[lbo-talk] ruling class

Gar Lipow the.typo.boy at gmail.com
Mon Apr 3 20:05:32 PDT 2006


On 4/1/06, Josh Narins <josh at narins.net> wrote:
>
> To break the backs of the parties, though, for that you need a
> monotonic, cloneproof, condorcet balloting method like Schulze or
> Tideman. IRV is not the answer, and the reasons are mathematical, and
> therefore shouldn't be doubted.

Schulze or Tideman or something along those lines are probably needed where filling one office. Certain types of PR work fine for multi-member selections- as long as you are ultimately voting for a party and not just an individual, gaming is by mathematical means such as spoilers (clones) is no more likely than with mathematically perfect methods. You can even still let people vote for individuals within single districts if you wish.

Simple Pr -you vote for party -party gets seats in proportion to votes distributed to candidates according to method it determines

A bit more complex - you vote for candidates in geographic districts. Only candidates within your district appear on your ballot, but you can write in candidates from other districts if no one local suits. Parties receive seats according to total share of vote. Candidates within parties get seats according to who got most votes. Yes, much room for gaming here as to who gets seats within party - but danger limited by fact that the gaming take place within a party not between parties.

A bit more complex; candidates with parties can declare affinities for others within same party. Now again seats distributed to parties by percent vote. Seats distributed to affinities within parties by percent of their party's vote. Individuals within affinities seated in order of who received most votes. Now gaming takes place entirely inside party factions. Parties get votes fairly, factions get votes fairly - all gaming is between individuals within common ideology who trust each other enough to join a common affinity. So plenty of room for gaming, but not of the sort catastrophic to voter.

These are deliberately made up simplified versions (though I actually think the last would work pretty well- you vote for someone local unless everyone local is such a wanker you write someone in. The use of affinities keep people from using votes for the left to seat people from the right.)

Of course you still have the problem of electing people with great platforms who break all there promises once in offices. Takes more than a vote distribution system to solve that one:

Oh, and Carroll
>is, actually, no less laughable than proposals to reconstitute the
whole system of elections in the u.s. In fact I would think that in the longer run seizing control of the corporations would be rather easier than persuading those corporations to allow a constitutional change in the voting system.

The revolution-is-easier-than-that-reform trope is getting stale. A number of nations have moved from single district to PR without overthrowing capitalism. A few cities in the U.S. have done it. If a thing has been done,the assertion that it is impossible is refuted.



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