I was not saying that the Iraq Study Group is recommending rapid withdrawal. Regarding the Iraq Study Group, I was referring to its Iran plan. A few in high places in Washington are certainly making the Israeli power elite nervous, though they remain a minority who probably won't get their way:
<blockquote>Israeli officials were shocked by Robert Gates' statement to Congress that Israel has nuclear weapons, and they are worrying over why the U.S. secretary of defense-designate made this statement.
In particular, they want to know two things: First, whether this statement was a private initiative by Gates, or whether he coordinated it with the top levels of the American administration. And second, whether he was implying that since Israel has nuclear weapons, it can deal with any nuclear threat from Iran on its own.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Israeli officials were also shocked by Gates' expression of understanding for Iran's desire to obtain nuclear weapons: He listed all the states near Iran that do have nuclear weapons - Pakistan, India and Israel - and noted that not long ago, Saddam Hussein's Iraq also attempted to acquire the bomb. Furthermore, he said, the United States is a nuclear power, and its forces are deployed in Iran's vicinity throughout the Middle East, and Russia, another nuclear power, is also nearby." (Ze'ev Schiff, "Gates Testimony / Preserving Nuclear Ambiguity," 10 December 2006, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/798771.html>)</blockquote>
> No doubt many "moderate" Democrats and "moderate" Republicans will broadly
> back the Baker Plan and their seeming opposition to Bush will draw in some
> more liberal elements. Unless there is a strong mass pressure AGAINST a
> Baker Plan-like time line we will be left with a debate between that and
> whatever Bush proposes.
>
> The steps the ISG lays out mean 80,000 troops in Iraq in 2008 at which time
> a review and debate will then begin -- in that spirit one doesn't even have
> a chance for U.S. troops to be out before 2010 (with a new Administration
> taking office in 2009).
The right-wing Democrats are determined to have their shot at managing the Iraq War from both the executive and legislative branches of the government. If we can't build any organized Left in America under _that_ condition, we might as well close shop and move to Venezuela!
On 12/13/06, Jim Straub <rustbeltjacobin at gmail.com> wrote:
> After reporting rumors that the
> Sunni insurgency was confident they could take out the green zone in a
> frontal assault, and was merely biding its time, Juan went on to say that
> among acquaintances in Iraq there was consensus agreement that the Sunni
> ex-Baath insurgency could handily militarily defeat the Shia militias in a
> straight up war (if openly funded and armed by the Saudis on the greater
> level threatened, I would imagine their chances get even better). I was
> surprised that such hypothetical speculation would produce unanimous
> agreement among any group of folks in the know over there, and a little
> dubious. After all the Sunni are such a small minority. Even with superior
> arms and training, what would they do with Sadr City?
Darling, think like a Henry Kissinger or a Zbigniew Brzezinski.
One, when you can't win, what do you want to do? Deny your enemy victory. The enemy in this case is Sadr and the populist and anti-imperialist faction of Iran.
Two, Riyadh and Washington can exploit multiple divisions among Shi'i Iraqis and give their Sunni clients Shi'i allies.
> Terrifying, that reality-based contingents of the imperial machine
> in the middle east are already starting to maneuver with respect
> to a potential Arab Rwanda.
You understand them better once you remind yourself that all "reality" they care about is the reality of their power and wealth. The Saudi plan can very well blowback on the rulers of the Gulf states and Washington, though; certainly it will have as profound an impact on geopolitics as the anti-Soviet jihad, backed by Washington and Riyadh among others, in Afghanistan did during the Cold War. The Gulf states have a lot of Shi'is. The estimates of Shi'is among the Saudi population range from 10 to 20 percent. According to Vali Nasr, "some 70 percent of the people living in the Persian Gulf region" are Shi'is ("When the Shiites Rise," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060701faessay85405/vali-nasr/when-the-shiites-rise.htmll>).
POSTSCRIPT:
The radioactive Holocaust revisionist conference in Iran makes me nostalgic for the ruthlessness of the Soviet leaders*. The Russians today are unlikely to warn the President of Iran: "Stop that foolishness, or eat polonium and die." Democracy and republicanism have their drawbacks.
* <blockquote>In September [1979], the question became completely academic for Noor Mohammed Taraki, for he was ousted (and his death soon announced) in an intra-party struggle and replaced by his own deputy prime minister, Hafizullah Amin. Although Taraki had sometimes been heavy-handed in implementing the reform program, and had created opposition even amongst the intended beneficiaries, he turned out to be a moderate compared to Amin who tried to institute social change by riding roughshod over tradition and tribal and ethnic autonomy.
The Kremlin was unhappy with Amin. The fact that he had been involved in the overthrow and death of the much-favored Taraki was bad enough. But the Soviets also regarded him as thoroughly unsuitable for the task that was Moscow's sine qua non: preventing an anti-communist Islamic state for arising in Afghanistan. Amin gave reform an exceedingly bad name. The KGB station in Kabul, in pressing for Amin's removal, stated that his usurpation of power would lead to "harsh repressions and, as a reaction, the activation and consolidation of the opposition"{20} Moreover, as we shall see, the Soviets were highly suspicious a bout Amin's ideological convictions.
Thus it was, that what in March had been unthinkable, in December became a reality. Soviet troops began to arrive in Afghanistan around the 8th of the month -- to what extent at Amin's request or with his approval, and, consequently, whether to call the action an "invasion" or not, has been the subject of much discussion and controversy.
On the 23rd the Washington Post commented "There was no charge [by the State Department] that the Soviets have invaded Afghanistan, since the troops apparently were invited"{21} However, at a meeting with Soviet-bloc ambassadors in October, Amin's foreign minister had openly criticized the Soviet Union for interfering in Afghan affairs. Amin himself insisted that Moscow replace its ambassador.{22} Yet, on 26 December, while the main body of Soviet troops was arriving in Afghanistan, Amin gave "a relaxed interview" to an Arab journalist. "The Soviets," he said, "supply my country with economic and military aid, but at the same time they respect our independence and our sovereignty. They do not interfere in our domestic affairs." He also spoke approvingly of the USSR's willingness to accept his veto on military bases.{23}
The very next day, a Soviet military force stormed the presidential palace and shot Amin dead.{24}
He was replaced by Babrak Karmal, who had been vice president and deputy prime minister in the 1978 revolutionary government. ("AFGHANISTAN 1979-1992 America's Jihad," William Blum <http://members.aol.com/bblum6/afghan.htm>)</blockquote>
-- Yoshie <http://montages.blogspot.com/> <http://mrzine.org> <http://monthlyreview.org/>