Yes, the Libyan solution would be possible if Washington made a serious offer -- Rafsanjani would be overjoyed, Khamenei would take that offer, too, and the President of Iran would not be in a position to reject it.
But is the offer serious? For, if that's all that Washington wanted, it could have made the same offer in the Khatami years.
Take a look at this BusinessWeek article: "Iran: The Mideast's Model Economy? Not long ago, it was a basket case. But now growth is strong as oil prices soar and Tehran eases restrictions" (24 May 2004, <http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/04_21/b3884094.htm?chan=mz>).
The BusinessWeek writer all but kissed the hands of the clerical rulers of Iran.
Tehran was liberalizing Iran's economy: "The country has racked up growth in the 5% range for four years running, thanks to high oil revenues, abundant rainfall, and a gradual easing of the choking economic restrictions ushered in by the 1979 revolution. Not long ago, Iran was a bona fide basket case struggling to pay its debts. Now its external accounts are under control, with the trade balance in surplus and substantial hard currency reserves of $35 billion. The government is also raising money internally by privatizing shipping, auto, and other assets" 24 May 2004, <http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/04_21/b3884094.htm?chan=mz>).
And it was seeking to assist Washinton in Afghanistan and Iraq:
<blockquote>Despite the nuclear tensions, the optimists point out that the U.S. and Iran share plenty of regional interests. Iran despised both the Taliban in Afghanistan and Iraq's strongman, Saddam Hussein, and applauded the toppling of both. Since then, the Iranian government has encouraged local businesses to supply both countries with goods that range from fuel to cement. While some Iranian factions may be contributing to the turmoil in Iraq, the mainstream wants calm to return to its neighbor in order to hasten the departure of U.S. troops. The Iranians reckon that once the Americans go, a Shiite-led government friendly to the Islamic Republic will come to power. In an interview with BusinessWeek, Iranian Vice-President Mohamed Ali Abtahi poured scorn on the rebel Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr's troublemaking "is providing the Americans with a reason to stay" in Iraq, the vice-president said.
(24 May 2004, <http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/04_21/b3884094.htm?chan=mz>)</blockquote>
Really, what's not to like?
Besides, if Washington had made a serious offer back then, it could have conceivably prevented the rise of Ahmadinejad -- notwithstanding the simmering discontent of workers and slum dwellers that the BusinessWeek article completely ignored -- for that would have given neoliberal "reformists" a tangible result to boast of and lifted the morale of educated urban professionals and small producers who love America and want to study in it and do business with it.
I suspect that the reason it didn't make that offer when it made perfect sense to make it was Washington wanted a full neo-con prize: the total restructuring of Iran at Washington's, not the clerical gerontocrats', pace, and an overtly (not covertly) pro-Tel-Aviv government.
-- Yoshie <http://montages.blogspot.com/> <http://mrzine.org> <http://monthlyreview.org/>