The Americans must eventually force the US government to accept defeat _without_ honor, for as long as the USG is trying to make defeat look honorable, it will make what Henry Kissinger called a "decent interval" -- between recognition that victory is impossible and actual withdrawal of US troops and of funds for clients -- indecently long.
That's what leftists ought to hammer on, rather than suggest that the US power elite will withdraw US troops soon on their own, a suggestion that makes ordinary Americans even more passive than they are now.
Then, leftists must prod the Americans to demand that the USG leave no base in Iraq or build a new one in the Middle East and that the USG not sanction any Iraqi government that might arise after the US withdrawal.
> Finally, the report suggests the unsuggestable: It may be time to
> rein in Israel. It's a measure of how degraded political discourse
> has become that to even suggest this draws vicious attack. But facts
> are facts, and the Baker-Hamilton commission is correct in assessing
> that "Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other
> major regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To put it
> simply, all key issues in the Middle East... are inextricably linked."
>
> If that is true, then: "There must be a renewed and sustained
> commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
> on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002
> commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This
> commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between Israel,
> Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel's right to exist), and
> Syria."
That looks to me to be DOA, though I'd LOVE to be wrong about this one.
> Experts close to the industry say the country needs $20 billion to
> $60 billion in capital investment if it is to recover its former
> glory. That deficit alone practically insures future privatization--
> or at least liberalization of participation by foreign firms and oil
> majors.
No one will probably invest in Iraq, for no one can pacify the country, for some time to come, so privatization is a moot question at this point, and those on the Left who mention it should do so only to score rhetorical points.
* Re: "decent interval":
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HK23Ak04.html> Iraq: Kissinger's 'decent interval', take two By Marc Erikson 23 November 2006
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An inspection of Vietnam-era secret documents now declassified after the lapse of the mandatory 30-year period does not make for encouraging reading. On June 20, 1972, then-national security adviser Henry Kissinger told Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in the course of a four-hour meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing:
So we should find a way to end the war, to stop it from being an international situation, and then permit a situation to develop in which the future of Indochina can be returned to the Indochinese people. And I can assure you that this is the only object we have in Indochina, and I do not believe this can be so different from yours. We want nothing for ourselves there. And while we cannot bring a communist government to power, if as a result of historical evolution it should happen over a period of time, if we can live with a communist government in China, we ought to be able to accept it in Indochina. (Emphasis added) [1]
A month and a half later (August 3, 1972), Kissinger explained to president Richard Nixon:
We will agree to a historical process or a political process in which the real forces in Vietnam will assert themselves, whatever these forces are. We've got to find some formula that holds the thing together a year or two, after which - after a year, Mr President, Vietnam will be a backwater. If we settle it, say, this October, by January '74, no one will give a damn. [2]
The "strategy" - if you want to call it that - summarized here by Kissinger had been conceived at least a year earlier. As noted in the Indochina section of the briefing book for Kissinger's July 1971 China trip:
On behalf of President Nixon I want to assure the prime minister [Zhou] solemnly that the United States is prepared to make a settlement that will truly leave the political evolution of South Vietnam to the Vietnamese alone. We are ready to withdraw all of our forces by a fixed date and let objective realities shape the political future
... We want a decent interval. You have our assurance. [Marginal notation in Kissinger's hand.] If the Vietnamese people themselves decide to change the present government, we shall accept it. But we will not make that decision for them. [3]
One wonders what exactly the United States' South Vietnamese allies would have thought or done had they known the substance of Kissinger's "diplomacy" - if you want to call it that - on behalf of their future.
Well, that was then. What about Iraq and the wider Middle East region now?
-- Yoshie <http://montages.blogspot.com/> <http://mrzine.org> <http://monthlyreview.org/>