> PS. I do not have a WSJ subscription, so I could not access the piece you
> posted.
================
Sorry, it was only the link. Here is the article. When you cut through the
propaganda, you can see that Safoer represents that wing of the ruling
class, which I believe is now dominant, which thinks there is a basis for
agreement with Iran and Syria if the US provides security guarantees and
trade concessions in both cases, and a return of the Golan Heights to the
Syrians and of frozen assets to Iran seized when the Shah was overthrown. He
suggests also that Israel would have to settle for less than full diplomatic
recognition, but that the Israeli leadership and public would go for a deal
(or be forced).
Of course, Sofaer wants the Bush administration to maximize its bargaining power and to keep its options open by maintaining economic pressure and the threat of military action against Iran. Leftists who get very alarmed by these threats - "Be afraid! Be very afraid!", as Carrol exclaims - tend to not understand or to overlook their role in the formation of a negotiating posture. That said, it's always better to be vigilant rather than complacent in preparing for the possibility of a conflict.
It seems to me the big difference between the Baker and Bush camps is over when rather than whether to negotiate with Iran and Syria. The latter obviously don't want to be seen to be pushed, and so are very publicly balking. The Bush admin is meanwhile busy lining up its allies in Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel to face the Iranians, Syrians and their allies across the negotiating table - and if this effort should fail - on a regional battlefield.
But, as always, unpredictable events on the ground can upset the best laid strategies.
* * *
A Reagan Strategy for Iran and Syria By ABRAHAM D. SOFAER Wall Street Journal December 20, 2006; Page A18
The Iraq Study Group's recommendation that the Bush administration drop its preconditions and negotiate with Syria and Iran has been praised as a "no-brainer" -- and condemned as an improper effort to reward rogue regimes. Neither reaction is correct. Negotiating with enemies can be a useful aspect of effective diplomacy. But successful negotiations with enemies result not from the talks themselves but from the diplomatic strategy that accompanies them. The Group's recommendations deserve support, but must be effectively integrated into President Bush's strategy of ending state-sponsored terror.
The arguments against negotiating with Syria and Iran were also made against negotiating with the Soviet Union, and by some of the same people. Soviet misconduct easily matches that of Syria or Iran in aggression, oppression, murder, support for terrorist groups and mendacity. President Reagan challenged Soviet behavior by supporting groups fighting communist intervention, building the military, strengthening NATO, condemning human-rights violations, commencing a missile-defense program, and conveying the message of freedom in every way possible. George Shultz supported these efforts but sought to negotiate with the Soviets in an attempt to increase stability, reduce nuclear weapons, attain freedom for oppressed groups, and enhance understanding. To make negotiations possible the U.S. adopted specific policies, including:
o Regime acceptance. The U.S. refrained from activities aimed at destroying the Soviet regime it was seeking to influence, while vigorously denouncing its political and moral legitimacy.
o Limited linkage. Negotiations on human rights, arms control, regional issues and bilateral relations were pursued without linkage to Soviet conduct, enabling negotiations to proceed while the U.S. responded firmly through deeds.
o Rhetorical restraint. Reagan vigorously criticized the Soviet system and its behavior, but promised not to "crow" when the Soviets agreed to U.S. proposals, enabling Soviet leaders to avoid being seen as capitulating to U.S. demands.
o Self-interest. U.S. negotiating policy was based on convincing the Soviets to act in their own best interests.
The Study Group's "external" strategy for Iraq contains several elements necessary for successful diplomacy: the need for both incentives and "disincentives"; negotiations "without preconditions"; and negotiations that are "extensive and substantive," requiring a balancing of interests. The general incentives identified by the Group are unlikely, however, to lead to constructive discussions. While Syria and Iran should realize that preventing a breakdown in Iraq is in their interests, they see great advantages in having the U.S. lose strength and credibility in a costly effort to help a state they are relieved to see powerless. The notion that they will help in order to have "enhanced diplomatic relations" with the U.S. assumes that states will do what they know the U.S. wants simply because Washington will not otherwise talk to them. The pronouncements that accompany this Bush policy exemplify the sort of rhetoric that discourages cooperation. The possibility of obtaining U.S. assistance in joining the WTO would be a real incentive in an ongoing negotiation, but it is not a credible incentive in the context of hostile confrontation and proliferating sanctions.
