[lbo-talk] Fwd: Jamie Galbraith on deficits

Jim Devine jdevine03 at gmail.com
Thu Sep 1 10:39:38 PDT 2005


[lbo-sters: please respond off-list if you want me to see it, since I am not participating in the list at present.]

http://www.economist.com/subscriptions/offer.cfm?campaign=168-XLMT

GEORGE MAYNARD BUSH

Sep 1st 2005

Most American liberals are now fiscal conservatives. But not all

LIKE all the fiercest debates in American politics, the fight over the

budget deficit has its hawks and its doves. But on fiscal matters, it

is now the American left that brandishes talons and the right that

carries an olive branch in its beak.

One exception is James K. Galbraith, of the University of Texas,

Austin. "A card-carrying member of the Texas left", he is also the

whitest of fiscal doves. That makes him a rare bird indeed these days.

He shares not only his famous father's initials, but also his sharp

pen and his passion for the economics of John Maynard Keynes. In a

recent pamphlet*[1] on the budget deficit, Mr Galbraith argues that

members of the present Republican administration are unwitting

disciples of the Cambridge master.

That administration ran a deficit of $412 billion, or 3.6% of GDP, in

the most recent fiscal year. The deficit this year will narrow to $331

billion, according to the Congressional Budget Office. But under some

plausible assumptions about congressional budget-making, America's

deficits will average about 3.5% of GDP over the next decade, estimate

William Gale and Peter Orszag of the Brookings Institution.†[2]

By 2014, they project, America's public debt will amount to 55% of its

GDP. By 2030, on present trends, debt could reach 139% of GDP.

How much will this matter? Messrs Gale and Orszag think that chronic

deficits will eat away at the pillars of American prosperity like

"termites in the woodwork", as Charles Schultze, former chairman of

the Council of Economic Advisers, once put it. The coming decade of

big deficits will reduce national saving by 2-3% of GDP. As a result,

American households will accumulate fewer assets, yielding

$1,500-3,000 less income a year.

The deficits serve only to divert resources from investment to

consumption, they argue. When taxes are cut, households spend up to

80% of the proceeds, they find. But this extra consumer demand must

compete with other claims on a fully employed economy. In their view,

extra household spending crowds out investment, dollar for dollar.

Ah, a Keynesian might ask, but what if the economy is not fully

employed? Then, says Mr Galbraith, a budget deficit adds to demand in

the economy, bringing into play labour and capital that might

otherwise have lain idle. These resources might not be put to their

best use, to be sure; but what matters is that they are put to some

use. The economy is bigger as a result, so even if the deficit reduces

investment's share of GDP, it might (at least in principle) raise the

actual amount of investment that takes place.

Few could disagree with this logic: it is the basic case for a

counter-cyclical fiscal expansion. Even the administration's critics

concede that its 2001 tax cuts were impeccably timed (if fortuitously

so), boosting consumer demand at a time when many workers were at risk

of forced idleness. But as the economy nears full employment, those

same critics believe, budget deficits become more damaging.

DOOM OR VERDOORN?

Mr Galbraith thinks otherwise. America's sustained deficits will help

it outgrow the liabilities they leave in their wake, he believes. And

if that fails, they will help inflate those liabilities away. As an

economy approaches full employment, any fiscal stimulus is dissipated

by higher prices. In this case, the stimulus may add nothing to real

GDP. But, Mr Galbraith points out, it still adds something to nominal

GDP. This will ease the government's debt burden, since it is out of

nominal GDP that the government must repay the nominal claims held by

its creditors.

Inflation, like devaluation, is a tried and tested way for an indebted

government to escape its obligations. It is because it is so tempting

that macroeconomic stability is so hard-won and so easily lost. It may

be true, as Mr Galbraith suggests, that America would rather let its

inflation rate multiply than its debt-to-GDP ratio explode. But why

would anyone want either?

In fact, Mr Galbraith is confident that a sustained fiscal stimulus

will yield more than just inflation. When demand is strong, innovation

quickens, he argues. He cites Verdoorn's law, named after the Dutch

economist Petrus Verdoorn, which holds that the pace of productivity

growth picks up as the economy nears full capacity. If a government

deficit adds to the demands on an economy at full stretch, the economy

may find ways to stretch a little further.

There may be a grain of truth to this observation. But Mr Galbraith

presumably does not believe in a world without any supply-side

constraints, in which the only check on the ingenuity of the American

economy is the timidity of its fiscal authorities.

In so far as there is any truth in Verdoorn's law, its practical

implications are more modest. It suggests that America's policymakers

must test the economy's limits before they can know precisely where

they lie. The American economy might, for example, learn to cope

surprisingly well with a tight labour market, as it did in the late

1990s. At that time, the Federal Reserve seemed to take the view that

faster productivity growth had allowed the unemployment rate

consistent with stable inflation to be temporarily reduced. More

generally, the Fed knows that it cannot be quite sure exactly where

America's natural rate of unemployment and its neutral rate of interest lie.

But if the Fed can be trusted to explore the economy's limits and

respect them, Congress cannot. Fiscal policy is made in a spirit of

political point-scoring, not macroeconomic inquiry. Given too much

licence to roam, Congress would soon reach the economy's outer

frontiers--and carry right on over the edge.

* "Breaking Out of the Deficit Trap: The Case against the Fiscal

Hawks[3]". The Levy Economics Institute. June 2005

- - - - -

† "Budget Deficits, National Saving, and Interest Rates[5]"

-----

[1] http://www.economist.com/#footnote1

[2] http://www.economist.com/#footnote2

See this article with graphics and related items at

http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4342510 -

Jim Devine "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante.



More information about the lbo-talk mailing list