<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/12/07/africa/ME_GEN_Iraq_Insurgency_Saudi.php> Officials say Saudis major provider of finance to Iraqi Sunni insurgents
The Associated Press Thursday, December 7, 2006 CAIRO, Egypt
Private Saudi citizens are providing millions of dollars in funding to Sunni insurgents in Iraq, much of it used to buy weapons including anti-aircraft weapons, according to key Iraqi officials and others familiar with the flow of cash.
Saudi government officials deny that any money from their country is being sent to Iraq. But the U.S. Iraq Study Group report released Wednesday also cited Saudi individuals as a source of Sunni insurgent funding.
Two high-ranking Iraqi officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the issue's sensitivity, told The Associated Press recently that most of the Saudi money comes from private Islamic donations inside Saudi Arabia, known as zakat. Some Saudis appear aware the money is headed to Iraq but others merely give it to clerics who then send it on, they said.
In one recent case this fall, US $25 million from Saudis went to a top Iraqi Sunni cleric and was used to purchase weapons, including Russian-made Strela anti-aircraft missiles obtained in Romania, apparently through the black market, one Iraqi official said.
Overall, the money has been pouring into Iraq from oil-rich Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Muslim bastion, since the 2003 U.S.-led war that toppled the Sunni-controlled regime of Saddam Hussein, the two officials said.
Saudi officials vehemently deny the flow.
"There isn't any organized terror finance, and we will not permit any such unorganized acts," said Brig. Gen. Mansour al-Turki, a spokesman for the Saudi interior ministry. He said that about a year ago the government set up a unit whose mission is to track any "suspicious financial operations."
But the Iraq Study Group, in its report Wednesday, noted that "funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within Saudi Arabi and other Gulf states."
The two Iraqi officials said that while some of the funding goes to Iraqi Sunni leaders, who then disburse it, other channels are being used to send money directly to insurgents. Among them are Iraqi drivers working on road links between Iraq and neighboring countries.
Several drivers interviewed by the AP in several Middle East capitals said Saudis have been using religious events, like the annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca and a smaller midyear pilgrimage, to send money into Iraq on buses that carry returning pilgrims.
"They sent boxes full of dollars and asked me to deliver them to certain addresses in Iraq," said one driver who would give his name only as Hussein for fear of reprisal. "I know it is being sent to the resistance, and if I don't take it with me, they will kill me."
He said he was told what was in the boxes so it could be hidden from Iraqi authorities as he crossed the border.
The two Iraqi officials would not name any specific Iraqi Sunnis who have received money from Saudi Arabia. But the Iraqi government issued an arrest warrant for Harith al-Dhari, one of the government's most vehement Sunni opponents, accusing him of sectarian incitement, shortly after he visited Saudi Arabia in October. The specifics of the charges could not be determined.
Saudi Arabia is a top U.S. ally in the Middle East and the Iraq Study Group report noted that its government has assisted the U.S. military in Iraq on issues like intelligence.
But its people have close tribal ties with Sunni Arabs in Iraq and see their brethren in a fight for control — and survival — with Iraq's Shiites.
On the political front, the Saudi government has actively been trying to counterbalance the growing influence of its top rival in the region, Iran. Tehran is closely linked to Shiite parties that now dominate Iraq's government.
Saudi officials point out, however, that the kingdom has worked with all sides to reconcile Iraq's warring factions, including holding talks in Saudi Arabia with Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose militia is accused of killing Sunnis.
The Saudi officials say zakat donations have been brought under control and can only be done through strictly supervised bank accounts. Donation boxes that used to be prevalent in supermarkets and shopping malls have been eliminated.
Nevertheless, Iraqi officials have expressed worry that Sunni neighbors might be interfering inside Iraq. At a recent Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari raised the issue of neighbors' meddling with his Arab counterparts.
"We hope that Saudi Arabia will keep the same distance from each and all Iraqi parties," Zebari later told the AP.
Last month, The New York Times reported that a classified U.S. government report said Iraq's Sunni insurgency had become self-sufficient financially, raising millions from oil smuggling, kidnapping and Islamic charities. The report did not specify whether any money was believed to come from Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, the contention by Iraqi officials that insurgents used the money to buy Strela rockets raises the worrying possibility they are getting sophisticated weapons.
On Nov. 27, a U.S. Air Force F-16 jet crashed while supporting American soldiers fighting in the Sunni insurgent hotbed Anbar province. The U.S. military said it had no information about the cause and Gen. William Caldwell, a U.S. military spokesman, said he would be surprised if the jet was shot down because F-16's have not encountered weapons capable of taking them down in Iraq.
But last week, a spokesman for Sunni insurgents from Saddam's ousted Baath Party claimed that fighters armed with a Strela missile had shot down the jet.
"We have stockpiles of Strelas and we are going to surprise them (the Americans)," Khudair al-Murshidi, the spokesman, told the AP in Damascus, Syria. He would not say how the Strelas were obtained.
Saddam's army used to have the missiles in its arsenal, but it is not known how many have survived. The Strela is a shoulder-fired, low-altitude system with a passive infrared homing guidance.
