This is an intriguing analysis, Woj, but it would seem to apply largely if not entirely to states; it doesn't explain, for example, the motivations of the 9/11 hijackers, obviously non-state actors. For them, I think it is safe to say, the US was indeed the primary target, and in fact they succeeded hitting highly symbolic targets. For whom was this "just" domestic politics? Likewise, Bin Laden has specific grievances with the US, originating with its presence in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, and he has become adept at demonizing the US in the eyes of the Muslim world. In what way is this just sordid realpolitik?
You seem to discount the power of ideology. Why?
[WS:] First, I think the notion of non-state actors is grossly overblown - states have always maintained non-state vassal organizations that waged savage attacks against other states. The Nicaraguan contras or the Khmer Rouge are essentially no different than Al Quadea in being non-state organizations waging brutal terrorist attacks against states. I think the main difference is that thus far, Western states used to treated with a kid's glove by their opponents, say, during the cold war. The Soviet-bloc or China sponsored "communist" organizations in those countries limited themselves to polite political actions, and were spared the savagery of guerilla warfare they exported to the Third World countries. With the Al Quaeda, the kid's glove is off, and Westerners got a glimpse of the same savagery that has been plaguing Third World countries for decades. Basically, it is a "welcome to the club."
The radical Islamist movement started long before the US hegemony. AFIK, Islamic Brotherhood was active in Egypt at the turn of the century, and its main hostilities were directed at the secularization and modernization of their society, as well as European colonialism.
I conjecture, that Al Quaeda and company function as a safety valve for Islamic autocracies that diverts public attention from internal problems and autocratic rule to an outside enemy. Just imagine what would happened if instead waging a symbolic war against the Great Satan (which almost certainly will not produce any benefits to the combatants), al Quada and fellow travelers were fighting, say, the Saudi monarchy.
I also think that the mujahadeen movement in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion was a godsend to Arab autocracies, which could redirect the zeal of their dissidents to fight an external enemy instead. Al Quaeda may be a lose cannon, but I think it enjoys tacit support, moral as well as financial, of the Saudis, probably the Pakistanis and other states. Just think about, why were not there any terrorist attacks against *strategic* Saudi targets linked to its oil-producing capacity? Such attacks are no more difficult to carry than, say 9/11, and certainly would hurt the Great Satan and its allies more than blowing up a building or a subway train.
Keep also in mind that most terrorists are recruited not from the Arab countries that directly suffer the effects of US foreign policy, but from émigrés, oftentimes second generation. That weakens the supposed direct link between US foreign policy and terrorism. If terrorism were a "blowback" - you would expect those most affected filling its ranks, say, Palestinians. Yet, those who do fill those ranks come from Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Yemen.
In sum, I do think that any grievances against the US voiced by Bin Laden and Co. are commensurate with the actions they take. Not even close. On the other hand, those who do have legitimate grievances (like Palestinians, for example) generally do not fill the ranks of anti-US terrorist organizations. This paradox can possibly be explained if we assume that the US is merely a proxy target, a diversion that re-directs internal conflicts on an outside enemy - which I believe has been a hallmark of Muslim politics since the times of the "prophet."
Wojtek