Here's what the Pentagon has to say about the breakdown of attacks in Iraq:
<blockquote>In the past three months, the total number of attacks2 increased 22%. Some of this increase is attributable to a seasonal spike in violence during Ramadan. Coalition forces remained the target of the majority of attacks (68%), but the overwhelming majority of casualties were suffered by Iraqis. Total civilian casualties increased by 2% over the previous reporting period. Fiftyfour percent of all attacks occurred in only 2 of Iraq's 18 provinces (Baghdad and Anbar). Violence in Iraq was divided along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines, and political factions within these groups, and was often localized to specific communities. Outside of the Sunni Triangle, more than 90% of Iraqis reported feeling very safe in their neighborhoods. ("Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," November 2006, p. 3, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010Quarterly-Report-20061216.pdf>)</blockquote>
Once coalition forces leave Iraq, attacks that target them will also cease. If the Pentagon's assessment is honest and correct, and if really "only 2 of Iraq's 18 provinces (Baghdad and Anbar)" are experiencing more than half of violence in Iraq, that means one or another force is in hegemony in each area of the rest of Iraq, on its own or together with others, and capable of governing it.
Who is killing the most civilians?
<blockquote>The level of sectarian violence in Baghdad has risen, with much of it directed against civilians. Neighborhoods have responded by forming their own militias for self-defense. The Sunni Arab insurgency also remains a potent threat to Coalition forces and the ISF, but it generally conducts smaller-scale attacks on military targets. As a result, the insurgents have had a lower profile than the sectarian elements executing civilians or al-Qaeda in Iraq elements conducting mass-casualty bombings and suicide attacks. ("Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," November 2006, p. 17 <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010Quarterly-Report-20061216.pdf>)</blockquote>
Again, if the Pentagon's assessment is honest and correct, the worst case scenario after US withdrawal is either (1) Riyadh, directly or indirectly, will fund "al-Qaeda in Iraq elements conducting mass-casualty bombings and suicide attacks" out of desire to keep them busy in Iraq, away from Saudi Arabia, and out of fear of the rise of a Shia crescent or (2) Washington manages to put together, leave behind, and continues to fund a pro-Washington Iraqi coalition consisting of pro-Washington Shi'is, Sunnis, and Kurds, which goes to war with Shi'is, Sunnis, and Kurds who are opposed to the pro-Washington coalition. Washington would prefer (2) to (1), and it's already working on it:
<blockquote>As new coalitions emerge inside the Iraqi government, it seems that the background of "sectarian conflict" put forth by the U.S. is collapsing completely. A number of Shia groups such as the Al-Sadr movement and the Al-Fadila party are working with Sunni, Kurdish and secular parties both within and outside the Iraqi government and are attempting to establish a national front that is against the occupation and is for unity in Iraq.
While these pro-unity groups coalesce, the Bush administration is lending its support to another pro-occupation coalition that may include Al-Hakim of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution In Iraq (SCIRI), the two main Kurdish parties, and the Islamic party which is a Sunni party led by the Iraqi vice president, Tariq Al-Hashimi. (Raed Jarrar, "Iraq's About Politics, Not Sectarianism," 19 December 2006, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raed-jarrar/iraqs-about-politics-no_b_36679.html>)
(2) is more difficult to pull off than (1), though. So, eventually (1) after (2) fails.
In any case, things are unlikely to get better after US withdrawal in the short term.
Eventually, though, one or another party will prevail and establish a state in much of Iraq, though the Iraqis will never have it as good as they did in 1980, when their per capita income was the same as the Portuguese'.
On 12/19/06, Michael Pollak <mpollak at panix.com> wrote:
> (B) Anti-imperialists. It seems to me the main interest of an
> anti-imperialist is that the US should be weaker. And the US is weaker than
> it was 3 years ago. It's weaker in material force (despite half a trillion
> spent, we now have less bombs, armor and ready troops than we had 3 years
> ago) and it's weaker in being able to enforce its will. Every country in
> the world, from our worst enemies to our best friends, are less inclined to
> follow our lead than they were 3 years ago.
>
> If most of the troops are still in Iraq in 2008, these trends will continue
> -- our army will be weaker, and our ability to impose our will on the world
> will be even further diminished.
>
> So does it really serve the cause of anti-imperialism for the troops to get
> out, rather than continue to get ground down make the US look incompetent
> and untrustworthy?
If US troops stay in Iraq, the US empire will become weaker, and if US troops are forced to withdraw, the US empire will also become weaker, for the US defeat will embolden the Arabs and others who suffer under the pro-Washington regimes and make it more difficult for Washington to go to war on a large scale for a couple of decades to come. The empire has a lose-lose situation in Iraq, and that's why its power elite can't make up their mind easily about what to do. -- Yoshie <http://montages.blogspot.com/> <http://mrzine.org> <http://monthlyreview.org/>