> My point wasn't that there's not a difference between the left and right
> kinds of populism, but that the approving comments of working- class
> people at a rally - including a 10-year-old - tells you much about the
> nature of the Persian Chavez' regime. Ahmadinejad can make all the
> populist noises he wants, but he lacks the resources to make good on
> them, and is subordinated to a reactionary clerical permanent government
> that circumscribes his actions.
Yoshie can answer for herself, but I understand her starting point to be that Ahmadinejad has the support of the poorer classes and is the only politician who articulates their needs - as against the reactionary clerics on the Supreme Council and the middle class reformers in Tehran and elsewhere. She seems to me to be too dismissive of the concerns others on the left have about A's reactionary social and religious views and his past complicity in the repression of the Iranian left, but I think her assessment of his populist social program and strong defence of Iranian sovereignty is correct.
My own view of these contradictory Islamist movements is that, whatever
their domestic policies, their role in in resisting the US and Israeli
occupations in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq has been on the whole positive.
The Iranians, by providing modern weaponry and other forms of support, have
helped redress the military balance in the region, without which there is no
possibility of an eventual settlement which would go some way to meeting
the needs of Israel's neighbours.
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> The original Islamic revolution was avowedly anti-imperialist, but turned
> into a fairly ugly state. All kinds of despots and demagogues can be
> anti-imperialist - it's often a nice cover for your domestic reaction and
> corruption.
I accept your point about how easy the rhetoric can serve as cover for reactionary demagogues, but I'm not persuaded how applicable it is to the Ahmadinejad government, which despite its backward features, still strikes me as anti-imperialist for the reasons stated above.
It seems to me that the onus is on the regime's critics to identify alternative forces in Iran which are as committed to its national independence and to addressing its social inequalities along with their more enlightened policies towards women, gays, secular dissidents, trade unionists, etc., Yoshie's point is that the more socially progressive Iranian left, in reaction to the Islamists, has compromised itself by adapting to the West's agenda for the region.