[lbo-talk] Rove going down tomorrow?/chem data

W. Kiernan wkiernan at ij.net
Thu Apr 27 17:46:29 PDT 2006


ravi wrote:

> Sorry no links (I closed my RSS reader and deleted/purged

> read articles unfortunately), but I read on Raw Story and

> Truth Out that Rove has received a target letter from

> Fitzgerald and is to be indicted by the grand jury

> tomorrow. Any comments?

Here you go:

> RAW STORY has also learned that an MSNBC report tonight

> revealed that one of Rove's lawyers said the presidential

> adviser described his fifth grand jury appearance as

> "hell."

dear me, "Hell" is a place name and should be capitalized...

> ...Also not boding well for Rove is the fact that the

> grand jury plans to meet tomorrow. Some are speculating

> that an indictment for Rove may be handed up tomorrow,

> though others have claimed such a fast turnaround time

> is unlikely...

http://www.rawstory.com/news/2006/MSNBC_reports_Rove_believes_he_in_0427.html

> ...Although Rove's attorney Robert Luskin (right) denies

> his client is a "target" in Special Prosecutor Patrick

> Fitzgerald's investigation, sources knowledgeable about

> the probe indicated Wednesday that Rove may face imminent

> indictment.

http://truthout.org/

I'll believe all that when I see it, but I'm going out and buying a bottle a spensive Frensh champain just in case!

Chuck Grimes wrote:

>

> Well, folks, that was bright. Hope everybody sharpened

> their pencils and got to work.

>

> What that post was about for those interested.

>

> According to some blog the Iranian separation centrifuges are 1.8m

> tall and run at 350 m/s velocity. I would guess they are about .5m to

> .75m in diameter from looking at the proporitions of other

> centrifuges. So that represents the max volume per centrifuge. They

> claim to have one cascade of 164.

I'm not sure I could calculate the throughput of a UF6 centrifuge from fundamental principles, but I have found a published figure for the efficiency of Pakistan's P-1 and P-2 centrifuges: about 2.5 SWU-kg per year for the P-1 (the kind Iran has today) and about double that for the faster P-2. To translate that into bomb-sized quantities here are some figures I posted elsewhere (OK, fark.com [blush]):

> Using the formula from this page:

>

> http://www.sizes.com/units/separative_work_unit.htm

>

> and assuming Iran starts with a large quantity of natural

> Uranium, from which they intend (at first) to extract 25%

> of the U235, in order to obtain enough 90% U235 for ten

> bombs (200 kg) you get:

>

> X(f) = 0.00711

> X(p) = 0.9

> X(w) = 0.00533

> F = 101266 kg (that's a hundred tons of natural Uranium)

> P = 200 kg

> W = 101066 kg

>

> By the formula, separation then requires 31,000 SWU-kg.

> (I'm assuming that Iran would be in a hurry to get the

> first bomb cores, so they'd trade off a higher X(w) for a

> lower net cost in SWUs. If they wanted to get two-thirds

> of the U235 out, they'd need only 38,000 kg of natural

> Uranium but 43,000 SWU-kg.) The 160 or so aluminum centrifuges

> in Iran's labs, which you've heard so much about lately, are

> the P-1 type which produce about 2.5 SWU-kg per year;

> Pakistan's nuclear engineers have also made a P-2 centrifuge

> of maraging steel, which can stand higher rates of rotation

> and is capable of twice the throughput, or 5 SWU-kg per year.

> So to produce ten bombs's worth of HEU requires about 12,000

> P-1 type centrifuges or 6,000 P-2 centrifuges to run for a

> year. Regarding the power consumption of these centrifuges

> I've read estimates from 50 kWh to 200kWh per SWU-kg; assuming

> 100 kWh per SWU-kg, separating 200 kg of HEU uses about a third

> of a megawatt-year.

>

> In other words, with the facilities they have today, Iran could

> produce 20 kg of HEU, enough for only one single bomb, in about

> seven years. Keep that in mind when you recall the wild claim

> that Iran could produce this quantity of HEU in sixteen days!

> (If you were paying real close attention you'll recall that

> that was a counterfactual, hypothetical argument; to be specific,

> the claim was that if Iran were to miraculously acquire 50,000

> centrifuges, they could manufacture a bomb core every sixteen

> days. Also, if they had functioning magic carpets, flying at

> below-radar altitudes, they could deliver these bombs anywhere

> on the globe!)

>

> If they start with reactor-grade LEU, enriched by the Russians

> to 4% U235 (x(f) = 0.04), and they purify it so the product

> concentration is 90% and the tail concentration is 3% (that is,

> they extract a quarter of the U235 in the LEU, x(w) = 0.03 and

> x(p) = 0.9) the formula says that 18,000 kg of LEU are required

> as feed - a fuel load large enough for a 1000 megawatt reactor!

> - and 5,900 SWU-kg are required for enrichment. Assuming that the

> Iranians buy large quantities of LEU from the Russians and, right

> under the IAEA's noses, they divert enough of it to fuel a power

> reactor to a secret weapons program in violation of the

> Non-Proliferation Treaty and they increase their current

> centrifuge facilities by a factor of ten, they would be able to

> produce about six bombs's worth of HEU a year; of course the

> whole Russian deal is contingent upon Iran ceasing to enrich U235

> domestically!

Yours WDK - WKiernan at ij.net



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