> On Aug 17, 2006, at 1:12 PM, Eric Beck wrote:
> > I'm always fascinated by the artful ways in which certain western
> > leftists are able to excise the religious content of the resistance
> > groups they favor, as if the latter's reactionary-theocratic
> > politics is just an undesirable superstructure easily erased from
> > an exemplary anti-imperialist base. Which is to say, such leftists
> > never fail to encourage subaltern populations to live under
> > theocratic regimes they would never accept themselves.
>
> That's true of a lot of the left's reaction to the Iranian revolution
> in 1979 (both the Iranian and Western left) - Val Moghadam's 1987
> article in New Left Review goes into this in detail.
> Doug
<<<<<>>>>>
widespread iranian opposition to the shah produced a broad-based coalition of social forces whose political and religious differences were blurred in the heady days of revolutionary victory (such blurring is common in almost all such instances)...
khomeini faction's consolidation of power was facilitated by "critical mass" of committed clerics and laity, former were, in effect, a vanguard with vision and a plan that exploited differences and subsequent confusion that emerged in the immediate post-revolutionary period...
in the process, khomeini and his clerical cohorts replaced the authoritarianism of the shah and his secular elites with their own...
khomein's interpretation of islam and his belief in direct clerical rule and guardianship by a supposed expert - such as the likes of himself - in Islamic law was not prominent in Shia doctrine and it had not previously been held by many iranian religious leaders...
guardian council, arrogating for itself the power of absolute veto in the new "islamic republic" summarily struck down much legislation passed by less-sectarian parliamentary majority, included among measures that were blocked were various price and market controls, nationalizations of certain industries, the financial sector, and foreign trade, and expropriation of property and redistribution to the poor, major rural and agricultural reforms.
significantly, khomeini and the council's interpretation of islamic law was influenced by opposition to the above legislation, particularly, from among elements of the merchant class that had provided substantial financial support for the revolution and urban and rural landowners, among them clerics aligned with khomeini...
struggle over such matters would probably have continued for some time had it not been for the iraqi invasion and, in fact, similar political differences reemerged following the war which had provided an excuse for poor economic performance, minimized criticism of the government, and sustained regime support...
nevertheless, the khomeini vanguard had probably solidifed power in the days prior to the war through a combination of sectarian patronage and political repression... mh