The wars of independence in the de facto breakaway regions of Georgia’s Abkhazia and Russia’s Chechnya in the early 1990’s resulted in parallel discourses of defiance and searches for independence. Yet recently the paths of these Caucasian neighbors have begun to diverge dramatically. The Georgian government’s three-day military campaign in the Kodori Gorge in late July signified the desire to restore Georgian central authority, long rejected by an elected Abkhaz government. Alternatively, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin had recently held a meeting with his ministers to discuss the forthcoming normalization of relations with Chechnya.
Although both Russia and Georgia espouse the ideals of territorial integrity, which is the core issue behind objections to the secession of either Chechnya or Abkhazia, it appears that the Russian government, after years of empty resolutions, has found a feasible approach to assure Chechnya’s wavering loyalty to the center. The Georgian government, however, has begun to shift its operations from the political realm to the military one. The resolve to include and exclude Russia’s and Georgia’s respective secessionist regions is molding the diverging destinies of Chechnya and Abkhazia.
The two Caucasus republics share a similar history of Russian conquest and Soviet rule. Following the late 19th-century Russian empire’s quest to acquire the Caucasus, both Abkhazia and Chechnya were subject to demographic manipulation, first through initial settlement by Russians in Chechnya and Russians and Georgians in Abkhazia, and later, through the political machinations of Joseph Stalin, who deported massive numbers of native Chechens following the Second World War.
Stalin also stripped Abkhazia of its Union Republic status, replacing it with the status of autonomy within the Union Republic of Georgia. The inevitable disintegration of the Soviet Union led to heightened tensions between the central and regional governments. Fearing that an independent Georgia would eliminate the autonomous status of Abkhazia, the Abkhaz citizens demanded the status of a Union Republic within the Soviet Union in 1989. The final dissolution of the USSR and the subsequent declaration of Georgian independence resulted in a statement of secession from the Abkhaz government in July 1992, which led to a brief but bloody war between Georgia and Abkhazia. Chechnya, a voice of secession amongst many regions in post-Soviet Russia, was the only territory to weather a war as a result. Russian territorial integrity was under threat following President Boris Yeltsin’s exclamations over the “parade of sovereignties” and the Russian government set to use Chechnya as an example of what would happen to defiant regions. Thus, both Abkhazia and Chechnya stepped into the post-Soviet era as challengers to their respective central governments.
However, the events of the past year indicate that the parallels between the two may be disappearing. Over the last two years, the Kremlin has been tightening its ties with the ruling government in Chechnya through Alu Alkhanov, a president who is widely believed to have been installed rather than elected in office in August 2004, and Ramzan Kadyrov, the prime minister, who is known for a shady past. Despite Kadyrov’s questionable background and Alkhanov’s controversial rise to power, the cooperative efforts to normalize Chechnya have been stepped up at an unprecedented rate, with investments to rebuild the Grozny airport, and with funding to reconstruct the homes destroyed during the two wars.
Unfortunately, out of the $2 billion dispensed for Chechen projects since 2000, only $350 million was spent as intended. However, on August 2, Russian media reported the plan of Putin’s ministers to see the completion of Chechnya’s reconstruction by 2010. The massive project will involve the infusion of five billion rubles, five times the amount issued in 2004, which will be used to repair roads, rebuild health clinics, hospitals and schools, and to revive agriculture.
Such increased confidence may come from the recent operations that have resulted in the deaths of the two most notorious Chechen rebel leaders, Shamil Basayev and Abdal-Khalim Sadulayev, who were the symbolic figures of Chechen rebel resistance. In its hopes that the elimination of the movement’s leaders will lead to a possible dissolution of the movement itself, the Russian Federal Security Service has called on illegal armed formations in the North Caucasus to lay down their arms in exchange for amnesty. So far, almost a hundred rebels have surrendered, among them the brother of the current leader of the resistance movement, Doku Umarov.
There is good reason to believe that Chechnya is indeed on a path to reconstruction and stabilization. Not only has the republic received assured support from the federal center, it has also received foreign offers of investment. In fact, the Chinese State Development Bank signed an agreement with Alkhanov to establish a system for financing investment in Chechnya, particularly in housing construction and infrastructure, automobile production, and the oil industry. The influx of investment from foreign sources signifies Chechnya’s first step towards economic autonomy. During the past decade, Chechnya has been heavily reliant upon federal subsidies. Hopefully, with the improvement of the political situation, and a decreased risk of terrorist insurgencies, other investors will take notice of Chechnya.
