> Not snide - it's a term of art among the hard left (of which
> I still consider myself a member). Among the defining
> characteristics are to dismiss the mainstream parties as
> indistinguishably bourgeois, and dismiss electoral politics
> as somewhere between a waste of time and a malignant
> diversion from the serious business of politics, which is
> bringing about the revolution, however that is supposed to happen.
I do not think that there are many of those left around. I mean, nobody hardly even mentions the r-word, even Chuck0 :).
I think that two inter-breeding species dominate what you call the 'ultra-left'. One is the counterculturalist left whose defining characteristics is appearing radical by talking tough and espousing outrageous cultural messages. Basically, putting on baggy clothing, blasting loud and obnoxious music and saying "fuck the mainstream" every now and then is the minimum qualification, although it can certainly involve more sophisticated cultural forms of expression. The second species is the populist left that includes both older relics resembling characters from Frank Capra movies (does that ring any bells, Carrol?), and the younger generation of "activistists" and "moralists" engaged in conspicuous displays of solidarity with 'da people' through rituals of essentially Christian provenance, such as ennoblement of the poor ("Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven," "Blessed are the meek: for they shall posses the land." "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." ), "turning the other cheek," condemnation of material wealth ("it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.") etc.
As I see it, the "traditional" categories left-right do not apply to the modern world anymore. They neither describe the alignment of political forces anymore, nor they speak to people's concerns. The reasons behind that development is the subject of a longer discussion, but I will try to outline a few more important ones. On the demand side, there is an unprecedented growth of standards of living for the great majority of the population in every developed and many developing countries. Not only most people do not feel immiserated anymore, but they do not identify themselves with the lower social strata and instead aspire to a higher social status. Consequently, appeals to misery ("you have nothing but fetters to lose") that used to mobilize people for the Left are not in demand anymore.
On the supply side, the Left lost the monopoly for mass mobilization through incendiary political propaganda, first to the fascists and then to the mainstream conservatives. It is not that conservative forces did not use propaganda, but that their propaganda had a certain soporific quality. It used to be that "conservatism" meant the preservation of the institutional status quo, and thus the hallmark of conservatism were appeals to calm, peace, obedience of the established authority, rule of law etc. By contrast, the left was the force of social change, and its propaganda was very dynamic, incendiary, mobilizing for action (the adoption of the color red, the popular tunes (the International), the marches, the bombastic rhetoric, appeals to imminent liberation from misery, etc.). That is why the left was initially so successful in popular mobilization.
However, the fascists closely emulated the mobilizing strategy of Left with their own color scheme (brown and black), their own popular tune (the Horst Wessel Lied), their own marches, their own appeals to liberation from misery, etc.) and they managed to beat the Left in their own game. Today, almost everyone from Islamic and Christian fundamentalists to mainstream conservatives is using the same strategy, enhanced by the developments in advertising techniques. As a result, the left that used to be the innovator now is truly left behind in the game it invented.
But more importantly, this means the exponential growth of the supply of mobilizing agents for every conceivable cause - from radical Islam, to authoritarian brand of conservatism, to the myriad of separatist movements, and to radical environmentalism. This resulted, first of all, in competition on the supply side, which has a 'canceling out' effect on mobilizing (e.g. mobilization by faction A may undermine mobilization by faction B). Secondly, it led to market fragmentation i.e. instead of one big market (aka mass movement) we have diverse market niches (special interest groups mobilized for their on idiosyncratic causes).
In conclusion, those who still think of the old Left-style mass movement missed the boat big time. It simply ain't gonna happen because the social conditions that produced it are the thing of the past which is unlikely to repeat itself. Today, the trick is to follow what for the lack of a better term may be labeled "Nike, SUV, or hip-hop strategy": first find your market niche to which you introduce a product that is unique and distinct in appearance from the majority of "mainstream" products; and then try to expand that niche by making that unique product appealing to other market niches (yuppies, college kids, suburban wannabies, etc.). This approach is neither mass movement, not identity politics, but a third way between the two. It uses identity groups (market niches) as stepping stones to introduce a mass product (which clearly transcends the ID politics compartmentalization), yet it never dominates the entire market, because that would surely kill it as its appeal lies in its uniqueness rather than commonality.
This calls for the "triangulating Left" as opposed to the "dinosaur populist Left" yearning for a mass mobilization of 'da people' that simply ain't gonna happen, or the "countereculturalist Left," that is perfectly happy in its own small insignificant niche and does not even know how to appeal to broader audiences.
Wojtek