[Bulk] Re: [lbo-talk] Chomsky on sociobiology

Jerry Monaco monacojerry at gmail.com
Mon Jun 12 14:45:43 PDT 2006


On 6/12/06, Ted Winslow <egwinslow at rogers.com> wrote:
> Jerry Monaco wrote:
>
> > On 6/11/06, Ted Winslow <egwinslow at rogers.com> wrote:
> >> Unless you're through the looking glass, you can't define "pure
> >> indeterminateness" of the "Ego" elaborated as
> >>
> >> the Ego "as such has no limitation or a content which is immediately
> >> extant through nature but is indifferent towards any and every
> >> determinateness"
> >>
> >> as
> >>
> >> the Ego has limitation and a content which is immediately extant
> >> through nature and is not indifferent towards any and every
> >> determinateness,
>
> You neglect to mention that what you're quoting was responding to
> your claim that Hegel's (not my) idea of "pure indeterminateness" of
> the Ego "can be defined in any way you or I wish to make it
> consistent with physical theories, biological theories or historical
> theories". As is obvious, it can't. It was on this mistaken basis
> that you claimed that "what Hegel said and what Marx said at various
> times ... does not effect at all Marx's (partially failed but
> interesting) attempt to create a theoretical model through which we
> can understand history and society."

You answer nothing Ted. Hegel's notion of "pure indeterminateness" is neither consistent or inconsistent with Marx's view of history, no matter what Marx said in 1844. "Pure indeterminateness" can be defined in any way you or I wish because simply because it is too abstract to have any definition at all. One can believe that everything from quarks to the human mind is "determined" and still believe in "pure indeterminateness" in Hegel's sense because it doesn't refer to anything in the world. In fact it quite literally refers to what Hegel believes is nothing. (Here at least Heidegger is superior to Hegel because Heidegger uses the notion of nothing as a otological-phenomenological concept referring to the way we structure experience and not to a metaphysical reality that must be out there and exist as the "Ego of nothingness.")

So pure indeterminedness can be defined if you like as consistent with nothing or everything. Pure indeterminateness is neither consistent or inconsistent with any scientific theory, simply because there is nothing relevant to any theory and nothing that can be tested or shown or presented.

You do not deal with my historical criticism. You do not deal with my specific examples from language, etc. You don't deal with the fact that Marxists such as E. P. Thompson and Raymond Williams have a definition of "determination" consistent with the definition I am using for biological constraints, limits and rules, and that there are good arguments that Marx also had a such a definition. Even if Marx didn't have such a more "realistic" definiton it doesn't mean that we have to accept Hegel's definiton or throw out Marx. (Now I know you will focus on such a statment instead of answering the questions at issue. It is altogether possible, for the historical reasons of the collapse of mechanistic materialism I explained above that Marx was misled. This would not mean that his historical view is either wrong or not a good starting point. Marx is stating an historical view and that is consistent with Darwin and your interpretation of "self-determination" is neither consistent or inconsistent with either Darwin or Marx. It is simply stating that the ego is contentless. Even though you are quoting Hegel you quoute it as your view.)

You don't deal with the fact that your or Hegel's contradiction is purely definitional.

So I stick to my statement: the idea of "pure indeterminateness" [which you use to say that Kropotkin's notions that we evolved cooperatively] "can be defined in any way you or I wish to make it consistent with physical theories, biological theories or historical theories". This is simply because there is no common territory between Hegels idea, and anything that is said in any attempt at a theoretical model or empirical theory, of any biological theory, or of any physical theory. You have yet to show by either taking any of the examples I have given, or any of your own examples, how the notion of "pure indeterminateness" is anything but definitional and is anything but irrelevant to the subject.

Supposing that it may be so that homo sapiens sapiens evolved so that it gives them a reproductive advantage to cooperate, rather than not to cooperate, (say because of cooperative breeding and complex social organization) there is nothing that you seem to offer to say how this contradicts a view of history such as one that aims for anarchism, socialism, communism, or a realm of freedom. Or even any of the work of Marx and Engels that they actually published after they tried (and sometime succeeded, but often failed) to understand Darwin.

So once again I must remind you: I wrote:

__"Kropotkin does three things

"1) He offers a critique of Huxley and his soft critique of Spenserian "social Darwinism".

"2) He makes claims that cooperative examples taken from nature can provide a different point of view on evolutionary natural selection.

"3) He concludes that examples from this natural view shows that humans are a cooperative species and this supports his politics.

His critique of Huxley and his critique of "fundamentalist Darwinism" are still interesting. Leftists and philosophers of science can learn from his critiques. Further, that Kropotkin assumes a perspective that we would call today "evolutionary psychology" and "sociobiology" shows that one does not have to be a "rightist" of any sort to think that some form of cooperative democracy (anarchism, socialism) are compatible with natural human capacities.

But I think the optimism of his assumed conclusion in (3) was wrong and makes the same mistake that many social Darwinists made and many "right wing" sociobiologists made. "___

And you replied by quoting Hegel:

__"Any ontology that has no logical space for the ideas of a "will proper" and a "a universal will" also has no logical space for Marx's idea of a "true realm of freedom". The latter actualizes the former.

"The Will Proper, or the Higher Appetite, is (a) pure indeterminateness of the Ego, which as such has no limitation or a content which is immediately extant through nature but is indifferent towards any and every determinateness. (b) The Ego can, at the same time, pass over to a determinateness and make a choice of some one or other and then actualize it." (Hegel, The Philosophical Propaedeutic, p. 2)

The "Universal Will" is "the Will which is Lawful and Just or in accordance with Reason." (Philosophical Propaedeutic p. 1)"__

How is what I wrote about Kropotkin at all relevant to your reply.

We are at an impasse.

Jerry

-- Jerry Monaco's Philosophy, Politics, Culture Weblog is Shandean Postscripts to Politics, Philosophy, and Culture

http://monacojerry.livejournal.com/

His fiction, poetry, weblog is Hopeful Monsters: Fiction, Poetry, Memories http://www.livejournal.com/users/jerrymonaco/

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