[lbo-talk] How to defeat the "Great Firewall of China"

Sujeet Bhatt sujeet.bhatt at gmail.com
Tue Jun 27 23:15:59 PDT 2006



>From Bruce Schneier's blog:

June 27, 2006 Ignoring the "Great Firewall of China"

Richard Clayton is presenting a paper (blog post here - http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/06/27/ignoring-the-great-firewall-of-china/) that discusses how to defeat China's national firewall:

...the keyword detection is not actually being done in large routers on the borders of the Chinese networks, but in nearby subsidiary machines. When these machines detect the keyword, they do not actually prevent the packet containing the keyword from passing through the main router (this would be horribly complicated to achieve and still allow the router to run at the necessary speed). Instead, these subsiduary machines generate a series of TCP reset packets, which are sent to each end of the connection. When the resets arrive, the end-points assume they are genuine requests from the other end to close the connection -- and obey. Hence the censorship occurs.

However, because the original packets are passed through the firewall unscathed, if both of the endpoints were to completely ignore the firewall's reset packets, then the connection will proceed unhindered! We've done some real experiments on this -- and it works just fine!! Think of it as the Harry Potter approach to the Great Firewall -- just shut your eyes and walk onto Platform 9¾.

Ignoring resets is trivial to achieve by applying simple firewall rules… and has no significant effect on ordinary working. If you want to be a little more clever you can examine the hop count (TTL) in the reset packets and determine whether the values are consistent with them arriving from the far end, or if the value indicates they have come from the intervening censorship device. We would argue that there is much to commend examining TTL values when considering defences against denial-of-service attacks using reset packets. Having operating system vendors provide this new functionality as standard would also be of practical use because Chinese citizens would not need to run special firewall-busting code (which the authorities might attempt to outlaw) but just off-the-shelf software (which they would necessarily tolerate).

Posted on June 27, 2006 at 01:13 PM

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/06/ignoring_the_gr.html



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