[lbo-talk] combined e-mail ;)

Josh Narins josh at narins.net
Mon Apr 10 11:33:15 PDT 2006



> At 10:37 AM -0400 9/4/06, Josh Narins wrote:
>
> > > So it would make sense for the Democrats to push for a preferential
> > > voting system, wouldn't it. Unless they think that it won't happen
> > > again for a long time. You can't allow yourself to be threatened or
> >> coerced with dire warning about the result. Stay strong, they have
> >> more to lose than you. Think of the future.
> >
> >Vermont is fairly close to permanently adopting IRV.
> >
> >The current Gov and Lt Gov are Republicans, but I've been in contact
> >with the (likely winner) Lt Gov, Campaign Manager for the Gov, and the
> >Chief of Staff for the (Dem) Speaker of the Vermont House.
> >
> >It's a math question, and none of them are mathematicians. I have yet to
> >come up with the "instantly obvious" presentation.
> >
> >It would be quite logical of me spend part of next week generating 3d
> >graphs that would illustrate how the different system create different
> >results.
>
> That sounds like madness. It isn't a math issue at all, unless you
> are trying to blind them with science. It isn't as if preferential
> voting is a radical new concept that needs to be checked for
> mathematical flaws, its been in use around the world for donkey's
> years. Its a political question. Forget about all these complex
> systems that are used only to elect the board of directors of a weird
> local housing co-op. There's plently of different systems used to
> elect actual governments of actual western nations like the USA.
>
> >That is, after all, what the National Academy of Sciences did in order
> >to change the mathematics of apportionment.
> >
> >Actually, Libertarian and Christian Fundie Republicans, anyone who leans
> >towards a third party, would favor rational voting system reform.
>
> Yes, but they don't have the power to implement it. The point is to
> convince those who do. My strategy is simple and doesn't rely on any
> good will towards political competitors.
>
> >So, you jumped to conclusions, and jumped all over me for not liking
> >them.
>
> Maybe.
>
> > > Because reducing the proportion of votes a candidate needs
> >> to win election is the obvious way to increase the number of
> >> electable parties. And PR does that.
> >
> >PR might be semi-useful for assemblies, but it is useless for electing
> >people to single seats (Governors, Presidents, Attorneys General).
>
> Obviously. Although there is no difference in principle. Australian
> single member electorates are all filled with preferential voting and
> basically the counting is done the same way as with PR. The quota for
> a single member electorate is 50% of valid votes, plus 1. Which is
> the same in essence as the quota for multi-member electorates.
>
> [Numer of valid votes divided by [number of vacancies to be filled
> plus one]] plus one vote.
>
> Its essentially the same thing. The only difference is that in multi
> member seats the count needs to provide for distribution of
> preferences of winning candidates, where their vote exceeds the quota.
>
> That's simple enough. Keep it simple. Its isn't exactly rocket
> science, you make out it is.
>
> >Even with PR, you still have to consider how you count the votes. Matrix
> >Math is the only sound way.
>
> I don't believe so. Single Transferrable Vote is far simpler to
> understand and people have enough trouble with understanding that.
> Especially Americans, in my experience. Also, it appears to me that
> this "matrix math" is a method designed to count votes in two ways -
> higher preference votes FOR a candidate, lower preference votes
> against. I see no virtue in that. Lower preference votes are only
> counted in STV in the event that the voters higher preference
> candidates are eliminated. You are already voting against a candidate
> by giving them a low preference, there's no justifiable reason to
> discriminate against a candidate who has enough preferred votes
> simply because a higher number than average put him last.
>
> If enough voters put a candidate low down their preference, below any
> other electable candidate, that will keep that candidate out under
> simple STV. Seen it happen lots of times.
>
> What exactly is your problem with that simpler system?

Bill,

It honestly seems to me that you are saying "3.1 works perfectly well for Pi, and it sure is, as you readily admit, better than 3."

Pi exists. When the best approximation of the will of the voters is used, it is actually _simpler_ for the voters than STV. When it has been strayed from in the past, it has always worked against what I would call progress.

You say this isn't a mathematical problem, which proves you don't understand the math. You say STV is simpler, which sort of proves you don't understand the problem.

I worked on the graphics issue last evening. Have been busy so far today, but will proceed now. I'm going to use a nice tool which allows me to spin the three-dimensional charts around by moving the mouse over the image :)

Josh



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