Interestingly, many American Leftists saw NATO as a direct agent of American Imperialism and hegemony. This was not the view in Western Europe. In reality, it was the post war Labour government in Britain, especially its Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, that was one of the moving forces in trapping the US into NATO. The aim was as the old phrase has it, that it would keep "the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." Far from dancing on the string of Washington, the alliance operated on the principle of total consensus of all members. When the time came to assemble such a consensus of such a heterogeneous group, the lowest common denominator was a bombing campaign. Operating by consensus does not, unfortunately, give much scope for flexibility, but at least it preserves norms of consultation that should mitigate any claims of unilateralism. By the time the choices had to be made, it was becoming apparent that some at least of the Europeans, not least the British Labor government, were far more hawkish than the Clinton administration. In his memoir of his tenure as UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali describes how Clinton responded to media pressure to do "something" over Bosnia. This, he says, "seemed to be air strikes, which would punish the Serbs and provide the United States and NATO with the appearance of decisiveness without risking unacceptable military losses on the ground." The man derided for being anti-Bosnian declared that at Srebrenica, "Nothing can excuse the atavistic cruelty of the Serbs; the incompetence of the international community in no way diminishes their guilt." (Boutros Boutros Ghali Unvanquished, Random House, 1999 pps 92-93) It was clear that similar considerations of polity and incompetence played a part in policy-making over Kosovo. It was not the result of US bellicosity, but rather the absence of any track record of firmness which encouraged Milosevic to think he could get away with his atrocities. However, this would be lost on many American socialists, who acted as if this were a one-off conflict with no antecedents. Despite their alleged internationalism, they seemed to share the general American insularity. Indeed, that is somewhat unfair: they seemed to share a particularly conservative Know-Nothingism. Vukovar, Sarajevo, Srebrenica meant nothing to them, and even when their significance was explained, showed an equal lack of empathy for the victims there as they did for the Kosovars.
Another argument was that effectively, only saints could be victims. Some Kosovo Albanians were involved in smuggling, prostitution and similar Mafia activities. Some of the money and personnel were involved in the KLA, and therefore all Kosovars were unworthy of support. The irony is that the source for these stories was Milosevic's regime, which is based on a kleptocratic caste of smugglers - and whose servants have been credibly accused of mass rape in Bosnia and Kosovo. Since all arguments are ad-nationem, needless to say, such accusations only have culpatory effect against Kosovars. This last sentence is a little ambiguous to me: clarify.... Then there was an argument from history. Edward Said and Noam Chomsky set the tone for many. They both admitted that what the Serbs were doing in Kosovo was evil. However, they then looked at the record of inaction by the West, in Palestine, East Timor, Kurdistan and so on, and therefore deduced that any action over Kosovo could not be for good motives and should therefore be opposed. Both were clearly worried about the dilemma presented by the obvious Serb atrocities, and both in their various ways decided that no one should undertake the role of the Samaritan. As Chomsky summarized, "One choice, always, is to follow the Hippocratic principle: "First, do no harm." If you can think of no way to adhere to that elementary principle, then do nothing. There are always ways that can be considered. Diplomacy and negotiations are never at an end." (The Current Bombings Behind the Rhetoric. N Chomsky, Znet) It would have been interesting to see the reaction to continuing negotiations with someone whose minions were simultaneously and visibly shooting whole families and stuffing them down wells. Even more interestingly East Timorese leader Ramos-Horta supported NATO action on the much more practical reasoning that it was indeed about time the West started taking robust action in favor of oppressed people, and that this was a welcome precedent. (Fraid Not this late maybe if its not alte, on return or call John Miller of the ET support group)