"I've read and reread the thread, and as far as I can see, my argument above still stands. You haven't responded to the argument. --And note that this is not a defense of "the academic class"; it's a defense of any specialized language created by a group of people who do something with the language."
But how can that be? Below are the significant excerpts of posts from you and then the previous posts by Ravi and myself that answer everything that you write about except possibility the Wittgensteinian notion of language games that you have in mind. But it certainly answers what you have to say about technical language.
Miles you wrote:
The clarity of a text is not a product of the text; rather,
> clarity is a product of people in a given social context who share the
> same background of knowledge and interest and then use the text in
their
> ongoing interactions. Thus a computer programming text is not clear
to
> me at all, but it could be a clear text in the culture of computer
> programmers. A chess book using algebraic notation may be a
> fascinating topic of discussion for me and ravi (/Life and games of M.
> Tal /rocks!), but it's just gibberish to people who don't
> participate in
> the chess culture. In sum: you can't say a text is "unnecessarily
> obscure" until you participate meaningfully in the culture that
> created it.
>
> Miles
Ravi wrote:
The mathematician Doron Zellberger [sp?] writes that the Sokal prank is a cheap laugh at someone's language. There is (to my naive eyes) a sort of wilful reverse language incommensurability going on here with these "theory" or "ideology" analysis thinkers. It seems to me that Chomsky says, as seen even in the limited quotes offered by Jerry, what needs to be said at the theoretical level. It's just that he says it in a particular language (what Jerry calls common sense, and I would agree) that is unpalatable[?] or at least un-parse-able for members of other communities. I think there is a legitimate point to requiring the use of particular language both to avoid pitfalls in inference/analysis and to avoid hidden assumptions and plain old vagueness. However, typically, as long as the alternate language is used honestly and is rich enough (both of which are true of common sense and of Chomsky's usage) then it should be possible to demonstrate the errors of its users in that language itself (I am speaking generally; common sense is heavily tied to very human notions of sense and explanation, whereas some languages such as math can produce internally meaningful sentences that cannot be translated into common sense terms at all. Similar things may be true of poetry though it shares the tokens of common sense language).
For example, Aristotle's long wordy text syllogisms are no different from their formal logical symbolic counterparts. Now, using the symbolic versions gives us two things: one, the possible manipulations of the tokens are better spelled out and catch ignored conditions, and second, because of the syntactic nature of the deductions they can unearth wrong conclusions in the syllogisms. Both results can however be explained in Aristotle's language.
[ By the way the same thing that can be said of Aristotle's wordy text syllogisms can be said of chess notation of any kind.]
I wrote:
Difficulty and obscurity are not the same. Technical prose and obscurity are not the same. Obscurity that is for the sake of obscurantism is always wrong if our intention is to communicate, learn and educate, and not mystify and indoctrinate. Some writing needs to be technical in order to communicate accurately and precisely. But most technical language is in fact unnecessary in proportion with the level of expertise required by the subject. Those of us who are for openness and democracy should be skeptical of esoteric language. We should be suspicious that much esoteric language is not in fact the secular equivalent of religious mumble-jumble. Those who write obscurely or esoterically need to assume the burden of proof that there obscure or esoteric style of communication is necessary for the subject. Of course I am only making this case for non-fiction, as will become evident below.
[and]
This is to say that there are good communicative reasons for "obscurity" that have nothing or little to do with deliberate obscurantism, and there are good reasons having to do with preciseness for technical concepts. But through human history those who claim the need for technical concepts or esoteric language or seek to keep their technical means of thinking and communicating esoteric, most often do so for reasons having to do with elite and class dominance. Those of us who seek a more democratic politics and economics should be deeply suspicious of what seems to be unclarity for the sake of mystification and obscurantism for the sake of esoteric elitism. Much of the technical language and obscure prose used by authors, even those who think of themselves as being on the left, exists to enforce a kind of intellectual exclusivity or to promote academic reputation. I have read nothing written by Judith Butler or Derrida or Zizek or Foucault that could not be written in the prose style of Edmund Wilson or Bertrand Russell, or for that matter the Simone de Beauvoir of "The Second Sex." But writing such things in a clear prose style would often reveal the absurdity or vacuity or mere everyday truth of the thought underneath the writing.
There are times when obscure prose is not for the sake of obscurantism or when language is esoteric but not for the sake of exclusivity. When thoughts are being expressed for the first time and the author is trying to work through his/her thinking in public then even though the writing might not make sense, it may help others to entangle and then untangle a knot of meaning. In such a case obscurity has a creative and germinating aspect and may lead to clarity later on and/or the development of a legitimate subject of expertise and technicality. I often told students that Kant is the only unreadable philosopher worth reading. This I think is an exaggeration. I think I might add Wittgenstein or Augustine, though sentence for sentence neither Wittgenstein nor Augustine are unreadable simply very dense. I think that in the instance of all three of these cases the authors are working close to the limits of thinkable and expressible thought. Much that is good in philosophy (or poetry for that matter) tries to push the edges of thinkable thought in this way and I suppose a certain amount of tolerance in this area is necessary. But we should have our detectors out for pretension and intellectual social climbing.
Then you wrote:
"I've read and reread the thread, and as far as I can see, my argument above still stands. You haven't responded to the argument. --And note that this is not a defense of "the academic class"; it's a defense of any specialized language created by a group of people who do something with the language."
I simply don't see Miles how Ravi and myself have not taken into account already the problem of technical language, etc. I don't understand how you could have read the above and then wrote what you did about chess as a technical lexicon.
Now unlike you I believe that clarity is a good in and of itself, in practically all cases where the intention is to communicate. As I said though sometimes the intention is to communicate obscurity itself.
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