While Chechnya was experiencing rejuvenated interest from its federal authority, however, Abkhazia was witnessed a progression from stagnating relations to military engagement. The latest events at the Kodori Gorge indicate that the Georgian government is eager to reassert control over Abkhazia. The matter is intensified by the fact that the Abkhaz government is supported politically and militarily by Russia, which sees potential for its own gains within the region.
Upon a declaration of its independence, which was not officially recognized by any country in the world, Abkhazia nevertheless received strong support from Russia, which supplied significant military and financial aid to the separatist side. In fact, the continued presence of CIS peacekeepers, primarily made up of Russian troops in Abkhazia was used as one of the provocations for the Kodori operation. The Georgian government then displayed its military might before the potential protectors of the Abkhaz region.
Things took a turn for the worse for Abkhazia after its Foreign Minister, Sergei Shamba, announced in early June that Abkhaz authorities will never abandon the objective of creating an independent state in response to Georgia’s plan to make Georgia a federal state, which would offer broad autonomy and provide aid to develop Abkhazia’s economy.
Following this exchange, Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili reshuffled his cabinet on July 21, removing the state minister for conflict resolution, Giorgi Khaindrava. Khaindrava was the top official dealing with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This dismissal was preceded by the unexpected appointment in early June of Irakli Alasania, President Saakashvili’s special representative for the Abkhaz conflict, as Georgia’s new ambassador to the UN. It was largely due to Alasania’s efforts that the Abkhaz and Georgian sides agreed earlier this year to resume sessions, suspended in January 2002, of the Coordinating Council established under UN auspices. With the two remaining “doves” ousted from government, Georgia, under the direction of Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili, began its preparations for military operations.Recent events may elucidate the ongoing conflict, yet they are incapable of highlighting the underlying causes of such cool relations between Abkhazia and Georgia. It is true that Georgia does not possess the same luxury of installing its own leaders, as Russia does in Chechnya, who could then implement reform under the guise of autonomous reconstruction. Yet the efforts to stabilize and improve the political and economic situation in Abkhazia have been overshadowed by the drive for the ever-elusive territorial integrity.
Unfortunately, Georgia has taken few steps to improve the economic prosperity of the breakaway region. The continued impoverishment of Abkhazia and its loss of economic opportunities mainly originated with Georgia’s reluctance to provide incentives to resolve the lack of economic progress. Often, the Georgian government uses the ongoing conflict as an excuse for its failure to solve economic problems.
However, unlike Russia and Chechnya, it is Georgia that stands to lose more from ignoring potential economic opportunities in Abkhazia. Georgia loses customs revenues from goods imported to Abkhazia which are then smuggled into Georgia. Furthermore, the strong potential for the Abkhaz per capita income, from mass tourism and high-quality agriculture, may be capable of outstripping the Georgian per capita income in the future. Thus, in a purely economic way, Georgia is hurting its own economic potential more than it is hurting the Abkhaz economy.
Yet, it would be unfair to lay all the blame on the Georgian government, however belligerent it has been in the last few months. The continued claims for sovereignty from Abkhazia are strengthened by the solid support provided by the Russian government. Practical support, in the form of pensions, railway infrastructure, and the provision of Russian passports to over 80 percent of Abkhaz residents, is enhanced by a growing economic dependency.
The Abkhaz economy is tied directly to the Russian economy and its trade is conducted in Russian rubles. Russia claims to act only as an arbitrator between the two factions, yet, its territorial interests are exposed through the amount of assistance it continues to provide to Abkhazia. Evidently, the Georgian leadership then not only faces the secessionist leadership, but also the Russian state, which has lately been reasserting its dominance in the CIS space. The internationalization of the internal conflict has decreased the negotiation space between the central and the regional leaderships.
Despite the similarity between their original goals and motives, Abkhazia and Chechnya are moving further apart in their dialogues with their respective governments. The deaths of two Chechen rebel leaders, compounded by a strong cooperation between the regional government and the federal center has provided Chechnya with an opportunity to rebuild its shattered territory. The economic boost, both from the Russian government and foreign investors, also works as an incentive for citizens of Chechnya who have been impoverished by the consequences of the two wars.
Alternatively, Abkhazia, supported by the meddling Russian Federation, still cannot agree on a feasible solution of its rights with the aggravated Georgian government. Unable to look past the argument of territorial integrity, Georgia continues to isolate Abkhazia. Of course, Georgia has less financial ability to offer the same kind of incentives to Abkhazia as does oil-rich Russia. Nevertheless, actions like the recent invasion into the Kodori Gorge hardly promote a spirit of cooperation between regions. The lack of economic integration only promotes the groomed closeness between Abkhazia and Russia. It would be a shame to see Abkhazia go through the same tragedy of violence and destitution as Chechnya before the Georgian government realizes that the way to negotiation is through incentives and not force.
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