What we speak of today as "the war" came in drips and drabs. So, indeed, Mussolini tried to dissuade Hitler from risky aggressions where Italy had no interests (i.e. the Sudetenland, Poland); Hitler did the same on his side. Neither had much effect on each other (nor did anyone else ever dissuade them from aggressions) and, of course neither was against "the war" per se. There were also similar arguments with and among the smaller axis allies (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia etc).
Germany and Italy had been on opposite sides over Austria where the Chancellor Englebert Dollfuss was pro fascist and anti-German. He outlawed and tried to eliminate the Nazi party and in turn the Nazis assassinated him in 1934 as part of an attempted coup that failed. Despite the Axis Pact of late 1936 Mussolini was perhaps the most vigorous opponent of the Anchloss with Austria which placed Germany on his border. He also vied for influence in Hungary and elsewhere. Not only was Mussolini unenthusiastic about invading Poland in September 1939 but remained neutral (despite clear provisions of the Axis Pact) until June 1940. Only after the Germans reached the English Channel did he declare war on France et. al. and seize the area around Nice. Even then the anti-German factions of the Italian Fascist Party were reluctant. [Churchill, who had some admiration for Mussolini, and who "summered" in Italy during much of his regime, had seriously hoped to keep Mussolini neutral.]
Mussolini's main concern was not peace but rather to focus on the southern Balkans and the Mediterranean where Italy had hopes for conquest. He invaded Albania five months before Hitler invaded Poland and invaded Greece (a neutral) one month after Poland (much to Hitler's fury). Mussolini's aggressions (and failures) provoked countries like Yugoslavia to enter the war for the Allies and permitted a British landing in Greece. Italy was being defeated and their retreat required that, in the first part of 1941, Germany divert troops to save the Italians - lest Hitler have an exposed southern front before his planned invasion of the Soviet Union.
Diverting those troops to his southern front forced Hitler to be a full month late in starting "Operation Barbarossa" and at less than full strength. Many think this was critical in his failure to reach Moscow and beyond before winter.
Paul
>I'm really interested in Il Duce's claim that Italy
>tried to prevent the war (I'll type in the whole quote
>if anybody wants). That seems totally
>anti-the-received-wisdom, but it seems not totally
>unplausible. .....