[lbo-talk] Chomsky v Marko

[Michael Pugliese]

It also has to be said that many of the social democratic parties had a long
tradition of opposition to the Leninist versions of Socialism that
emphasized class struggle at the expense of individual human rights. In many
East European countries, from the Bolshevik revolution onwards, social
democrats were among the first victims of the communist regimes. In
contrast, a disturbing number of the American Left saw the European parties
as somehow spuriously socialist in comparison with Milosevic's kleptocrat
Socialist Party.
In the US, of course, socialists are a much less significant force. Their
distance and detachment from real influence and power tends to make debate
and discussion more intensely ideological: the absence of real pragmatic
consequences from the positions it takes allows lines to be straight and
rigid.
The first and most extreme group looked at events not from a position of
humanitarian concerns, but through the prism of class struggle. Their
support for or opposition to any movement was based not on any moral
considerations but on their position in the anti-imperialist struggle. Hence
although many would offer total support to the IRA in Northern Ireland, to
the PKK in Turkey, or to the NLF in Vietnam, they rushed to condemn the KLA
as terrorists and bandits. There were indeed many disturbing aspects about
the behavior of the KLA, but no more so than with the other organizations
that were deemed deserving of solidarity. And few had as much support in
their claimed constituency as the KLA so obviously did.
With a straight face, these supporters of liberation movements across the
globe were prepared to deny Kosovars the right to self-determination, and
indeed condoned the form of apartheid that Belgrade had inflicted upon the
Albanian majority in Kosovo. It was a horrifying display of indifference to
human rights violations, perhaps unparalleled since the support of some
Leftist intellectuals of Stalin's purges. But at least, those people in the
thirties did not have the benefit of television to see and hear the
testimony of the survivors as they crossed the frontiers, or the evidence of
the mass graves as the tides of war turned. The message is clear, victim
status is determined by the identity of the victimizers, not the enormity of
the victimization.
To be fair, there was a second group, which deplored the Serb actions
against Kosovars, but could not countenance United States intervention under
any circumstances. They were quite prepared to join common ground with the
apologists for Serbia against the war, which they clearly saw as a "greater
evil" than the actual massacres.  At several meetings in the course of the
war, anti-war activists berated others for supporting the "aggressive" NATO
pact. (For example, there were debates in New York by the Anarchists and the
Marxist School at the Brecht Forum). In fact, when challenged,  they were
unable to cite a single incident of NATO military action of any  kind. There
are legitimate questions about the usefulness of NATO - but  before acting
against Belgrade, the Alliance itself had not hitherto fired a  shot in
anger.

Interestingly, many American Leftists saw NATO as a direct agent of American
Imperialism and hegemony. This was not the view in Western Europe. In
reality, it was the post war Labour government in Britain, especially its
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, that was one of the moving forces in
trapping the US into NATO. The aim was as the old phrase has it, that it
would keep "the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down."
Far from dancing on the string of Washington, the alliance operated on the
principle of total consensus of all members. When the time came to assemble
such a consensus of such a heterogeneous group, the lowest common
denominator was a bombing campaign. Operating by consensus does not,
unfortunately, give much scope for flexibility, but at least it preserves
norms of consultation that should mitigate any claims of unilateralism.
By the time the choices had to be made, it was becoming apparent that some
at least of the Europeans, not least the British Labor government, were far
more hawkish than the Clinton administration. In his memoir of his tenure as
UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali describes how Clinton responded to media
pressure to do "something" over Bosnia. This, he says, "seemed to be air
strikes, which would punish the Serbs and provide the United States and NATO
with the appearance of decisiveness without risking unacceptable military
losses on the ground." The man derided for being anti-Bosnian declared that
at Srebrenica, "Nothing can excuse the atavistic cruelty of the Serbs; the
incompetence of the international community in no way diminishes their
guilt." (Boutros Boutros Ghali Unvanquished, Random House, 1999 pps 92-93)
It was clear that similar considerations of polity and incompetence played a
part in policy-making over Kosovo. It was not the result of US bellicosity,
but rather the absence of any track record of firmness which encouraged
Milosevic to think he could get away with his atrocities.
However, this would be lost on many American socialists, who acted as if
this were a one-off conflict with no antecedents. Despite their alleged
internationalism, they seemed to share the general American insularity.
Indeed, that is somewhat unfair: they seemed to share a particularly
conservative Know-Nothingism. Vukovar, Sarajevo, Srebrenica meant nothing to
them, and even when their significance was explained, showed an equal lack
of empathy for the victims there as they did for the Kosovars.

 Another argument was that effectively, only saints could be victims. Some
Kosovo Albanians were involved in smuggling, prostitution and similar Mafia
activities. Some of the money and personnel were involved in the KLA, and
therefore all Kosovars were unworthy of support. The irony is that the
source for these stories was Milosevic's regime, which is based on a
kleptocratic caste of smugglers - and whose servants have been credibly
accused of mass rape in Bosnia and Kosovo. Since all arguments are
ad-nationem, needless to say, such accusations only have culpatory effect
against Kosovars. This last sentence is a little ambiguous to me:
clarify....  Then there was an argument from history. Edward Said and Noam
Chomsky set the tone for many. They both admitted that what the Serbs were
doing in Kosovo was evil. However, they then looked at the record of
inaction by the West, in Palestine, East Timor, Kurdistan and so on, and
therefore deduced that any action over Kosovo could not be for good motives
and should therefore be opposed. Both were clearly worried about the dilemma
presented by the obvious Serb atrocities, and both in their various ways
decided that no one should undertake the role of the Samaritan. As Chomsky
summarized, "One choice, always, is to follow the Hippocratic principle:
"First, do no harm." If you can think of no way to adhere to that elementary
principle, then do nothing. There are always ways that can be considered.
Diplomacy and negotiations are never at an end." (The Current Bombings
Behind the Rhetoric. N Chomsky, Znet)
It would have been interesting to see the reaction to continuing
negotiations with someone whose minions were simultaneously and visibly
shooting whole families and stuffing them down wells. Even more
interestingly East Timorese leader Ramos-Horta supported NATO action on the
much more practical reasoning that it was indeed about time the West started
taking robust action in favor of oppressed people, and that this was a
welcome precedent.
(Fraid Not this late maybe if its not alte, on return or call John Miller of
the ET   support group)