>
> Miles writes: Sure, we agree completely. This is true of any community of language
> users, from poets to engineers to pomo lit critics.
First, I don't think that there is such an entity as a "community of language users." So unless you can translate this notion or explain to me your notion of a "community of lanaguage users" in a way that makes sense to me, I will not concede the truth of your statement. I suspect that this notion is some combination of Wittgenstein's notion of "language games" and Stanley Fish's notion of an "interpretive community."
Second, I wish to praise poets and even engineers and not place them in the same sentence as lit crits like myself.
And third, if pomo lit crits do nothing but talk to other pomo lit crits, I think they are not probably doing any harm, except to themselves. Though I do think I could show you how the ideology implicit in pomo lit criticism might do harm to literature and rhetoric. Frankly, if I had to chose between two "community of language users" medieval Roman Catholic theologians and pomo lit crits I would choose the Catholic theologians. I have read the Scholastics and I have read many deconstructionists and the Scholastics are simply more in touch with reality and pay more attention to rational argument.
If an engineer gets things wrong his bridge will fall down. If a pomo lit crit finds a new way to obfuscate his star may rise. There is real world punishment for engineers, and not for pomo lit crits.
Just as an observation of intellectual history, this kind of
obfuscation was not tolerated between medieval Catholic theologians.
This is perhaps because as a whole such theologians were isolated from
the multitude and there was as yet no wide or deep middle class
audience for theology. Some times elitism and isolation does have
benefits for rationality and clarity.
>
>
> >JM: But don't try
> > to sell me on the fact that in doing this you are striking a blow
> > against hierarchy.
>
>Miles writes: Who claimed that was the paramount goal of specialized
language? People
> do lots of things with language; fomenting revolution is one important
> use of language, but there are many others!
JM: Who claimed otherwise? But, it seems to me that many of the left pomos claim that somehow their "theories" are striking a blow against hierarchy. Maybe I missed something here, but aren't some people claiming that Zizek, Butler, Derrida gave us some tools to challenge the status quo?
> >JM: It is my experience there is nothing about history, the class system,
> > the division of labor, racism, gender division, economics, law,
> > international relations, and literature, that cannot in principle be
> > discussed in the vernacular language... and that there are no
> > specialized theories of these areas of human life.
>
>Miles writes: [1] Consider this possibility: the venacular language
is a product of social
> relations; as such it is imbricated in the political and economic
> systems of a society (back to the ideology thread!).
JM: The results are in on this. Natural languages are not a product of social relations. Now the _use_ of language is part of the social system as opposed to "language" as a mental system. I would distinguish "language" from "language use". But I do not think that this distinction harms your argument below. (Question: I like that word "imbricated" and have only come across it in biological literature -- the scales of snakes -- and in latin texts -- imbricatus -- to describe how a building is covered with tiles. Does Laclau use the term in this way?)
>Miles writes: [2] The language
> people use is a crucial means for the maintenance of the status quo in
> all human societies. Thus if we restrict ourselves to the vernacular to
> make sense of human social life, we can do nothing but reinforce the
> status quo. To think in innovative ways, we typically need to develop
> specialized language.
JM: Well it is possible, but so far not in the areas of politics, international relations, the class system and gender relations. Like I said before I think that the burden of proof is on those who use what seems to me esoteric language, that such language is necessary or better than language that might reach others.
Take your word choice above -- the use of the word "imbricated." I gain some aesthetic pleasure from this word choice. But if the word is called for at all, one basically has to accepted your premise that "language" covers the social and political system like the scales of a snake cover a snake, or like terra cotta covers a roof, overlapping, but not quite matching. This is not a bad metaphor for the _use_ of language in ideological contexts, but the burden of proof for everything here, your claims on "language" and the appropriateness, effectiveness of this metaphor, is on you.
In fact historically it is simply the opposite of what you say. Those who seek to undermine such systems speak and write in the vernacular, even trying to translate scientific and technical knowledge into the vernacular, and those who seek to maintain the status quo of society seek to obfuscate, claim specialized knowledge where there is none, etc. This has been the case over and over again in history. You have not explained why I should think the case is any different now. The case may be different now and there may be exceptions in the past. But nobody has explained why, in this case, our current society is exceptional or how the exceptions in the past, where-ever they are, may perhaps lead you to this conclusion. Perhaps we disagree on the history?
The first part of your above paragraph (I label it [1]) I reject but it seems to me your argument stands on the second part of the paragraph (I label it [2]). If you could convince me of that then we would be making some sort of "progress" in this discussion.
>Miles writes: There are numerous well-developed, empirically
validated theories
> in the social sciences.
JM: Such as? I think the crucial word here is "theory." There are good rational arguments when we talk about society, psychology, literature, etc. but "theories?" I haven't come across any.
