[lbo-talk] Focus on Iran and Palestine, Not Iraq

Julio Huato juliohuato at gmail.com
Fri May 19 09:39:52 PDT 2006


The discussion moved away from this, but I'm just catching up with the postings.

Yoshie wrote:


> We failed the Iraqis, because we couldn't
> force US troops to withdraw before they
> and their local hirelings wrecked Iraq
> and sowed the seeds of a civil war, which
> may possibly last for decades.

I think I now see your point.

But I don't think that, in 2003, a popular movement against the invasion of Iraq was very likely to stop an invasion. Think of what preceded it. Think of 9/11 and its aftermath. Unlike the anti Vietnam war movement, this wasn't preluded by a Civil Rights movement.

(On the contrary, the antiwar movement was kind of prelude for the immigrant movement to erupt.) Yet, also unlike it, people began to move against the invasion of Iraq before it took place.

In history, mass movements of this type take time to accomplish their goals and, when and if they do, it's rarely in a linear fashion. But, even if the explicit demands are not fulfilled, the political landscape winds up transformed.

I don't know how strongly you disagree with my views on this, but I'm convinced that the U.S. political system is extremely robust. The reason is that, historically, it hasn't been credibly challenged by the left -- ever. To me, this implies that for the time being any progressive political transformation in the country is going to take place within the confines of the hated bi-partisan system. One thing is clear to me -- the system is not going to snap anytime soon.

Don't get me wrong -- I think there's a large and rapidly growing gap between the needs of regular working people (basic economic security, universal health care, out of Iraq, etc.) and the inertia of the bi-partisan political system. A major political crisis is being engendered of the kind that presents a tremendous opportunity for progressive change. But we shouldn't underestimate the ability of this political system to repair itself.

Of course, extreme events occur. But, most likely -- and that's the conclusion I draw from this -- *the most* we can expect from the antiwar movement (and the enthusiastic, but fairly unorganized and otherwise restricted, immigrants movement) is a different political climate, a shift in the composition of congress and other government branches away from what Bush and his constituency represent. I admit that in the Weltanschauung of the radical left, this is too reformist a scenario, but I would not sneer at it. The international political climate would improve a lot as a result, and that's a great plus.

But back to Iraq -- right now, the U.S. intrusion is not making things easier (but harder) for a viable nation to emerge from the mess. So, if the concern is Iraq's national viability, then we should be insisting in getting the U.S. out.


> There are mass sentiments against the Iraq
> War, but the sentiments have not been
> translated into any mass activity since the
> beginning of the invasion.

We may be seeing two completely different antiwar movements. *After* the invasion of Iraq, I witnessed massive antiwar events. I recall the huge marches in Washington, DC in October 2003 and in New York City in August 2004 (during the Republican convention). I didn't attend the April march in NYC, but I read it was massive.

On the other hand, we should not underestimate "mass sentiments," even when they do not appear to timely translate into growing, massive, and disruptive demonstrations. A tremendous amount of indispensable activity takes place at a "molecular" (to use Trotsky's old metaphor), individual, or small-group scale -- in schools, workplaces, churches, neighborhoods, over the net, etc. This ferment, often unnoticed, is crucial in the evolution of a movement. Big marches may be sexy, but they cannot replace short-distance human-scale activity.


> So, Washington
> won't withdraw from Iraq any time soon;
> and if it did, it would do so only to attack
> Iran, for instance, blaming Tehran, not
> itself, for the civil war in Iraq.

This is too fatalistic for me. In Washington, things are in flux. The most obvious, immediate, and blunt impact of a withdrawal from Iraq would be... the recognition that for the time being Iraq has been lost to U.S. imperialism. How is that going to make it more likely for the U.S. to engage in another (much worse!) military adventure? I don't exclude the possibility of madness at the top, but the proper way to minimize it is by defeating them in Iraq, rather than abandon that position.


> Our failure has helped Washington wreck one
> nation in the Near East, which wasn't free
> but at least modern; let us not help it
> destroy another.

I agree. But the right way to prevent a war with Iran is by defeating U.S. imperialism in Iraq. The main factor, of course, is the people of Iraq -- the local resistance to the occupation. You seem skeptical of a coherent unified resistance to the occupation in Iraq. But there's little we can do from here to help them in that regard -- except keep demanding that the troops be brought home. That's the best (only, really) effective way to do our part.

Julio



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