Contributors: Nikolas Gvozdev, Andrei Lebedev, Anthony T. Salvia, Andrei Seregin, Sergei Shishkarev
The United States and its allies are getting increasingly bogged down in Iraq. Religious and ethnic violence continues unabated. Repeated guerrilla and terrorist attacks are exerting a heavy toll on American and Iraqi forces. More than 2,000 Americans have died in the war.
Iraq now has a constitutionally elected government, but its control of the country remains tenuous at best. Iraqi police are still not up to the job and criminal gangs roam the country. Key resistance and Al Qaeda leaders remain at large.
Iraq’s economy has not rebounded to prewar levels and indeed is barely functioning; basic communal services like water and electricity still not restored in many areas. Iraq’s oil production is below the pre-war levels, which is contributing to high oil prices on the international markets.
The political standing of U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair has taken a serious hit and both leaders have lost the popularity they enjoyed before the war. Opinion polls show that a majority of voters in the United States and Britain think that the war was a mistake.
The tales of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction turned out to be a bad joke while North Korea and Iran are marching full speed ahead toward nuclear capability, aware that U.S. forces are bogged down in Iraq and cannot afford another major military conflict.
Contrast this scenario with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s situation in Chechnya.
The war is essentially over; no major military operations have taken place for the last two and a half years. Russian military casualties in Chechnya are a very rare occurrence now. The guerrilla resistance is no longer a viable force and is incapable of staging large-scale military or terrorist operations against government forces. Mop-up operations against scattered and disorganized rebels are conducted by highly capable Chechen security forces run by former rebel leaders who voluntarily joined the government side.
Chechnya has a constitutionally elected President and a multi-party Parliament. The Chechen government, headed by Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, is in almost full command of the country. The positive aspects of Kadyrov’s control of the country should, however, be balanced with the rumors of widespread abuses carried out by his during his term as head of the Chechen presidential security service.
Chechnya is engaged in serious talks with the federal government on broad powers of autonomy, though some of these powers may be negotiated in such a way as to avoid Kadyrov making the country his personal fiefdom, subjected to no oversight from Moscow.
Chechnya has ceased to be a major domestic political problem for Putin and has largely ceased to be an issue in Russia’s relations with the United States and the EU.
In terms of security, Russian military reduction and co-optation of rebel forces into the pro-government security structures, as well as economic reconstruction efforts, Chechnya could in some ways be a model for Iraq. Compared to the case of Iraq, an invasion of a foreign country and ensuing chaos due to dismal preparation for the post-war reconstruction, the case of Chechnya demonstrates many positive aspects of post-war management and local empowerment.
So why are Russia and Putin not given credit internationally for the transformation of the festering Chechen insurgency into a manageable political problem with viable local institutions that take responsibility for the country’s future?
Will President Bush take any friendly advice from President Putin at the G8 summit in July on how to handle the reconstruction of Iraq based on Russia’s experience in Chechnya?
Anthony T. Salvia, former Director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Moscow Programming Center
It is far-fetched to think Russia would get any international credit for its relatively successful handling of the Chechen war. For one thing, in the view of the U.S. foreign policy elite, Russia can only be a satellite or an adversary, never a partner, and therefore never deserving of credit. For another, those who were most enthusiastic for the Iraq war have also tended to oppose Russia’s role in Chechnya.
It may sound strange that those who support a war in one locale whose ostensible purpose is to deal a blow to radical Islam, would oppose a different war in another locale being carried out for the same purpose. But then again, Putin’s objective has been the pragmatic one of short-circuiting the establishment of a radical Islamic caliphate in south and central Asia, whereas the Americans have other, grander and more complex priorities, including nothing less than advancing the interests of all of progressive humanity. Russia got over its end-of-history moment when the Soviet Union collapsed, whereas the United States remains in the throes. Now Russia is absorbed in such mundane tasks as maintaining internal political coherence, assuring the physical and moral health of the nation, and securing its borders.
With the United States increasingly concerned about the security of its own southern border and at a loss as to how extract itself from a war gone badly awry, the U.S. elite may have to resume the practice of traditional diplomacy and give Russia a new, friendlier hearing. They may yet discover that it makes good sense to work with Russia and others to meet the challenge of radical Islam and rising China.
Russia should not expect credit for its achievement in Chechnya. But it is an achievement, and it should at least receive some publicity. Unfortunately, as has been noted in the experts’ panel before, there is no effective, organized pro-Russian lobby in Washington
although Russia does have friends there. This state of affairs must be rectified.
Nikolas Gvozdev, editor, The National Interest
There are many lessons for the U.S. - led coalition in Iraq based on the Russian experiences in Chechnya, notably the extreme difficulties in recruiting and maintaining effective security forces within the local
population, as well as the ongoing challenges of simultaneously fighting a local insurgency while trying to engage in economic and political reconstruction.
There are also lessons to be avoided especially what happens when outside military forces turn to brutalization in order to deal with the local population. Politically, however, it is impossible for any Western policymaker to claim that there is anything that can be learned from Chechnya, because the dichotomy is in the portrayal: Russia’s repression of freedom in Chechnya versus the liberation and democratization of Iraq.