The Saudi funding issue could gain new prominence as the Bush administration reviews its Iraq policy to possibly engage neighbors like as Iran and Syria.
Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, wrote in a recent leaked memorandum that Washington should "step up efforts to get Saudi Arabia to take a leadership role in supporting Iraq, by using its influence to move Sunni populations out of violence into politics."
Last week, a Saudi who headed a security consultant group close to the Saudi government, Nawaf Obaid, wrote in a Washington Post piece that Saudi Arabia would use money, oil and support for Sunnis to thwart Iranian efforts to dominate Iraq, if American troops pulled out.
The Saudi government denied his words and fired him.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801277.html> Stepping Into Iraq Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis if the U.S. Leaves
By Nawaf Obaid Wednesday, November 29, 2006; A23
In February 2003, a month before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, warned President Bush that he would be "solving one problem and creating five more" if he removed Saddam Hussein by force. Had Bush heeded his advice, Iraq would not now be on the brink of full-blown civil war and disintegration.
One hopes he won't make the same mistake again by ignoring the counsel of Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal, who said in a speech last month that "since America came into Iraq uninvited, it should not leave Iraq uninvited." If it does, one of the first consequences will be massive Saudi intervention to stop Iranian-backed Shiite militias from butchering Iraqi Sunnis.
Over the past year, a chorus of voices has called for Saudi Arabia to protect the Sunni community in Iraq and thwart Iranian influence there. Senior Iraqi tribal and religious figures, along with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan and other Arab and Muslim countries, have petitioned the Saudi leadership to provide Iraqi Sunnis with weapons and financial support. Moreover, domestic pressure to intervene is intense. Major Saudi tribal confederations, which have extremely close historical and communal ties with their counterparts in Iraq, are demanding action. They are supported by a new generation of Saudi royals in strategic government positions who are eager to see the kingdom play a more muscular role in the region.
Because King Abdullah has been working to minimize sectarian tensions in Iraq and reconcile Sunni and Shiite communities, because he gave President Bush his word that he wouldn't meddle in Iraq (and because it would be impossible to ensure that Saudi-funded militias wouldn't attack U.S. troops), these requests have all been refused. They will, however, be heeded if American troops begin a phased withdrawal from Iraq. As the economic powerhouse of the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the world's Sunni community (which comprises 85 percent of all Muslims), Saudi Arabia has both the means and the religious responsibility to intervene.
Just a few months ago it was unthinkable that President Bush would prematurely withdraw a significant number of American troops from Iraq. But it seems possible today, and therefore the Saudi leadership is preparing to substantially revise its Iraq policy. Options now include providing Sunni military leaders (primarily ex-Baathist members of the former Iraqi officer corps, who make up the backbone of the insurgency) with the same types of assistance -- funding, arms and logistical support -- that Iran has been giving to Shiite armed groups for years.
Another possibility includes the establishment of new Sunni brigades to combat the Iranian-backed militias. Finally, Abdullah may decide to strangle Iranian funding of the militias through oil policy. If Saudi Arabia boosted production and cut the price of oil in half, the kingdom could still finance its current spending. But it would be devastating to Iran, which is facing economic difficulties even with today's high prices. The result would be to limit Tehran's ability to continue funneling hundreds of millions each year to Shiite militias in Iraq and elsewhere.
Both the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite death squads are to blame for the current bloodshed in Iraq. But while both sides share responsibility, Iraqi Shiites don't run the risk of being exterminated in a civil war, which the Sunnis clearly do. Since approximately 65 percent of Iraq's population is Shiite, the Sunni Arabs, who make up a mere 15 to 20 percent, would have a hard time surviving any full-blown ethnic cleansing campaign.
What's clear is that the Iraqi government won't be able to protect the Sunnis from Iranian-backed militias if American troops leave. Its army and police cannot be relied on to do so, as tens of thousands of Shiite militiamen have infiltrated their ranks. Worse, Iraq's prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, cannot do anything about this, because he depends on the backing of two major leaders of Shiite forces.
There is reason to believe that the Bush administration, despite domestic pressure, will heed Saudi Arabia's advice. Vice President Cheney's visit to Riyadh last week to discuss the situation (there were no other stops on his marathon journey) underlines the preeminence of Saudi Arabia in the region and its importance to U.S. strategy in Iraq. But if a phased troop withdrawal does begin, the violence will escalate dramatically.
In this case, remaining on the sidelines would be unacceptable to Saudi Arabia. To turn a blind eye to the massacre of Iraqi Sunnis would be to abandon the principles upon which the kingdom was founded. It would undermine Saudi Arabia's credibility in the Sunni world and would be a capitulation to Iran's militarist actions in the region.
To be sure, Saudi engagement in Iraq carries great risks -- it could spark a regional war. So be it: The consequences of inaction are far worse.
The writer, an adviser to the Saudi government, is managing director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project in Riyadh and an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. The opinions expressed here are his own and do not reflect official Saudi policy. -- Yoshie <http://montages.blogspot.com/> <http://mrzine.org> <http://monthlyreview.org/>