Citations, even serious injuries failed to fix Sago hazards
Saturday, February 18, 2006
By Cindi Lash and Steve Twedt, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Federal inspectors found ventilation and roof problems, potentially combustible accumulations of coal and other serious safety hazards in the Sago mine before the explosion that killed a dozen miners and injured another, newly released records show.
Records released this week by the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration also indicate that those hazards, while often fixed quickly, recurred repeatedly last year at the mine in Tallmansville, W.Va.
MSHA released hundreds of pages of inspectors' notes, accident reports and citation forms, communications between MSHA officials and Sago supervisors and other administrative documents pertaining to the mine. In an unusual step, the agency posted the documents on its Web site, saying it had done so in response to a large number of requests for the information.
The documents cover citations issued and other events documented at the mine since 2004. Names of inspectors and other details were removed from some of the documents.
The cause of the fatal explosion at Sago remains under investigation and is not likely to be determined until later this year. But the records shed added light on problems at a mine that received 208 citations last year from federal inspectors, nearly half of which were for "significant and substantial violations" of safety regulations.
The fatal explosion occurred four days before a top MSHA official was to have met Jan. 6 with Ben Hatfield, president of Sago owner International Coal Group Inc., to discuss the accident rate and other conditions in the mine. Five other meetings between lower-level federal and ICG officials took place last year.
ICG officials did not respond yesterday to a request for comment on the newly released records. In previous statements, they have said they were working to correct problems inherited from the mine's previous owner and had improved their performance in the last quarter of 2005.
Weeks before the explosion, the mine company was seeking to amend the ventilation plan it had submitted to MSHA by asking permission to leave open, rather than seal off, three crosscuts, or tunnels, in the mine. The company was required to seal off the crosscuts to make sure that enough air flowed into the rest of the mine where miners were working.
The company twice sought permission to keep the crosscuts open, but District Manager Kevin G. Stricklin denied the requests late last year, saying the plan did not include "adequate justification that ensures the safety of the miners."
Ventilation was a recurring issue at the mine last year, the records show.
In a report Nov. 1, an inspector wrote that the mine operator was not complying with its ventilation plan. The inspector also noted that if an accident occurred, it could result in burns, lung damage from exposure to coal or rock dust.
"If this type of mining practice continues, miners will be exposed to harmful dust or methane ignitions," the inspector wrote in his notes.
In October, inspectors noted that air flow had been directed away from the face where miners were working. Two months earlier, inspectors found that chemical smoke from a scoop battery charger was blowing toward workers.
The company also had been cited in June when inspectors found fumes from a battery charging station were going up the intake vent to where miners were working.
Inspectors found other problems throughout 2005.
In September, inspectors found conveyer belts running into mounds of combustible coal on three different conveyor belts, some up to 32 inches deep and 20 feet long.
Those resulted in the 13th, 14th and 15th citations for that hazard issued in a span of five months, including a citation May 20 for a 7- to 11-inch deep coal accumulation under a conveyer belt. Inspectors also noted an accumulation of coal dust atop coal "ribs" in two locations in October.
In December, inspectors ordered Sago officials to clear coal that had accumulated under a belt in one of two sections being worked in the mine.
Less than three weeks before the explosion, an MSHA inspector found piles of coal that were 6 to 8 inches deep in the mine, the records show. The inspector called the piles a serious fire hazard that demonstrated "a high degree of negligence for the health and safety of the miners that work at this coal mine."
Sometimes even miner injuries did not prevent a repeat violation.
On Aug. 16, inspectors issued citations for a deteriorating mine roof and a rib support that was hanging loose.
Those hazards were particularly notable because six days earlier, a collapsing roof material fell on a miner, breaking his back. A similar incident July 11 had caused "a serious lost time injury" to another miner.
In July, inspectors noted that the mine's use of smaller pillars had dangerously reduced sight lines.
Because it was not practical to replace all of them, "The miners will be exposed to the danger done for several years to come," an inspector wrote.
On Nov. 1, an inspector noted several instances where the company was not complying with its roof control plan, prompting the company to install supplemental supports.
In that report, the inspector found a "reasonable [likelihood] that broken bones, cuts or crushing type injuries would occur." The inspector also wrote that "if this type of mining practice continues, workers will become seriously injured from loose falling rock or cave-in ..."
Inspectors also noted problems with gas monitors and fire suppression equipment in the mine that were not working, not properly maintained or not tested as required.
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06049/657605.stm
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