Sergei Shishkarev, Deputy Chairman, Committee on Energy, Transport and Communications, the Russian State Duma (United Russia)
It is no longer a matter of dispute between Russia and the United States and EU that the situation in Chechnya has markedly improved over the last two years. Violence is down, kidnappings and terrorist attacks are a rare occurrence compared to what the situation used to be. The Russian military is in the barracks, and the security forces that still conduct some limited anti-insurgency operations are composed mostly of local police, many of whom are former rebel fighters who switched to the pro-government side.
A meaningful political process has begun. For years, the West has been insisting that Moscow launch a dialogue with moderate rebel leaders. Today most of those rebel leaders, including the former defense minister in Aslan Maskhadov’s government, Magomed Hambiev, are sitting in the new Chechen Parliament or command pro-Moscow security forces. This would be equivalent to Saddam Hussein’s top military commanders switching over to the new government in Iraq and leading the new Iraqi security forces to defeat the Sunni insurgency.
The new Chechen government is in talks with Moscow over broad powers of autonomy that would grant Chechnya self-rule in everything except defense and foreign affairs. Economic reconstruction has begun, and the devastated capital, Grozny, is being gradually restored.
Internationally, Chechnya has ceased to be an issue that Moscow, Washington and Brussels regard as a sore point in their relationship -- one that could adversely affect other areas of cooperation. It is true that there continue to be serious political and security issues that need to be resolved in Chechnya. But they pale in comparison to what Russia had to surmount just two years ago and what the United States and NATO still need to address in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Of course Russia will not seek any official international credit for its success in Chechnya. But at least some objective comparative analysis on Chechnya in Western media and among Western policy makers and political pundits is long overdue, and would not hurt Russia’s feelings.
Andrei Seregin, Senior Political Analyst, The National Laboratory for Foreign Policy, Moscow
The key difference between the two cases -- Russia in Chechnya and the United States in Iraq -- seems to be in the core attitude towards the stabilization process. Iraq is one of the elements of broader American policy in the Greater Middle East. The United States seeks to make Iraq a stronghold in the whole region, and foil the attempts of Islamic regimes to isolate Israel.
Chechnya is surely quite a different case. With the current stability in the North Caucasus and in Russia at large dependant upon the success of post-war management and local empowerment, the main interest of the Kremlin here is not the former breakaway republic in itself, but rather by setting an example with a Republic governed by a relatively loyal and generally secular Islam. So, it’s more the consideration of oil vs. stability that makes the great difference between Russian and American ways.
The West is reluctant to give the Kremlin international credit for a peaceful transformation in Chechnya due to two main reasons. The first is purely political: until the very last day of Chechen insurgency Chechnya will and should remain on the watch lists of Western democracy vigilantes. It’s unreasonable to expect the West to throw away all diplomatic aces, just because life in Chechnya gradually improves. Whatever success Putin may have in stabilizing the republic, there still will be at least some opposing him. If there is no protest, it should be made up artificially. That’s quite an obvious tactic of the managed instability practiced by the Bush White House.
The second reason is more profound -- the Russian “success story” in Chechnya is still far from over. Bearing in mind the notorious example of “vietnamization,” which had a limited and temporary effect, Western observers sense big trouble ahead for the Kremlin. The viability of local institutions being created by the Kremlin in Chechnya is virtually based on independence. The sole fact that Chechen leader Kadyrov never speaks of independence and liberty in the same terms Dudaev and Maskhadov used won’t make any difference for Western analysts.
Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation, Moscow
Putting aside the evident difference between the two cases -- namely that Chechnya is an integral part of Russia and Iraq is an independent country -- they certainly may be compared in terms of political and military settlement. The degree of success, however, is strikingly different.
The reasons for that are evident enough. Rehabilitation of Chechnya was entrusted to local feudal barons-turned-politicians, who widely employed -- and still employ -- former rebels. This did not end the interclan feud, however, it only made them less visible by mostly excluding federal forces from them. As the outcome of the feuds in favor of the Kadyrov clan was becoming clear, it left less ground for involvement from abroad in the situation. As long as Kadyrov’s people rule in the republic, they have no reason to let someone from Amman, Tbilisi or Istanbul stir the situation, and many reasons to go on milking the federal center.
In Iraq the coalition forces failed to find the winning combination of leaders and/or forces. Potent religious and political groups violently oppose the pro-American government, making reconstruction of the country impossible. If there was a moment fit to switch gears and change horses, it was missed. The United States is in a desperate situation; its faces the unappealing alternatives of getting further bogged down in a hopeless guerrilla war or withdrawing from the country claiming “victory” but losing face over inevitable defeat. No joy either way.
So there is hardly is any realistic advice President Putin can give to President Bush on this sad situation. Moreover, peace in Chechnya achieved by Kadyrov’s clan may become a Pyrrhic victory for the federal center, after all. Milking the Russian treasury is an important element, but still more important is the possibility of sudden political changes in Chechnya, should its current clan leaders receive an enticing enough proposal. This is perfectly well known in Kremlin, which is why Putin will not offer Bush any Chechnya-based advice on Iraq. Still, the current development of events in Chechnya, however deficient, is the best of the worse from the Kremlin’s point of view. The trick is not to overplay the hand. Over time, something better that Kadyrov and his clan may come along. No one in the Kremlin will guarantee Kadyrov rule for life. Other powerful Chechen clans will be supported by Moscow to provide a check on Kadyrov’s rule.
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