On 5/24/06, Doug Henwood <dhenwood at panix.com> wrote:
> > Digs? Or are they just pointing out some real problems (as if a
> > revolutionary Trotskyist government would have an easier time of it!)?
On 5/24/06, Yoshie Furuhashi <critical.montages at gmail.com> wrote:
> WSWS's single-minded focus on Evo shows that it's going by its usual
> "revolutionary" fomulas, rather than a close look at Bolivia's
> reality. ...
here's what WSWS says:
>... Despite the radical-sounding character of Morales's proclamation,
the so-called nationalization is the culmination of a process that
began in October 2003, as a means to placate the popular anger that
brought down President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. In May 2005, the
Bolivian parliament approved the law upon which the current
nationalization is based.
> His decree is in line with a regionwide—and indeed, international—trend by governments to demand a bigger share of the windfall profits being pumped out of the ground by multinational energy and mining conglomerates. Ecuador, whose president Alfredo Palacio has among the region's closest ties to Washington, recently seized the operations of US Occidental Petroleum Corp. over a contract dispute. Meanwhile, Chile, long considered a model for IMF "free-market" policies, has imposed new royalties on foreign miners.<
This effort to put Evo's policies in context, if accurate, prevents us from hyping his policies too much.
>[IMF-man] Furtado's announcement came as no surprise to the Morales
government. On May 7, Correo del Sur published an article saying: "The
government, through its planning and development minister, Carlos
Villegas, announced that it was elaborating a National Development
Plan based on the nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry,
inclusion and social justice, in addition to economic and financial
stability."
>These words strongly suggest that the IMF was aware of, even that it
was consulted over, Morales's plan to nationalize the hydrocarbon
industry. Recent developments support this view.
>Since Furtado's announcement, for example, Morales has made it clear
that an increase to the price of natural gas is necessary to face
several economic problems, like financing the $270 million fiscal
deficit, without resorting to international cooperation.<
this doesn't make much sense to me, but if it's possible that Morales consulted the IMF, it should be looked into. And on what terms did Morales talk to the IMF? with hat in hand? or in a defiant way?
>During the social upheavals of 2003-2005, Evo Morales, then the
leader of the coca growers' union, played a conciliatory role and, on
many occasions, maintained himself and the peasant organization on the
sidelines of the struggle.
>After Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada resigned, Morales declared, "We will
give a breathing space to [new] President Carlos Mesa, a truce, so
that he can organize himself and carry out his promises to the
country." Bolivian workers and peasants thought otherwise, however,
and Mesa was overthrown after 20 months in office.
>From this point of view, Morales's election as president represents a
last-ditch effort to rescue capitalism in Bolivia. His job, he is now
told by the IMF, is to ensure that the masses do not interfere with
the results obtained from implementing the IMF policies...<
whatever one thinks of the rhetoric, it's likely true that Morales is not anti-capitalist _per se_. (Nor are most of the Bolivian workers and peasants, I would guess.) The Morales government is _reforming_ Bolivian capitalism (in a good direction, not like IMF "reforms"). It's possible that this could go in a revolutionary direction, however, as pressure from international capital and its Bolivian allies gets stronger. Efforts to "save the system" have turned in the revolutionary direction in the past (e.g., Allende's Chile).
>... Clearly, Morales foresees the very real possibility that he will
have to rely on these same security forces to suppress the kind of
mass upheavals that have toppled president after president in the
Andean country.<
on the other hand, Morales may be able to turn the military in favor of reform or even revolution, the way Chavez did. We can't say what "Morales forsees." He may not forsee much at all, given the uncertainty of the future.
I think the problem with the WSWS report is the hidden vision of what's happening. There seems to be an assumption that Bolivian "workers and peasants" are not just militant at this point, but basically revolutionary, i.e., have more than class consciousness but revolutionary socialist consciousness. Or they see this consciousness as bubbling close to the surface.
On top of that, there seems to be the 4th International's assumption (derived from Trotsky's "The Revolution Betrayed," "The Transitional Program," etc.) that Bolivia faces a "crisis of leadership": _if only_ a good leader were to arise -- and Morales isn't that leader, according to the WSWS -- who mobilized the revolutionary potential of the masses, Bolivia would move post-haste to revolution.
I dunno, but it seems to me that good leaders do not drop from the sky and they're not innate in the mind (or the program). Both good leaders and good movements arise out of the process of struggle, within the specific historical context encountered.
It seems reasonable to criticize Morales, but it's wrong to compare him to an idealized leader. It's also useful to examine the divisions among and within the Bolivian workers and peasants.
In the end, however, I find WSWS's biases easier to take than the NYT's. -- Jim Devine / "These capitalists generally act harmoniously and in concert, to fleece the people." -- Abraham Lincoln (attributed)