Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 From: Andrei Tsygankov <andrei at sfsu.edu> Subject: Why Russians "Love" Stalin
As Russia continues to consolidate its post-Soviet statehood and depart from the disarray of the 1990s, many ask if Russians are longing for a Stalinist restoration. In the West, pundits and politicians find multiplying signs that an emerging system is becoming xenophobic, authoritarian, and prone to repressions. Among those signs is a growing popularity of Josef Stalin, associated with an anti-Western isolationism and a terror against millions of his own people. Some polls find that almost half of Russians believe that Stalin played a positive role in history and that more than 25% would definitely or probably vote for him were he alive and running for president. Many pro-Western liberals inside Russia too are fearful that population’s support for Stalin may lead to further cultivation of an external enemy’s image and another cycle of the state-organized violence.
Why do Russians support Stalin? Even though it might seem tempting to draw grand historical parallels and frightening generalization about the Russian “naturally” authoritarian character, the answer seems to have roots in contemporary realities. Coming out of its longest and a most destructive social, economic, and geopolitical breakdown, many Russians feel they are not making it in the “transition to democracy” era. There is few evidence that Russians support a new cycle of anti-Western isolationism or that they might welcome a Stalin-like mass violence-based projects. In fact, only 7% accept the notion that the repressions under Stalin were inevitable given that the USSR was surrounded by “hostile imperialist” powers. Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization and Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika have made their impacts, and most Russians do not believe in mass violence and have repeatedly condemned the Gulag as a state-building tool. However, there is ample evidence to argue that Russians overwhelmingly hold negative attitudes toward the 1990s and that they appreciate and even romanticize three essential features that were a part of Stalinist state, but are still missing in today’s system. These three are state paternalism, decision-making autonomy, and sovereignty.
Paternalism, or state involvement in providing vital social services, is especially important. Stalin and the Bolsheviks introduced what Nicholas failed to deliver: immunization, employment and education for the entire population. Under the system of the today’s early capitalism, however, Russians are consistently denied these vital services or even a simple right for protection from street criminals. As a result, two thirds of the population feel that there is now less order in their country than previously, according to the results of a poll conducted by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion. Many blame the leadership of Boris Yelstin for that; indeed, half of the population wants the former president to stand a trial for what they see as criminal corruption and negligence. The view of Yeltsin as yet another “irresponsible” and therefore “corrupt” ruler compelled Vladimir Putin to emphasize in his programmatic Millennium speech the “paternalistic sentiments” that “have struck deep roots in Russian society” and “must be taken into consideration in social policy.” However, despite consistently high ratings for president Putin, Russians continue to grow pessimistic about the situation. The so-called “national projects” recently launched by the Kremlin are yet to make a difference in people’s lives, and the so-called “law enforcement agencies” are yet to make a successful transition from mafia-like organizations they have become during the 1990s.
Decision-making autonomy too continues to resonate with many Russians. The ruler’s institutional autonomy from internal power centers, such as the nobility, bureaucracy, and military, has of course strong roots in Russia’s traditional political system. However, a reasonable degree of state autonomy is a necessity for any governing structure, and it is plausible to assume that in their support for Stalin, Russians are reacting to the unhealthy devolution of power during the 1990s, rather than longing to restore the single-party dictatorship. Boris Yelstin’s rule has led to a system, in which everything was decided by special deals between state and special interests, such as overbearing oligarchs and powerful regional lobbies. The state was no longer able to serve its people, and the people now voice their opposition to the system. Putin has attempted to restore a measure of state autonomy by depriving powerful oligarchs and regional authorities of ability to blackmail the Kremlin. But the numbers indicate that the public wants Putin to be tougher on elites that are perceived just as corrupt and “selfish.” It is in this context that one must understand why Russians say that Stalin and the Soviet elite as a whole was more patriotic (57% to 6%) and more responsible (39% to 8 %) than the contemporary Russian elite.
Finally, Russians insist on sovereignty and independence of their state. That too has important historical roots, and Russians are proud to have never been conquered or colonized by other powers. Yet no less significant here is the legacy of the 1990s when an involvement of outside governments in Russia’s domestic affairs reached an unprecedented proportion and when a narrowly-based alliance of special domestic and Western interests was busy looting the country. Another aspect of lacking sovereignty is state inability to deal effectively with external threats. Having lived through multiple terrorist attacks and the state persistent inability to provide security, Russians look back to their past. Stalin and the Soviet system again stands out, and Russians overwhelmingly at the 76% levelsee the USSR as an example of security and a country “in which many people believed and were proud.”
It is in these mundane senses that Russians “love” Stalin. It is misleading to interpret strong public support for the revolution, Stalin or the Soviet Union as evidence for the Russians’ inability to come to grips with their past. Instead, such support confirms their refusal to come to grips with the present situation of mass poverty, coupled with a largely inefficient and persistently corrupt state. In the public mind, Yeltsinism, as a system that has created such a state, lives on. Unsurprisingly, a growing sympathy for Stalin strongly correlates with feelings of being “abandoned” by the state. Rather than being an outlandish authoritarian response, it is a natural, protest-like reaction to the political system of the 1990s many features of which remain part of everyday reality. Anywhere in the world people would withdraw their support for a state that consistently denies them sense of dignity and a decent level of living standards. State ability to formulate a paternalistic popular vision continues to matter. For example, Americans seem to love Ronald Reagan because he restored their sense of dignity (even while undermining middle class and economic foundations). French people think highly of Charles De Gaulle partly because the state was then socially paternalistic and autonomous.
Although the above-cited figures hardly indicate rising support for the Stalinist state, they are alarming. They demonstrate that modernization, even a successful one is bound to generate feelings of frustration and disappointment among those left out of the process and that economic recovery is yet to be followed by support among wide social stratums. Russians continue to respect Putin but the data imply that they see their president as a loner while remaining deeply pessimistic about his surrounding political elite and its selfish instincts. This suggests that the Russia’s traditional political cyclefrom liberalization from above to anarchy and then back to state concentrationmay have not yet completed its full swing. On Russia’s historical calendar, Putin may be presiding over completion of the stage of anarchy or Time of Troubles, but the Kremlin is yet to begin the stage of people-supported state concentration. Such concentration should restore faith of Russian people in paternalism, decision-making autonomy and sovereignty of their state.
Andrei P. Tsygankov Program Chair, International Studies Association 2006-07 Associate Professor, International Relations / Political Science San Francisco State University 1600 Holloway Ave. HSS San Francisco, CA 94132 Tel: (415)-338-7493 E-mail: andrei at sfsu.edu http://bss.sfsu.edu/tsygankov/
Nu, zayats, pogodi!
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