SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2005
Iran caught in IAEA pincer
K SUBRAHMANYAM
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board meets today to consider the report of its director general on Iran's observance of its regulations. Iran is a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore obligated to follow the regulations.
The report is expected to bring out instances of Iranian cooperation with the IAEA and also the lack of it. At present, the IAEA inspection team can neither accuse Iran of violating the NPT, nor give it a clean chit.
Iranians had earlier agreed to suspend their uranium enrichment activities, but have now revoked the offer and resumed the enrichment.
NPT provisions do allow nuclear energy technology for peaceful, civil purposes. So, as a non-weapon NPT signatory, Iran has to convince IAEA inspectors that its uranium enrichment does not exceed the 5% required for civil use, and is nowhere near the 90% required for nuclear weapons.
But it's not that simple, considering IAEA's lack of trust in Iran. In 1987, Iran made arrangements with Pakistan to clandestinely acquire uranium enrichment technology, and has since developed a network of underground enrichment and uranium hexafluoride gasification facilities with help from A Q Khan and his colleagues.
Under NPT, Iran was required to apprise the IAEA about this, but did not. IAEA discovered it by accident. Now, with its president announcing that Iran will supply enrichment technology to other Islamic states, the IAEA is hardly reassured.
It also recalls A Q Khan's statement that his proliferation activity had Islamic justification and Z A Bhutto's claims of building the Islamic Bomb. Iran has resumed construction of the power reactor at Bushehr with Russian help.
The Russians have committed to supplying enriched uranium fuel to the reactor. Since Iran claims that the uranium enrichment is required for future reactors, three EU countries — Germany, France and UK (EU-3) — have offered to construct all the power reactors Iran needs and supply the enriched uranium, provided Iran shuts down its enrichment plants.
Iran hasn't accepted the offer and insists it is within its rights to produce non-weapons-grade uranium. However, Iran's clandestine proliferation in 1987 leaves the IAEA deeply suspicious. Comparing Iran and India, as some proliferation fundamentalists in the US and elsewhere have attempted to do, is unjustified.
India was never an NPT member, nor were there ever allegations of any clandestine activity. India broke no treaty commitments, nor threatened to proliferate. In fact, in 1992, India went back on its promise to supply Iran an experimental reactor when the US brought to India's notice the proliferation risks involved.
Today, the IAEA board will decide whether the IAEA report on Iran is to be sent up to the UNSC to consider imposing sanctions under Chapter 7, of the UN charter. The EU-3 and the US are likely to press for this. US is asking India, Russia and China to support sending the report to the UNSC.
Manmohan Singh has informed George Bush that while India does feel Iran should have abided by the NPT, the solution to the problem may still be found in diplomacy rather than sanctions.
Russia too feels that Iran should abide by the NPT, while China is silent. Other non-aligned members of the IAEA council, including Pakistan, are against referring the report to the UNSC. There is a fresh proposal to give Iran another three to four weeks to accept the EU-3 offer.
This seems to be the best way out for all concerned. Under threat of the possible sanctions, if IAEA sends its report to the UNSC, Iran might accept the EU-3 offer. India too has indicated its support to this compromise. Iran, perhaps, has a good case for acquiring nuclear weapons.
It is the only country to be attacked with weapons of mass destruction. It is located between hostile, Sunni, nuclear Pakistan and Wahabi Saudi Arabia. But Iran has never put forward such honest reasons to justify proliferation.
Nevertheless, in the current scenario, Iran might find it difficult to continue being intransigent to the EU-3 compromise formula. Therefore, giving it a few weeks to mull over its options might do the trick.
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