> On 12/22/06, Dennis Claxton <ddclaxton at earthlink.net> wrote:
>
>> Obviously a lot of people *like* reading this
>> stuff and get something out of it. Like Doug asked, why can't people
>> just shrug their shoulders and move on?
>>
>>
>
> For reasons I already explained.
>
> I like Shelley's work, for instance, and don't like seeing it mangled.
>
> I think certain kinds of ways of thinking are harmful, at least to
> thinking about poetry and history, if not in other ways.
>
> I don't like institutions that perpetuate intellectual priesthoods.
>
I've been biting my tongue, but I'm compelled to say a bit more about
this. Jerry's argument is straightforward: if certain ways of thinking
or writing are harmful to society, they should be ignored or
stigmatized. For a leftist, any specialized thinking/writing that
creates an intellectual preisthood is anathema; thus we have a moral
obligation to shun that particular thinking/writing. I have no problem
analyzing language based on its social effects; cue Wittgenstein on the
crucial social roles of language games. However, here is what I do not
understand about Jerry's argument: How can any person correctly discern
a priori all of the social effects of a particular pattern of language
use? The social effects of language use are multifarious,
unpredictable, and often indirect.
--For instance, Jerry's protestations aside, it is clearly the case that specialized language in any scientific field contributes to an "intellectual preisthood" that distinguishes the "professionals" from the "public" and encourages academic elitism. Now, Jerry wants to argue that the positive effects of specialized language in some fields compensates for the intellectual elitism (technological innovations, medical breakthroughs, whatever). Thus Jerry will agree (I think) that there are justifications for the use of specialized language, based on a consideration of social effects. Here, then, is my point: let X be any specialized form of language use (deconstruction or whatever). For Jerry to stigmatize X, he needs to demonstrate that the social effects of X will be overwhelmingly negative. If X leads to some postive social effects, that could justify the use of the specialized language.
And this is where Jerry's argument fails: he declares that X is "pointless" based on his own perspective, and then does not consider the possibility that X could have some positive social effects that he didn't anticipate. --Who knows what positive social effects the work of Foucault or Zizek or Derrida could have in our society? Jerry will no doubt say "none", but that's not an observation based on evidence; that's an assumption based on an a priori assessment of a particular form of writing.
For me, the only reasonable pragmatic position (in the philosophical sense) is this: people are going to try out many forms of specialized language in many social contexts. Given the complex articulation of language and social structure, the effects of those uses of language will be difficult to specify a priori; we'll need to carefully gather data about the uses of language and evaluate those data to make any valid claims about the effects of specialized language use. It is entirely possible that types of language that Jerry or I think are not useful will prove to be very useful, and vice versa. These social effects, however, /cannot/ be discerned by reading the text at one point in time, making a personal determination that "this is obscure and pointless", and encouraging others to ignore the text.
Miles