Do you regard op-ed regulars like Kissinger, Brzezinski, Soros, Zinni, Woolsey, Carter, Rubin, Summers, Scowcroft, et al as belonging to the "ruling class" or "power elite", and what does it really matter unless you think there are different or conflicting interests implied in these sociological categories? They are all influential representatives of the ruling class, power elite, or haute bourgeoisie -call it what you will - and have a wide following within it. They have all been at the centre of power.
It seems to me that the significant divisions between the leaders of the corporate, executive, legislative, judicial, administrative, coercive, and ideological institutions are not primarily structural, but political - between those individuals broadly identified as belonging to the "liberal" or "enlightened" fraction of the bourgeoisie and those associated with its "conservative" or "reactionary" wing, and shades in between.
[WS:] It is hard to disagree with the above. Yet, one can't help but notice that the US international policy seems to follow a certain predictable path that is quite independent of the political divisions within the ruling class. The entire cold war kept a rather steady course, regardless which faction held power. The policy toward Cuba seems the continuation of the same, whether under Clinton or Bush Jr. Likewise, the Iraq war is a reply of Korea and Vietnam - as if nothing was learnt from Vietnam.
I am not inclined to believe that "structural capitalism" - or whatever other buzzword is in fashion - is "determining" one and only policy path. That is too simplistic and too conspirational to my taste. Obviously, there are certain objective national interests that are relatively independent of politics, but these interests could be pursued in many different ways. Moreover, these objective national interest are not necessarily a coherent bunch -more often than not, these interests are many, fragmented, and quite incoherent.
The existence of this multitude and incoherence is highly significant, because is would suggest the existence of a relatively wide range of possible courses of action. Yet, only a very small subset of these possibilities surfaces in the US policies. That remarkable consistency over time requires an explanation, would not you agree?
My favorite conjecture in this regard is grounded in the path dependency theory claiming that chance decisions (i.e. choices between more or less equally probable options) made at strategic points affect the probability that subsequent decisions will tend to resemble the initial choice. The classical illustration of this is the following game: a player is supposed to randomly draw a chip from a bag that initially contains five chips of different colors, replace that chip after drawing, and add a chip of the same color from a stash to the bag. Then another player repeats the process, and then another, and so on. It is quite obvious that while at the beginning of the process, every color has an equal chance of being selected (1 in 5 to be exact), at the second trial the color that was selected in the first trial has a somewhat greater chance than other colors (2 in 6). If trials continue, the probability of the initial color further increases.
The reason for portraying it as a chance event is to show that subsequent players are bound to select the same color more often than other regardless of their own preferences. Suppose that the first player cheated and managed to select a color of his preference. The subsequent players may prefer different colors, but they are likely to select the first player's color. If the game goes on for a while, the subsequent players are likely to select the first color (i.e. follow the path set by the first player) even if they cheat, because the odds are overwhelmingly in favor of it (for more on this see, Brian Arthur, _Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in Economy_).
The bottom line is that certain strategic choices skew the field in favor of similar choices. The mechanism that ascertains path dependence is transaction cost. In real life, economic or political decisions have externalities. A classic illustration is industry concentration - the first guy can build his business in virtually any suitable location, but as soon he does, his decision affects his environment (e.g. building infrastructure, attracting skilled labor to that location, etc.) in a way that, everything else being equal, makes it less costly for others to locate in the same area rather than elsewhere.
The same pertains to politics. Once national leadership decides to fight demons, for example, it commits resources to that fight that affect the entire political, social and economic environment. For example, it moves its troops to locations where demons are seen, trains the personnel to study demons and methods of fighting them, which in turn creates a demand for supplies for these troops and personnel, from demon-fighting weaponry to demonology departments in academic institutions to train new specialists. Moreover, it creates a propaganda machine to mobilize the population against the demons, which makes it easier for other politicians to use that machine and imagery it creates to their own advantage, rather than risking coming up with something brand new and untried.
This, I believe, explains policy continuity despite divergent interests and political preferences. The main implication of it is that the US policy (especially foreign) is set on a certain policy path that is unlikely to change by politics alone (i.e. anything from elections to street protest). It does not even matter that different interest groups - even powerful ones - may prefer different set of alternatives (e.g. US companies eager to do business with Cuba, communist or otherwise). Once the Titanic sets its course, changing it is very difficult (albeit possible,) even if icebergs are in the plain view.
Wojtek