[lbo-talk] "Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning"

[Colin Brace]

Bush Was Set on Path to War, British Memo Says

By DON VAN NATTA Jr.
Published: March 27, 2006

LONDON — In the weeks before the United States-led invasion of Iraq,
as the United States and Britain pressed for a second United Nations
resolution condemning Iraq, President Bush's public ultimatum to
Saddam Hussein was blunt: Disarm or face war.

Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain and President Bush arriving for a
White House news conference on Jan. 31, 2003, after a meeting about
Iraq that would be summarized in a memorandum by an adviser to Mr.
Blair.

But behind closed doors, the president was certain that war was
inevitable. During a private two-hour meeting in the Oval Office on
Jan. 31, 2003, he made clear to Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain
that he was determined to invade Iraq without the second resolution,
or even if international arms inspectors failed to find unconventional
weapons, said a confidential memo about the meeting written by Mr.
Blair's top foreign policy adviser and reviewed by The New York Times.

"Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military
planning," David Manning, Mr. Blair's chief foreign policy adviser at
the time, wrote in the memo that summarized the discussion between Mr.
Bush, Mr. Blair and six of their top aides.

"The start date for the military campaign was now penciled in for 10
March," Mr. Manning wrote, paraphrasing the president. "This was when
the bombing would begin."

The timetable came at an important diplomatic moment. Five days after
the Bush-Blair meeting, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was
scheduled to appear before the United Nations to present the American
evidence that Iraq posed a threat to world security by hiding
unconventional weapons.

Although the United States and Britain aggressively sought a second
United Nations resolution against Iraq — which they failed to obtain —
the president said repeatedly that he did not believe he needed it for
an invasion.

Stamped "extremely sensitive," the five-page memorandum, which was
circulated among a handful of Mr. Blair's most senior aides, had not
been made public. Several highlights were first published in January
in the book "Lawless World," which was written by a British lawyer and
international law professor, Philippe Sands. In early February,
Channel 4 in London first broadcast several excerpts from the memo.

Since then, The New York Times has reviewed the five-page memo in its
entirety. While the president's sentiments about invading Iraq were
known at the time, the previously unreported material offers an
unfiltered view of two leaders on the brink of war, yet supremely
confident.

The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a
transition to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated, but
manageable. Mr. Bush predicted that it was "unlikely there would be
internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic
groups." Mr. Blair agreed with that assessment.

The memo also shows that the president and the prime minister
acknowledged that no unconventional weapons had been found inside
Iraq. Faced with the possibility of not finding any before the planned
invasion, Mr. Bush talked about several ways to provoke a
confrontation, including a proposal to paint a United States
surveillance plane in the colors of the United Nations in hopes of
drawing fire, or assassinating Mr. Hussein.

[...]

full: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/international/europe/27memo.html

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  Colin Brace
  Amsterdam