[lbo-talk] Street-fighting Days

Michael Hoover hooverm at scc-fl.edu
Thu May 25 03:48:55 PDT 2006



>>> critical.montages at gmail.com 05/22/06 6:36 PM >>>
When Ahmadinejad won a surprise victory, I posted the following, to give people a flavor of so-called "reformists'" neoliberal economic politics: <blockquote>* Food and housing subsidies, as well as public education and health care continued as long as Khomeini was alive. But with the Ayatollah's death and the election of Hashemi Rafsanjani to the presidency of Iran, neoliberal policies replaced those of the welfare state of the Khomeini years. This marked a new era; in the late 1980s, when President Rafsanjani came to power, open-market policies led to economic measures such as devaluation of the currency (which increased the cost of living for the poor), privatization (which left many workers unprotected), and the decline of social services, all of which forced many women to enter the labour market. (Roksana Bahramitash, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Women's Economic Role: The Case of Iran," International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 16.4, Summer 2003, p. 565) Yoshie <<<<<>>>>>

several days behind on e-mail, trying to catch up...

Post-1979 revolution Iran inherited a fairly extensive social welfare system that the Shah's regime developed as part of what became identified - and eventually criticized - as a "western modernization" program. Khomeini and the Council of Guardians (a committee of clerics estabished to determine the ostensbly Islamic- correctness of parliamentary legislation) put an Islamic social justice spin on the "social safety net" as part of the official rejection of both capitalism and socialism. Food and housing subsidies were necessitated by the combined impact of western - principally U.S. - economic sanctions and costs of the war against Iraq.

Widespread opposition to the Shah and his "western" modernization programs had resulted in a broad-based coalition of social forces whose political and religious differences were blurred in the heady days of revolutionary victory. The Khomeini faction's consolidation of power was facilitated by a "critical mass" of committed clerics and laity. The former were, in effect, a vanguard with a vision and a plan that exploited the differences and subsequent confusion that emerged in the immediate post-revolutionary period. In the process, Khomeini and his clerical cohorts replaced the authoritarianism of the Shah and his secular elites with their own.

Khomein's interpretation of Islam was a self-admitted novel one. His belief in direct clerical rule and guardianship by a supposed expert - such as the likes of himself - in Islamic law was not prominent in Shia doctrine and it had not previously been held by many Iranian religious leaders. The Council of Guardians, arrogating for itself the power of absolute veto in the new "Islamic Republic", summarily struck down much of the legislation passed by the less-sectarian parliamentary majority. Included among the measures that were blocked were various price and market controls, nationalizations of certain industries, the financial sector, and foreign trade, and expropriation of property and redistribution to the poor, major rural and agricultural reforms.

Significantly, Khomeini and the Council's interpretation of Islamic law was influenced by opposition to the above legislation, particularly, elements of the merchant class that had provided substantial financial support for the revolution and urban and rural landowners, among them clerics aligned with Khomeini.

Struggle between moderates and militants (if that is an appropriate term here) would probably have continued for some time had it not been for the Iraqi invasion. And, in fact, political differences reemerged following the war which had provided an excuse for poor economic performance, minimized criticism of the government, and sustained regime support. Nevertheless, the Khomeini vanguard had probably solidifed power in the days prior to the war through a combination of sectarian patronage and repression. Michael Hoover

Please Note: Due to Florida's very broad public records law, most written communications to or from College employees regarding College business are public records, available to the public and media upon request. Therefore, this e-mail communication may be subject to public disclosure.



More information about the lbo-talk mailing list