Tuesday, March 07, 2006
EDITORIAL: General Musharraf's salvo on Afghanistan http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\03\07\story_7-3-2006_pg3_1
On the touchstone of newsworthiness, the US cable news channel CNN could not have caught General Pervez Musharraf for an interview at a more opportune time. Having had to stomach some dubious comparisons between what India got from Bush and what Pakistan didn't get, including some plain talking from President Bush on a couple of issues, General Musharraf was not exactly in an upbeat mood. In the event when CNN pushed him to the wall with some provocative questions on Afghanistan, Taliban and terrorism, it was like the veritable red rag to the bull. General Musharraf gnashed his teeth, set diplomatic niceties aside and laid into the Afghan government and its head, President Hamid Karzai. But this is not on, whatever the provocation.
Pakistan was compelled to ditch the Taliban after 9/11. Much of what has happened there since then hasn't been to its liking. Islamabad's irritation is not owed to the loss of the Taliban so much as the loss of the leverage it had with Afghanistan via the Taliban. When the US ousted the Taliban, however, the vacuum was primarily filled by the anti-Pakistan, pro-India Northern Alliance. Thus, while the Tajik element in the NA may not be as powerful today as it was when its forces entered Kabul, even the Pashtun elements in Afghanistan, including President Hamid Karzai himself, have shown themselves to be more friendly with India than with Pakistan. General Musharraf's reference to Pakistan's help for Mr Karzai is therefore interesting - "if it was not for Pakistan, maybe [Karzai] and his election would not have taken place smoothly" - and shows that Pakistan wanted Mr Karzai, a Pashtun, to head Afghanistan. There was also some indication during that period that Mr Karzai was trying to cut the NA down to size.
However, Afghanistan's relations with India continue to create trouble between Islamabad and Kabul. Pakistan has already accused India of fomenting trouble in Balochistan through its consulates in Afghanistan. The implication here is that Kabul, or at least some NA elements in the Afghanistan government, are helping India fish in Balochistan and Mr Karzai is either complicit or ignorant of what's happening. As General Musharraf told CNN, there is a "conspiracy going on against Pakistan in [Karzai's] ministry of defence and his intelligence set-up and I passed on information about it to Karzai. He better set that right."
For his part, Mr Karzai wants Pakistan to do more to curb the Taliban-sponsored violence in Afghanistan. This is partly because of his own failure to stem the rot and partly because he wants to deflect responsibility for the failure on to Pakistan. Therefore he has been encouraging his governors to stage anti-Pakistan rallies to protest the Taliban violence. But unfortunately for Pakistan, Kabul's account is corroborated by US military commanders and intelligence officials who say they have information on electronic traffic generated by Taliban fighters on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. Statistics also show that the level of violence in Afghanistan went up in 2005. However, Pakistan denies that it is responsible for aiding or abetting the Taliban and points out that it has more troops deployed on its side than the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. But at the joint press conference with Mr Bush, General Musharraf admitted to some "slippages" even as he iterated the intention to purge the area of undesirable elements.
It was in the wake of this that Afghanistan handed over a list of alleged Taliban terrorists to Pakistan just days ahead of Mr Bush's visit here. General Musharraf told CNN, as he also said when the list came in, that it was stale and two-thirds of it was nonsense. Still, the day Mr Bush was to land, the army conducted an operation in North Waziristan; the operation was followed up in the next two days and the death toll on both sides is close to 200. Yet it is clear from General Musharraf's interview to CNN that Islamabad loathed Kabul for timing the handing over of the list with the arrival here of Mr Bush. "He [Mr Karzai] waited for a presidential visit to hand me over this list," General Musharraf was quoted as saying. General Musharraf also attacked Mr Karzai for having released the information to the media: "Is that the way intelligence functions? I am totally disappointed with their intelligence, and I feel there is a very, very deliberate attempt to malign Pakistan by some agents, and President Karzai is totally oblivious of what is happening in his own country. There is no need of releasing such sensitive information to the press. And he did that. His government people did that, and [that is the reason for] the response, the harsh response that I am now giving against that."
However, General Musharraf seems to be conflating three issues here. Is the list handed over by Afghanistan nonsense; is Pakistan angry at the timing of handing over of the list; or is General Musharraf irked by the release to the media of the list? If the list is useless, and if, as General Musharraf says, the CIA knows this because Pakistan shares the information with it, then it should not matter what the timing is or even that Mr Karzai decided to release the information to the media. Contrarily, the timing and the leakage of the information to the media become pertinent issues if the contents of the list are accurate. We do not have any conclusive evidence, but the way the issue was brought up at the joint press conference shows the US government shares some, if not all, reservations of the Kabul government on the issue of any perceived or real linkage between Pakistan and the Taliban-sponsored violence. This argument is proved by the two US air strikes in Pakistani territory at least one of which, on the good authority of General Musharraf himself, Pakistan was ignorant about.
Is General Musharraf feeling any better after his outburst? Will it improve the situation on the ground or make it worse? The truth of the matter is that his straight shooting is unlikely to make things between Pakistan and Afghanistan better. At the end of the day, the two sides have to work together to get rid of the Taliban menace. At the same time, Afghanistan's leaders must realise, as must the Americans in Kabul, that they cannot hope to develop good relations with Pakistan if Kabul continues to help India in fomenting trouble in Balochistan. If the two sides are playing a game of one-upmanship, they will have to review their respective policies. That's the only way of getting out of this bind. *
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