The incentives proposed for negotiating with Syria are, by contrast, concrete and substantial. Syria would benefit economically from a stable Iraq, and getting back the Golan Heights would give President Bashar Assad's standing a much needed boost. Syria has no deep commitment to Hezbollah or Hamas to prevent it from accepting peace with Israel and increased cooperation in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian areas, in exchange for the Golan and a constructive role in the area. But the Study Group too casually assumes that the U.S. can secure "Syria's full cooperation with all investigations into political assassinations in Lebanon." The "full cooperation" of a sovereign state in such situations must be negotiated, rather than made a precondition. Convincing Israel to give up the Golan Heights will also be difficult, and Syria's help in securing the release of Israeli soldiers seized by Hamas and Hezbollah is a good place to start. While the security threat posed by returning the Golan has largely been worked out in prior negotiations, the challenge posed by Syria's claim to access to the Sea of Galilee, and the meaning of a "full and secure peace agreement" will require great efforts. Still, bringing Syria into a responsible nationhood is an objective well worth pursuing.
The anger and scorn heaped on the Study Group for advocating negotiations with Syria echo the opposition to negotiating with the Soviet Union. But Syrian behavior must be addressed, not just condemned. Egypt, too, wrongfully supported terrorism against Israel after the 1967 war, and launched the 1973 war, to get back the Sinai. Yet, the U.S. properly urged Israel to negotiate with Egypt, and the peace between them serves the interests of both countries. Similarly, an agreement to return the Golan in exchange for peace would have the support of most Israelis and the current Israeli government, and would be consistent with governing Security Council resolutions and the principle that precludes acquiring territory by force.
The Study Group is probably right that Iran is unlikely to agree to negotiate with the U.S. to bring stability to Iraq. The distrust between the U.S. and Iran suggests that negotiations between them should commence on limited issues, in a noncontroversial forum. The U.S./Iran Tribunal in The Hague might well work. Iran resents that many of its significant claims against the U.S. remain unresolved there after over 20 years. The U.S. should offer to negotiate these claims on an expedited basis. As progress is made, the dialogue would likely expand to include such issues as Afghanistan, Iraq, commercial matters and human-rights concerns. (During my negotiations with Iran as legal adviser between 1985 and 1990, we resolved many cases and discussed other issues; my interlocutor eventually agreed, for example, that the fatwa against Salman Rushdie could not be enforced in any state outside Iran.) A successful negotiation will include Iranian demands, such as an end to efforts at regime change. Major change in Iran is in fact more likely to result from normalization and internal activities, than by opposition groups seeking to overthrow the regime.
Finally, any effort to negotiate with Syria or Iran will fail if based only on incentives. The Study Group's proposal lacks a program of sufficient pressure to make diplomacy potentially successful. James Baker was able to convene the Madrid Conference in 1991 only after the U.S. had expelled Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The effort to impose sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program should continue as forcefully as possible. Multilateral sanctions helped get Libya to abandon its quest for nuclear weapons. A clear warning that Syria and Iran must end all forms of state-sponsored terrorism, as now required by Security Council resolutions, must be a central element of U.S. negotiating policy, backed with meaningful preparations for action. The power of the U.S. to inflict damage on its enemies remains substantial, despite current difficulties in Iraq. While it is now difficult to contemplate military action against Syria or Iran, continued sponsorship of terror against other states will eventually provoke the American people, if not the international community, to exercise their right of self-defense through affordable wars of destruction instead of costly nation-building exercises.
No one can convey this message more effectively than George Bush, who remains determined to prevent a future of state-sponsored terror. He should accept the Study Group's sound message on negotiating with enemies but supplement it with the toughness that effective diplomacy demands.
Mr. Sofaer, George P. Shultz senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, was legal adviser to the Department of State from 1985 to 1990.