valley, Tashkent, or even Tatarstan. If there is an Islamic threat, Roy noted, "it is not beyond the [old Soviet Central Asian] border but behind it."
Escudero agreed that many of the opposition leaders are not Islamic fundamentalists (or at least they were not when they were in power in Tajikistan), but stated that the current government in Dushanbe certainly does not view the situation this way. Escudero maintained that there is a risk that if the opposition were to come to power-- though this is unlikely--its approach would now be more fundamentalist than in the past because it would have to be responsive to those who supported it while it was in Afghanistan, people not from Afghanistan but from other countries--fundamentalists from outside.
Roy, however, disagreed. There is disillusionment among the opposition about Islam, he said, and about the fundamentalist view. There was a wave of Islamic enthusiasm in Tajikistan in 1990-92, but the opposition's defeat, and the continued difficulty of its current situation, has made its leaders and their constituency adopt a more pragmatic, realistic attitude. Put simply, they, like everyone else in Tajikistan, want peace and food. Furthermore, Roy reiterated, there is no real foreign support for the promotion of religious fundamentalism in Tajikistan. If the opposition were to come to power, and Roy agreed with Escudero that this prospect is extremely unlikely, an opposition-dominated government would not get millions of dollars in support from Iran or Saudi Arabia. In fact, the domestic situation would likely not change much, since the opposition would need the support of the Khojandis, for example, and would continue to let them go about their business. There would be not only political continuity, but economic continuity as well, as the opposition would have no incentive to abrogate economic agreements or other arrangements. The Tajik opposition, is now headed by politically minded, moderate leaders, even if some local armed groups on the border are headed by those not so moderate.
Another factor in this equation that cannot be discounted is smuggling, which generates a great deal of money for everyone, regardless of politics, ideology, or ethnic stripe--first and foremost for the doorkeepers, those who guard the border. The border guards thus have vested interests in maintaining the current situation. Obviously, Roy said, there are many things about this war that are not political, still less ideological.
Other Actors: Uzbekistan and Iran At the beginning of the war, according to Roy, Uzbekistan essentially had the same policy as Russia toward the conflict--to support the Kulyabis and crush the opposition. At that time, the Uzbekistan government greatly feared an "Islamic spillover" and the stirring of nationalism among Tajiks in Uzbekistan, both of which could have dire consequences for Uzbekistan's domestic political situation. However, since about mid-1994, the Uzbek government's position has changed; it no longer fears a spillover from Islamists or Tajik nationalists. One main reason for the change--after three years of brutal policies against the Uzbek opposition, the Uzbek government is now very much in charge of the political scene in that country. There are a few "hotspots," such as the Ferghana Valley, but the situation is largely under control.
An official clergy has been established--a very clever move, according to Roy, as it has made a number of concessions to committed believers (Islamic holidays have been made official, Uzbek President Karimov has made the hajj,), while forestalling any chance for the strengthening of a politicized Islamic opposition in Uzbekistan. And in a significant demonstration that he no longer dreads the specter of an Islamic movement in Tajikistan, in April 1995, Karimov met with Tajik Islamic opposition leader Turajonzoda, who, only two years earlier, was considered a traitor and a danger to Uzbekistan. Moreover, the civil war in Tajikistan has killed even the most extremist dreams of a "greater Tajikistan," as Tajiks in Uzbekistan, frightened by events in Tajikistan, have chosen to remain citizens of Uzbekistan. They still want some cultural concessions, such as Tajik schools, but by and large the Tajiks in Uzbekistan are not repressed. "The Tajiks in Uzbekistan are not treated like the Kurds in Turkey," Roy stated.
Now that there is no danger to Uzbekistan from problems in Tajikistan, Roy continued, Karimov is eager to act the part of "godfather" for a new Tajikistan. In any case, Tajikistan will without a doubt remain weak, and Uzbekistan "dreams of being the heavyweight" in the region. What the Uzbeks have adopted now, Roy said, is something of a patronizing attitude of superiority, taking the position that they need "to support the poor Tajiks who cannot build their own country." Karimov wants to be the broker, and in this role, his only rival is Russia. Currently, Russia is the broker, but all of Karimov's recent endeavors have been to convince the United Nations and the West to give up Moscow and take on Tashkent as the main power broker. This is why, according to Roy, the Uzbeks are staying out of the negotiation process; they did not even send an observer to Islamabad or Tehran [the sites of earlier rounds of negotiations] though they were entitled to.
Iran has generally changed its attitude toward the Central Asian countries since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Roy continued. When the USSR collapsed, Iran was at first concerned that there would be a power vacuum in Central Asia, out of which would develop either some sort of Turkic-based nationalist movement or a Saudi-backed Sunni Muslim resurgence, neither of which would have been welcome to the Iranians. To forestall especially the latter, the Iranians quickly developed contacts with the Sunni Muslim groups in Central Asia, with the various branches of the Islamic Renaissance Party, for example. It was not long, however, before Russia "came back" to Central Asia, which for Iran was the most desirable development. The Iranians, according to Roy, now prefer to have a direct dialogue with Moscow about their mutual interest in preventing the Turks from making greater inroads in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as it is better for the Iranians to deal directly with Moscow--the effective power broker--than with a number of small groups in Central Asia. Furthermore, the Iranians are in favor of the presence of Russian border guards on the Azeri-Iranian border for other reasons involving Azerbaijan's overtures toward the Azeri population in Iran. "The Iranians," Roy maintained, "are pragmatists despite what many may think."
Throughout the Tajikistan conflict, the Iranians have been careful--and very clever-- to maintain contacts with all sides. Despite the makeup of the Tajik government, for example, and its apparent anti-Islamist stance, the Iranian embassy in Dushanbe, unlike the Pakistan consulate, has not been closed. The Kulyabis in the government thus understood who was really supporting Islamic activism in Tajikistan. <SNIP>
Getting Uzbekistan Wrong Two powerful trends cross paths in the Ferghana Valley. by Stephen Schwartz 05/16/2005 2:25:00 PM http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/623dlyqv.asp