Stephen Zunes is a professor of politics at the University of San Francisco and Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project . He is the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003) and scores of articles on U.S. policy toward Iraq, including the September 30, 2002, cover story in The Nation magazine, "The Case Against War."
There are a number of scary scenarios that could result from the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. These include that country plunging into full-scale civil war, splitting into three (accompanied by ethnic cleansing), succumbing to fundamentalist Islamic rule, falling under increased influence by Iran and becoming a training and logistical base for international terrorism. All of these should be taken seriously.
The reality, however, is that each of these is at least as likely if U.S. forces remain than if U.S. forces withdraw. The U.S.-led war in Iraq is creating insurgents, including terrorists, faster than we can kill them. The U.S. and British military presence is exacerbating ethnic and sectarian divisions, not lessening them. The overwhelming U.S. presence throughout the government is weakening its standing with the Iraqi people and its ability to govern, rather than strengthening it.
While the principle of self-determination must be respected and while Iraqis are more than capable of governing themselves once stability and basic services are restored, the current circumstances may require active leadership from the outside. The United States, however, simply does not have the credibility to take that on.
Despite this, the vast majority of both parties in Congress, in continuing to fund the war, are putting their trust in the very same people who have proven to be profoundly ignorant about Iraq and totally inept in managing the post-war situation.
As a result, given the choice between "staying the course" and an immediate U.S. withdrawal, the latter is clearly the least bad option.
However, there may be other options for the anti-war movement to consider, such as calling on the U.S. government to: 1) immediately end offensive military operations by U.S. forces; 2) renounce any long-term military presence in Iraq; 3) enter into negotiations with the more moderate elements of the insurgency; 4) replace U.S. and British forces with peacekeeping forces from Arab and other Islamic countries; 5) fund a generous economic redevelopment package under United Nations supervision; and 6) support a mechanism for strict international human rights monitoring and other means to enhance the credibility of the Iraqi government and its ability to govern effectively.
There are dozens of armed groups in Iraq battling U.S. occupation forces and the U.S.-backed government, which include supporters of the former regime of Saddam Hussein, other Baathists, independent nationalists, various Shiite factions, tribal-based groupings and a number of Sunni Arab factions. The Al Qaeda-inspired jihadists and the foreign fighters upon whom the Bush administration focuses represent only a small minority of the insurgency. All but these Islamist extremists would likely be open to a negotiated settlement to the conflict, but only if there was a clear timetable or specific achievable benchmarks for a complete U.S. withdrawal.
Once that was accomplished, with the bulk of the insurgents then allied with the government, the Iraqis could likely deal with the jihadists and other radical elements themselves, since the extremist ideology and terrorist tactics of the radicals have little popular following in the country. If a broader-based Iraqi government was still incapable of containing the insurgency, international peacekeeping forces primarily from Arab and other Islamic countries could fill the breach until a reconstituted Iraqi army could fulfill its mission.
There is the real possibility that such a government of national unity could not be formed and/or the Iraqi government, even with the support of a multinational force, would still not be adequate to handle the insurgency. As a result, concerns that a U.S. withdrawal could lead to the overthrow of the government and victory by radical insurgents should not be discounted.
Some in the anti-war movement have downplayed the seriousness of this scenario, citing the grossly exaggerated horror stories and supposed threats to U.S. national security and world peace that the U.S. government claimed would result from a victory by the Communist-led National Liberation Front in Vietnam if the United States did not continue prosecuting the war.
Unlike Vietnam, however, the Iraqi opposition is not unified. As a result, the toppling of the Baghdad regime will not likely bring peace, but continued violence and disorder. The insurgents also include some decidedly nasty elements that are genuinely fascistic in orientation. In the power struggle that would follow a hypothetical overthrow of the U.S.-backed government in Baghdad, it is quite possible that the new government would become dominated by militant jihadists, Saddam's wing of the Ba'ath party, or other elements far worse than those currently in power or likely to be in power following next month's election.
This does not necessarily mean that the national security interests of the United States would be seriously threatened in such a scenario. Indeed, continuing to prosecute the war is probably a much greater threat. However, it does not mean that the United States does not have a moral and strategic responsibility to prevent an insurgent victory.
As a result, the United States may need to keep a residual rapid reaction force—possibly stationed in Kuwait, southeastern Turkey, or easternmost Jordan—that could provide tactical air support in the event there is an assault on Baghdad's Green Zone should the Iraqi government and its regional allies find themselves imminently threatened by the jihadists or other extremist elements.
The peace movement should be open to such a strategy, since it ends the occupation, it shifts our policy to diplomacy and it creates the common ground necessary to unite politically around the language of Rep. John Murtha, a retired Marine and staunch supporter of the military, who calls for America to get out of Iraq "as soon as practicable."
The slogan "Out Now!" fits nicely on a bumper sticker and may serve to pressure Congress and the administration to change its policies, but it is too simplistic to adopt as a policy around which to build a broad-based alliance that could actually result in the withdrawal of U.S. forces. At the same time, however, awareness of the complexities of the mess in Iraq and openness to various scenarios to resolve it does not mean being any less insistent in demanding an end to the U.S.-led war.
Rep. Murtha may have brought that urgency to a head last week, but it was the peace movement that has cleared his path. It is now time to unite and end this war.
( http://www.commoncouragepress.com/index.cfm?action=book&bookid=226 This is the book that Americans should read to really find out �why they hate us�. An essential guide, perhaps the most useful book on the actual record of US foreign policy in the region.� As`ad AbuKhalil, author, Bin Laden, Islam, and America's New "War on Terrorism"
A careful, informed and perceptive reconstruction of major historical forces in the Middle East and the world power nexus in which it is enmeshed. Zunes provides very valuable background for analysis and comprehension of what is at stake and where policy choices can be expected to lead. A very useful handbook to the complexities of this disturbed and fateful region. Noam Chomsky ) -- Michael Pugliese