[lbo-talk] Iran-U.S. tussle fuels anxieties in oil heartland

uvj at vsnl.com uvj at vsnl.com
Sat May 20 12:30:48 PDT 2006


The Hindu http://www.hinduonnet.com/

Saturday, May 20, 2006

Opinion

Iran-U.S. tussle fuels anxieties in oil heartland http://www.hindu.com/2006/05/20/stories/2006052004091000.htm

Atul Aneja

While their dependence on the U.S. is extensive, the GCC countries are in no position to adopt a confrontational posture vis-à-visIran.

THE GROWING tensions between Iran and the United States have alarmed the resource rich Arab Gulf countries - Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Oman.

These six nations, part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), are located on Iran's doorstep. Together they possess nearly 40 per cent of the world's oil reserves. The escalation of tensions is a matter of grave concern for them as they are close allies of the U.S. All of them are part of a U.S. regional security alliance formed to ensure oil supplies to the West remain undisrupted. For instance, Bahrain hosts the headquarters of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet. The Jufair naval facility there is one of the nerve centres from where the movement of U.S. warships, including aircraft carriers that roam the Gulf waters is coordinated. The Al Udeid air base in neighbouring Qatar has the longest runway in the Gulf; it plays a central role in providing logistics and surveillance support for operations in the area. Not too far away, the port of the Fujairah in the UAE acquires special importance in the execution of American contingency plans. The facilities at this port will come into play in case Iran blocks the Strait of Hormuz. In such an eventuality, Fujairah, which straddles the Gulf of Oman and is closer to the Arabian Sea, will be used to offload U.S. supplies. The cargo would then be dispatched by road to the other Gulf countries across a well-developed communication network. Alternatively, goods could be sent overland to the port of Jebel Ali in Dubai on the opposite end, for further redistribution.

All the GCC countries are fully aware that a war between Iran and the U.S. runs counter to their national interests - they are likely to be caught in the crossfire. Sabre rattling by Iran and the U.S. has not helped matters either. In a show of strength, Iran conducted well-publicised war games, codenamed Great Prophet, in the Strait of Hormuz. An estimated 17,000 troops, 1,500 gunboats, fighter jets, and helicopters participated in the manoeuvres conducted between March 31 and April 6. Iran also showcased its Fajir-3 ballistic missile, which it claimed could evade radar and was capable of destroying several targets simultaneously.

The Strait of Hormuz as a location for the exercise was significant. By conducting the exercise there, Iran appeared to signal that it had the means of blocking the channel through which one-third of the world oil supplies passed. The head of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards, Yahya Rahim Safavi, said: "The importance of the `Great Prophet' manoeuvre lies in the time and geographical place as well as the arms used."

Countering the Iranian moves, the U.S., on its part, publicised the testing of the bunker-busting "deep penetration" bombs in the Nevada desert. The tests were a thinly veiled warning to Iran that the U.S. could strike at its underground nuclear facilities from the air. There have also been reports that the Americans would conduct military exercises in the area in May.

During these manoeuvres, codenamed Arabian Gauntlet, U.S. forces were likely to test their capability to remove mines in the Strait of Hormuz. They were also expected to test a manoeuvre aimed at countering an attack by "enemy" boats laden with explosives.

While their dependence on the U.S. is extensive, the GCC countries are in no position to adopt a confrontational posture vis-à-vis Iran. This is because Iran can exercise significant leverage in most of the Gulf countries. Iranian influence has been deeply entrenched either on account of the close ties that key power centres in Teheran maintain with the Shia communities in this zone or because of the close economic ties that it maintains with some of the major GCC countries.

In the case of the UAE, Iran's deeply embedded relationship with Dubai is well known and has a high visibility. Visitors to the city can see several old buildings bearing the characteristic blue tiles and motifs of Persian architecture. The Iranian hospital in Dubai is a major landmark as are several Iranian schools spread across the city. Nearly a quarter of Dubai's population traces its origins to Iran.

On the economic side, more than 7,000 Iranian companies are known to be operating in Dubai. Iranian businesses have entered a variety of fields including banking, oil, and real estate. The Iranian Trade Centre and the Iranian Business Council are playing an active role in promoting trade and investments. The state run English language Iran Daily published from Teheran points out that trade between Iran and Dubai stands at $4.4 billion. This is mainly because the existence of U.S. sanctions inhibits direct trade, enabling Dubai to emerge as the re-export hub for goods bound for Iran.

The windfall profits arising out of the spurt of oil prices and the stiffening standoff with the U.S. has triggered a massive capital flight from Iran to Dubai involving billions of dollars. Iranians have also invested heavily in Dubai's booming real estate sector that was opened to foreigners three years ago. The intensity of the interaction between Iran and Dubai can be gauged from the existence of nearly 50 two-way monthly flights between them, apart from visits by ships, which are also used as a means of inexpensive transportation.

Similarly, Iran exercises considerable influence in Bahrain, mainly because of its majority Shia population. Ruled by a Sunni monarchy, which is known for its openness, the Shias in Bahrain have acquired a high political profile as seen in a series of political demonstrations in the capital Manama recently. Black flags, characteristic of Shia influence, are pervasive in some of the underclass localities on the edge of the city.

Iran had laid claim to Bahrain in 1970, but dropped its demand as the British withdrew from the island in 1971. Following the Iranian revolution, the radical Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain was accused of orchestrating a failed coup attempt in 1981. Its objective was to apparently bring to power Hojjat ol-Eslam Hadi al-Mudarrisi, a Shia cleric based in Iran, as the head of a theocratic government. Iran has, however, denied any association with the plot.

As in the case of Bahrain, there is a perception that Iran can exercise influence among the Shias in Saudi Arabia. This belief acquires a larger geopolitical dimension because there is a concentration of Shias in Saudi Arabia's Hawsa region. The area, which is part of the eastern provinces, holds the Kingdom's largest oil reserves. It is also physically linked with Shia strongholds in Bahrain across the 26-km-long King Fahd causeway.

Iran's diplomatic initiative

Aware of the anxieties among the Arab Gulf countries, Iranians have launched a major diplomatic initiative to engage them. Former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visited Kuwait in mid-April. During that visit, he expressed confidence that Kuwait, where thousands of U.S. troops have been positioned, would not take sides in case of a conflict. Separately, the head of the Iranian Security Council, Ali Larijani, visited the UAE, where he said Iran was ready for mediation by the GCC countries to ease tensions with the U.S. Iranian Foreign Minister Monouchehr Mottaki has visited Bahrain, while Qatar's Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani was in Teheran on May 1 for talks with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Trapped in the middle of an Iran-U.S. tussle for influence, the GCC countries have been treading the diplomatic ground gingerly. At a "consultative summit" in Riyadh on May 6, the GCC countries indicated that they did not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon, but were also opposed to the use of force against it. Their position vis-à-vis Iran, so far, bears greater similarity with the stance taken by Russia and China than the one adopted by the U.S. and its European allies. However, pressures on them to step out of the neutral zone and adopt a more pro-western position are bound to rise in case tensions between Iran and the U.S. intensify. These would be hard to resist, despite the dangers they would pose to the economic and political stability of this sensitive region.

Copyright © 2006, The Hindu.



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