The fact of the matter is that sometimes people vote Islamists into power through elections or bring them into power through revolution.
In principle, we have to accept other peoples' choices even when those aren't choices we make for ourselves, unless they make war on us or exterminate an ethnic group or do both, a la fascists: e.g., the Palestinian people voted for Hamas this January, so others -- including all Israelis -- should have accepted that choice, rather than organizing economic boycotts of it, kidnapping elected Hamas leaders, destroying Gaza again, and so on.
In the case of Lebanon, as long as the confessional system of power sharing* continues, which has hitherto underrepresented Shi'is, Hizballah won't be able to form a government on its own. The way Tel Aviv is carrying on, though, it may re-re-invade Lebanon and destroy the Lebanese government totally (or do virtually the same thing through the UN SC) sometime in the near future, on the pretext that it has failed to disarm Hizballah (which will be true, for the Lebanese Army won't even try to do so). Then, all bets are off.
* <blockquote>Lebanon's voters are also still waiting for a new electoral law to replace the seriously flawed law designed under Syrian tutelage before the 2000 parliamentary elections to ensure victory for pro-Syrian candidates. The 2000 law effectively disqualifies non-sectarian candidates who want to run on a secular program, even if they can garner a large number of votes. In Lebanon, 64 seats in Parliament are reserved for Muslims (including Druze) and 64 for Christians, and each denomination within the two religious groups is given a number of seats according to dated estimates of the denomination's weight in the population. In each district, citizens vote for prefixed slates of allied candidates, each mirroring the confessional balance in the district, so that in a majority-Shiite district, for example, each list features a majority of Shiite candidates allied with a few Sunnis and Christians. Usually, it is non-sectarian candidates who suffer from this system, since their rivals logically prefer to team up with sectarian leaders who have a proven track record of mobilizing their confessional constituency. The 2000 law worsened this effect by gerrymandering districts to make Christians the majority in only a handful of districts. So elections are turned into sectarian plebiscites to an extent unwarranted by the nature of the confessional system. This was amply illustrated in the May-June 2005 parliamentary contests, when each of Lebanon's confessional groups rallied behind "their" one strong leader. Maronite Christians, who feel an acute sense of marginalization because of the electoral law, voted for Michel Aoun not because of the ex-general's self-proclaimed secularism, but because other communities had already voted in strongmen who would represent "their" confessions first and foremost.
During the 2005 campaigning, virtually all of Lebanon's political leaders vowed to amend the electoral law if they won a seat in Parliament. A special commission was established to study proposals to this effect. Two of the commission's academic members soon resigned, however, in protest of attempts by politicians on the commission to gerrymander future election results in their own favor. Promising suggestions put forward by others, including a sophisticated blueprint for a more balanced electoral system based on the principle of proportional representation, failed to grab the commission's attention.[7]
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Following the Syrian withdrawal, Lebanon's internal balance of power has undeniably changed. Still, flawed implementation of the 1989 Ta'if formula of power sharing among the country's 18 ethno-confessional communities continues to block development of clearly defined and authoritative government policies.
Because the Ta'if agreement has gone unrevised, Lebanese politics is subject to institutional gridlock, epitomized by excessively inclusive governing coalitions. According to Ta'if and the 1990 constitutional amendments, representatives of the six main confessional communities—Shiites, Sunnis, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and Druze—should be part of every cabinet of ministers. Past practice further dictates that cabinet members should represent the country's geographical regions. If only for these reasons, Lebanon's post-war cabinets have been extremely large and heterogeneous, comprising up to 30 ministers. Cabinet meetings require a two-thirds quorum. Voting takes place only when consensus proves impossible, with "fundamental issues" requiring a two-thirds majority for action. Because it has proven impossible to reach agreement on what issues are "fundamental," decision-making based on consensus has become the rule even when consensus had not been reached, meaning, in other words, that all parties in the cabinet have an effectively veto. The most trifling matter, therefore, can precipitate a political crisis. Moreover, because the cabinet as a whole is charged with defending each ministry's policies before Parliament, all ministers have a say in all ministerial portfolios. No prime minister can be expected to enforce discipline in the resulting cacophony of dissent, as his own constitutional powers make him little more than primus inter pares.
(Reinoud Leenders, "How UN Pressure on Hizballah Impedes Lebanese Reform," 23 May 2006, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero052306.html>)</blockquote> -- Yoshie <http://montages.blogspot.com/> <http://mrzine.org> <http://monthlyreview.org/>