[lbo-talk] Juan Cole on the Bomb Iran debate

uvj at vsnl.com uvj at vsnl.com
Thu Mar 16 04:51:54 PST 2006


Michael Pollak wrote:


> On Thu, 16 Mar 2006, uvj at vsnl.com wrote:
>
> > Why Iran is almost completely isolated at IAEA on this question?


> Because it reversed direction and stopped cooperating with
> inspectors. So
> the IAEA has recommended action -- with the intention of getting
> inspections
> resumed. And the IAEA is a careful body, and one of the only that
> still has
> credibility in this area, and doesn't make recommendations rashly,
> so
> countries tend to follow its lead.

I have posted the text of the IAEA Resolution of 4 February 2006 separately on the lbo. I am puzzled by numerous assertion by Juan Cole in his article as the text recognises Iran's right to research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. [Clause (c) of the text of the resolution.] It also mentions the contribution that the solution of the Iran issue could make to "realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery." [Clause (m)] I don't know whether the P-5 states are serious about actually implementing "the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass, including their means of delivery" but it's there in the resolution.


> But it is a question of Iran breaking the rules of the old treaty.
> It is
> rather a desire on the part of the IAEA to set a precedent for the
> additional protocol that Iran agreed to voluntarily. The IAEA
> would like to
> give the additional protocol binding force of internaitonal
> customary law.

Surely Iran is not the only state required to agree to the Additional Protocol. (IAEA website shows the current status at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html on the IAEA website at http://www.iaea.org) Many states including China, Cuba etc are already subject to it. What are Iran's objections to the Additional Protocol?


> Because everyone, and most of all the IAEA, knows the NPT is in
> many ways
> obsolete.

I agree that the NPT is a discriminatory treaty. But the validity of the NPT was extended indefinitely and unconditionally in 1995. Iran had supported that decision. The NPT is in force in perpetuity ! :) How can the framework of the NPT be dismantled?


>Getting the additional protocol accepted as common
> practice is
> the only way it can see so far to evolve something more effective
> without a
> major refoundation, which it is powerless to bring about itself.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a real problem over last 50-60 years. How do you deal with it, if the NPT is obsolete, as you say? Is there an alternative to the NPT?


> The IAEA has been scrupulously clear, just as it was in Iraq, that
> has
> discovered no evidence of a nuclear bomb making program -- but
> that it also
> cannot rule it out, and needs more cooperation and inspection
> privileges in
> order to do so.

Yes, the IAEA resolution scrupulously clear. Ref. in particular clauses (g), (h) and (j) and paragraph 3. e.g.:

- "Iran possesses a document related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms" [Clause (j)].

- "Iran has in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components; and, noting that the decision to put this document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a full copy to the Agency" [Paragraph 3]

Isn't it related to AQKhan's nuclear Wal-Mart. No evidence of nuclear weapons programme? What are these "uranium metal hemispheres"?


> Iran feels that it voluntarily gave up its rights for 2 years
> expecting a quid
> pro quo and got nothing. (The oft quoted Iranian proverb is "we
> gave up a
> pearl for a candy.") And seems to think, under the very indirect
> leadership of
> Ahmadinejad, that these sort of confrontational tactics will get
> it more.

What's the quid pro quo Iran was expecting?

Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy has been recognised by the IAEA. But if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons, Iran must openly reject the NPT. The option of acquiring nuclear weapons under the guise of a programme for peaceful use of nuclear energy is no longer available.

Ulhas



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