>
> >JM: But don't mistake the star system or institutional hierarchy in any
> > field of endeavor with the pursuit and spread of knowledge (a very old
> > fashion notion) or with giving people the tools of thought to help
> > them understand the world.
>
>Miles writes: But this "star system" is a part of our whole system
of producing
> knowledge. [1] This is even [(a)] more common [(b)] in the natural sciences than it is
> in cultural studies or lit crit. I share your disgust about the
> academic star system, [2] but we should admit that it has significantly
> contributed to knowledge in many domains. --> >
JM: [1(a)] I doubt that it is "more" common in the natural sciences than it is in cultural studies and lit crit. For one thing there is more at stake in the "sciences" as far as the rulers and owners are concerned. But partially because of the fact that the rulers and owners, pick certain areas of science and certain scientists out for special attention, and the making of profits, the star system has less to do with "success" and "failure" in the field and more to do with monetary reward. In other words the "value" of the commodity of an individual scientist or of the science in general is determined by some extent by something outside of the star system, even though it feeds into the star-system in science. The only functional equivalent to this process in the humanities is some sort of star-system or, at its worse, simply an econometrics of citations. I don't deny that there is a star system in science, and that there aren't institutions that promote exclusivity, handing out awards and rewards for those who are favored by the status quo, etc. It is just so much harder to fake things in the natural sciences than it is in the humanities. But I would argue (and it would be a long argument) that in the sciences the star system hurts more than it helps.
We should distinguish the star system from competition and cooperation in any particular society, field of institution. They are allied but they are not the same. And even though the institutions that participate in producing "knowledge" and "information" are in our society part of a commodity system I don't think you should make the assumptions you make in the above paragraph.
[1(b)] Primarily, I think there is a fundamental difference between the natural sciences and the humanities. In the sciences (considered very generally) there are feedback systems that to some small extent test what is produced. An engineer who develops a new way to build a bridge across a windy gorge, will have to show that the bridge won't fall down and, in fact, the bridge should not fall down when built. There is nothing similar to this as far as I can see in the humanities. A chemist who performs an experiment, no matter how silly, has to make sure that the experiment is repeatable. If a "theory" is propounded then eventually people have to think up ways that the theory can be measured or tested some how. None of this is perfect or exact, and we have had discussions on this subject before. I personally believe that what makes scientific theories work, is that they cover a very think layer of reality but do so in depth. The humanities simply do not do this kind of thing.
[2] I think that in many ways the star system, by promoting certain forms of competition and undermining certain forms of cooperation, has often been an impediment to the production of "knowledge". It certainly has often been an impediment to the openness of information flow. Also one of the most harmful aspects of how modern science factors into the commodity system, is what might be called the investment strategy of scientific research. But I suppose you will agree with me on this.
>Miles writes: Sure, the intellectual elitism exists. It exists in
medicine, physics,
> poetry, theology, cultural studies, and every other field in which
> people specialize. Whether or not this specialized "priesthood" is a
> good thing or a bad thing cannot be specified a priori.
JM: I don't think that it is always a bad thing to produce an elite. I do think that an intellectual "priesthood" is always a bad thing. Perhaps this is the difference between an elite and elitism. Or perhaps this is the difference between accomplishment and class/caste dominance.
Again I think that I am kind of old fashion. In poetry or physics, in chemistry or chess, excellence is the goal and those who produce excellent work are and should be recognized as better than those who don't.
And I will agree with you, especially in our society, the difference between rewards for excellence and rewards for reaching the top of the star system cannot be specified _a priori_. But that is the very point of what we are arguing about and trying to distinguish. A small part of my argument is that people such as Derrida were rewarded not for their excellence but for the way they became stars; that there prose style, in general, is largely a result of the star system, etc. (Brian may recognize here a variation on my argument against applying the "auteur theory" to classical Hollywood studio films.) This is also the way that this institutional analysis of the promotion of obscurantist intellectuals connects up with notions of ideology.
>I know you
> agree with that, because you are willing to accept specialized knowledge
> and language in at least some domains. We also agree that it is
> appropriate to assess specialized language in terms of its social
> effects. If a particular form of knowledge mainly exists to "petrify
> democratic education or facilitate the dominance of various ruling
> classes"--in my view, economics is the poster child here!--it deserves
> any ridicule we can heap on it.
JM: I think we can reach (have reached?) some common ground here. I do wish you could agree with me on an _ethics of rhetoric_.
> I just don't agree with you that people
> like Foucault should be put in that dust bin.
>
> Miles
>
JM: Yes we will disagree about Foucault. But I can do without the dust bin of history. I just "wish" that Foucault's influence was much smaller, thus matching my (perhaps bad) judgment of his contributions.
Jerry Monaco